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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
ANXIETY AND VULNERABILITY TO ANXIETY DISORDERS 
 Anxiety and Fear 
 The terms “anxiety” and “fear” are often used interchangeably. Both of these 
terms refer to an unpleasant emotional state characterized by tension and 
apprehension in response to threatening/dangerous situations (Rachman, 1998). 
However, a distinction can be made considering the cause and course of them 
(Rachman, 1998; Barlow, 2002). Fear is an intense feeling related to an immediate 
threat and it usually diminishes when the source of threat disappears, whereas 
anxiety often is less intense than fear and it can exist even when there is not an 
immediate threat. Hence, the source of anxiety is often less clear, less predictable and 
it can be harder to control.  
 From an evolutionary perspective, both fear (i.e. to deal with dangerous 
situations) and anxiety (i.e. to detect threat earlier, better preparation for a 
dangerous situation) are considered adaptive states that are of key benefit to 
increasing chances of survival (Eysenck, 1992; Clark & Beck, 2011). However, when 
these negative emotional states are prolonged in the absence of an immediate threat, 
they may actually become non-adaptive which is typically the case for anxiety 
disorders (Barlow, 2002; Gray & McNaughton, 2003; Clark & Beck, 2011). 
1 CHAPTER 
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 Vulnerability to Anxiety Disorders 
 Anxiety disorders are amongst the most common problems of modern society 
with an estimated one-year prevalence rate of 18.1% in the US (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, 
& Walters, 2005); and a global prevalence rate (considering 6-month to 12-month 
estimates) ranging from 2.4% to 29.8% across forty-four countries (Baxter, Scott, Vos, 
& Whiteford, 2013). Therefore, understanding risk factors for the development and 
maintenance of these disorders has great importance.  
 Among many possible risk factors leading to anxiety disorders (i.e. genetics, 
early life experiences, trauma, personality factors; Barlow, 2000), cognitive risk 
factors are crucial since they are predominant features of anxiety, underlying various 
anxiety disorders (Eysenck, 1992). Moreover, cognitive factors are frequently 
considered the more proximal causes of anxiety, where negative life-events or 
personality factors influence cognitive factors (for instance, worrying) which is then 
linked to elevated risk for anxiety disorders. 
 Cognitive Approach to Anxiety 
 Cognitive theories in anxiety often suggested that biases in information 
processing could play a key role in anxiety disorders (for a review, see van Bockstaele, 
Verschuere, Tibboel, De Houwer, Crombez, & Koster, 2014). One of the most 
influential cognitive approaches in anxiety is proposed by Beck and Clark (1997); 
three-stage schema-based information processing model. According to this model, 
anxiety is related to information processing biases at several stages. Firstly, anxious 
individuals are more sensitive to threat-related information; hence, they allocate 
greater attention to such information (stage 1). After allocation of attention to threat, 
primal threat mode is activated (stage 2). This stage mainly serves survival purposes 
and includes affective, behavioral, cognitive and physiological responses to enhance 
safety, reduce danger, and cope with threat (i.e. hypervigilance). Primal threat mode 
then leads to the final stage secondary elaboration where coping strategies are 
evaluated (stage 3). This stage is usually slow, effortful and maladaptive for anxious 
individuals (i.e. worrying). Recently, this dominant model was revised and extended, 
and “increased threat expectancies” were brought up as a key (causal) underlying 
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component able to account for abnormal threat-related information processing in 
anxiety, as well as impaired value processing more generally (Grupe & Nitschke, 
2013). 
 Another important cognitive model in anxiety is proposed by Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews (1988). This model has examined the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying  vulnerability for anxiety and tried to explain why anxious individuals are 
characterized by biases during information processing. They suggest that high state 
anxiety, a transient emotional state of tension and apprehension (Spielberger, 1972), 
biases the automatic affective evaluation of the threat value of incoming stimuli 
(affective decision mechanism). Hence, high state anxious individuals are more likely 
to evaluate the threat value of a stimulus as high. If the stimulus is perceived as 
threatening, resource allocation mechanism gets activated depending on the level of 
trait anxiety, a personality trait referring to individual differences in proneness to 
anxiety (Spielberger, 1972). Individuals high in trait anxiety, have a tendency to 
subsequently orient attention to threatening stimuli. Low trait anxious individuals, on 
the other hand, keep their attention away from such stimuli.  
 Willams et al.’s model (1988) has been criticized based on the notion that only 
high anxious individuals would have a stable bias to orient towards threatening 
information. However, consistently orienting attention away from the source of 
threat and completely ignoring it probably would be problematic since orienting to 
potential danger is important to attain safety. Considering this critical point, Mogg 
and Bradley (1998) proposed another cognitive model. According to the cognitive-
motivational model by Mogg and Bradley (1998), attentional resources are also 
allocated to a negative stimulus depending on threat value. Threat value of a stimulus 
is evaluated via the valence evaluation system. Depending on the perceived threat 
value, the so-called goal engagement system gets activated. If the stimulus is 
perceived as highly threatening, the goal engagement system will lead to prioritized 
processing of this stimulus and attentional resources will be allocated to it. 
Importantly, this model proposes that high trait anxious individuals have a tendency 
to overestimate threat during valence evaluation. Therefore, high trait anxious 
individuals direct their attention to negative stimuli even when the actual threat 
CHAPTER 1 
 
4 
value is deemed only mild. However, low trait anxious individuals attend to threat 
only when the actual threat value is high. 
 The theories mentioned so far emphasize the role of information processing 
biases with regard to threat-related stimuli specifically. However, effects of anxiety 
on information processing can be observed even in the absence of threat (see Grupe 
& Nitschke, 2013). For example, the hypervigilance theory by Eysenck (1992) 
proposes that anxious individuals have a general tendency to scan their environment 
widely since they are vigilant for any possible threat. Therefore, they can be sensitive 
to any kind of distractor (whether it is threat-related or not). This theory also suggests 
that the influence of high trait anxiety can be observed mainly when state anxiety is 
also high. In a related matter, Eysenck and Calvo (1992) proposed the processing 
efficiency theory. This theory makes a distinction between processing efficiency 
which refers to the cognitive effort invested to accomplish a task (i.e. the manner in 
which the cognitive resources are allocated towards a desired outcome) and 
performance effectiveness which refers to the quality of performance (outcome, i.e. 
accuracy rates). According to the processing efficiency theory, anxiety typically 
impairs processing efficiency rather than performance effectiveness. This is observed 
especially under stressful conditions (i.e. while performing a challenging task). More 
specifically, this theory proposes that high trait anxiety leads to elevated worry (often 
regarded as a cognitive component of anxiety; Mathews, 1990) and due to elevated 
worry occupying limited cognitive resources, anxious individuals show impaired 
processing efficiency. However, the processing efficiency theory does not take the 
influence of neutral or emotional distractors into account and this theory also does 
not specify which cognitive mechanisms are influenced by anxiety. 
 Considering the limitations of the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992), Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo (2007) proposed the attentional 
control theory. The attentional control theory posits that anxiety disrupts the balance 
between attentional systems (top-down, goal-driven system vs bottom up, stimulus-
driven system; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Bishop, 2007), and as such anxiety impairs 
attentional control by reducing processing efficiency. Furthermore, according to this 
theory, anxiety-related impairments in attentional control are observed even more in 
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the presence of a threat-related distractor; yet high anxiety is also associated with 
impairments in core cognitive mechanisms like attentional control (Pacheco-Unguetti, 
Acosta, Callejas, & Lupiáñez, 2010; Bishop, 2009) and working memory (WM; Qi, 
Chen, Hitchman, Zeng, Ding, Li & Hu, 2014a; see also Berggren & Derakshan, 2013 for 
a review) even in the absence of threat. 
 Considering these prominent cognitive views and theoretical approaches in 
anxiety, this dissertation mainly focused on anxiety-related biases as well as 
impairments in information processing as vulnerability to anxiety. Our main aim was 
to gain a greater understanding of cognitive risk factors of anxiety at the behavioral 
and neurophysiological levels. In the following sections, we will describe the key 
constructs under investigation in the current thesis (i.e., WM and attentional control 
mechanisms). Finally, we present an overview of the empirical chapters that form the 
bulk of this thesis. 
WORKING MEMORY 
 WM is a limited capacity cognitive storage system which is essential to 
perform complex tasks (Baddeley, 1992). According to Baddeley (2003), WM has four 
main sub-systems: a phonological loop (for processing verbal information), a 
visuospatial sketchpad (for processing visual-spatial information), an episodic buffer 
(for the integration of information between WM components and also linking WM to 
long term memory), and a central executive (executive control of attention and 
information processing; Baddeley, 2003). 
 In many situations, information not only needs to be kept online in order to 
successfully complete a given task, but it has to be timely altered and updated to 
meet specific task demands. A key construct in this literature is the notion of WM 
capacity (as opposed to short term memory “span” only). Capacity of WM is 
explained in terms of one’s ability to process task-relevant information and resist 
distractor interference (Shipstead, Harrison, & Engle, 2012). In order to explain 
individual differences in WM capacity, three broad mechanisms are suggested 
(Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall, & Engle, 2014) – namely; primary memory (for storage 
and maintenance of task-relevant information in WM); attention control (ability to 
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remain focused on goal-relevant information); and secondary memory (for retrieving 
information). 
 Among the components of WM and processes contributing to WM capacity, 
the central executive/attentional control is often associated with anxiety-related 
impairments (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). Therefore, we describe 
hereafter this mechanism more extensively, considering its clear and strong 
relationship with anxiety. 
 Sub-functions of Central Executive 
 The central executive sub-system of WM has three main functions – namely; 
(1) inhibition, (2) shifting, and (3) updating WM (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, 
Howerter, & Wager, 2000). (1) Inhibition function is defined as an ability to actively 
ignore or suppress task-irrelevant while focusing on task-relevant information (Kok, 
1999; Miyake et al., 2000). (2) Shifting function is defined as an ability to switch 
between two cognitive tasks flexibly (Monsell, 1996). Lastly, (3) Updating function is 
defined as an ability to actively monitor and update task-relevant information (Morris 
& Jones, 1990).  
 Anxiety has been related to inefficient processing of all these sub-functions 
(see Berggren & Derakshan, 2013 for a review). The influence of anxiety on these 
functions is further described in the next sections. 
WORKING MEMORY IN RELATION TO ATTENTIONAL CONTROL AND 
ANXIETY 
 Attentional Control 
 WM processes are strongly associated with attentional control (Baddeley, 
2003; Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012; Shipstead et al., 2014). Accordingly, inefficient 
recruitment of attentional control can also lead to inefficient functioning of WM. 
Efficient processing of attentional control relies on the interaction between two sub-
systems of attention: Bottom-up system and Top-down system (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002; Theeuwes, 2010; see also Posner & Petersen, 1990). The bottom-up attentional 
system is stimulus-driven and reflexive. It is easily influenced by novel, salient stimuli 
                                                       GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
7 
in the environment (such as threat-related stimuli). By comparison, the top-down 
attentional system is goal-directed and volitional. It relies on experience, knowledge 
and ongoing task goals. According to Corbetta & Shulman (2002), when a salient (or 
emotionally laden) stimulus is detected, the bottom-up attention system “breaks in” 
and interrupts activity of the top-down attention control one (see also Uddin, 2015). 
 The interaction between top-down and bottom-up attentional systems is 
crucial since it determines to what extent individuals are able to inhibit interference 
by a potential threat and remain focused on their current goals (Pashler, Johnston, & 
Ruthruff, 2001; Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). Furthermore, anxiety is an important 
factor which can greatly influence the balance between the top-down and bottom-up 
systems (Eysenck et al., 2007; Bishop, 2007). In the following section, we start by 
describing the top-down factors and their relationship to anxiety, followed by a 
description of bottom-up factors related to anxiety. We end this section by describing 
how the context, which is defined here as the amount of ongoing cognitive tasks, also 
influences the balance between bottom-up and top-down processing in relation to 
anxiety. 
 Top-down influences: Attentional Control and Working Memory 
 The balance between top-down and bottom-up attentional control might be 
highly influenced by a distracting stimulus since such stimulus may enhance bottom-
up processing while depleting top-down control. This is often the case with high 
anxious individuals especially when there is a threat-related distractor (Bishop, 
Duncan, Brett, & Lawrance, 2004; Bishop, 2007), supporting the view of increased 
attentional bias towards threat in anxiety at the expense of top-down attention 
control (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). 
Furthermore, recent theoretical accounts propose that high trait anxiety might be 
related to general deficits in attentional control regardless of the presence of threat 
in the environment (see Eysenck et al., 2007; Berggren & Derakshan, 2013 for 
reviews). Specifically, high trait anxiety has been associated with deficits in top-down 
attentional control (Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010; Bishop, 2009). 
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 Anxiety-related impairments in attentional control can be observed through 
the central executive and its three functions (Eysenck et al., 2007); inhibition, shifting 
and updating (Miyake et al., 2000). Early theoretical accounts suggested that effects 
of anxiety on updating function can be weaker compared to shifting and inhibition 
functions since updating might be more related to the storage of necessary 
information rather than attentional control per se (Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck & 
Derakshan, 2009). However, recent developments in this area indicated that updating 
function is also influenced by anxiety, though impairments in this function might be 
observed more clearly at a neurophysiological rather than purely behavioral level (i.e. 
Qi et al., 2014a). Furthermore, it should also be noted that although these three sub-
functions of central executive are dissociable, they are all highly correlated with each 
other (Miyake et al., 2000).  
 Studies concerning the role of anxiety in inhibition, shifting and updating are 
presented below: 
(1) Inhibition 
 Anxiety is associated with difficulties in filtering out or suppressing task 
irrelevant information. This has been investigated in several studies using various 
tasks such as: a matching task where participants need to decide if two stimuli are the 
same while ignoring task-irrelevant negative information (Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & 
Lawrence, 2004); a visual search task where participants need to focus on the shapes 
and detect the target while ignoring the colors of the shapes (Moser, Becker, & 
Moran, 2012); a change detection task where participants need to focus on certain 
stimuli and monitor whether specific features of these stimuli have changed or not 
while ignoring task irrelevant stimuli (Qi, Ding, & Li, 2014b; Stout, Shackman & Larson, 
2013; Stout, Shackman, Johnson, & Larson, 2015) and an antisaccade task where 
participants need to look away from target stimuli and suppress it (antisaccade) or 
simply look at the target stimuli (prosaccade) depending on the instructions 
(Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & Eysenck, 2009; Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a). 
All these studies showed that elevated trait anxiety (at the sub-clinical level) is related 
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to greater difficulties in performing the task efficiently while ignoring task-irrelevant 
information. 
(2) Shifting 
 High anxious individuals have also greater difficulties when they need to 
switch between two different tasks and use their attention flexibly. For example, this 
has been demonstrated via an arithmetical task where participants need to switch 
between addition/subtraction or multiplication/division (Derakshan, Smyth, & 
Eysenck, 2009) and a mixed antisaccade task where participants need to look at the 
stimuli (prosaccade) or look away from the stimuli (antisaccade) depending on the 
cue shown prior to each trial/target (Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 2008; Ansari & 
Derakshan, 2011b). 
(3) Updating 
 High anxiety is also associated with impairments in monitoring and updating 
task-relevant information. This has been shown via a modified flanker task where 
participants need to perform two different tasks simultaneously (Qi, Zeng, Luo, Duan, 
Ding, Hu, & Li, 2014c). In this task, participants need to identify the orientation of a 
target arrow in the middle while ignoring the distracter arrows around it (task 1). 
Meanwhile, they need to remember one (low load) or six (high load) letters which are 
presented at the beginning of each trial (task 2). In this study, Qi et al. showed that 
anxious individuals have difficulties performing the task especially under high load 
when the task is more demanding. Another study, using a change detection task 
where participants needed to actively monitor the orientation of the certain shapes, 
showed that high anxious participants utilized their cognitive resources less efficiently 
as compared to low anxious participants (Qi et al., 2014b). 
Bottom-up influences: Attentional Bias towards Threat 
 The influence of anxiety on cognitive performance is also highly dependent on 
the negative/threatening/aversive content of a task due to attentional bias towards 
such stimuli. Attentional bias is defined as a tendency to notice and focus on 
threatening information in the environment (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The critical role 
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of attentional bias towards threat on development and maintenance of clinical 
anxiety is also highlighted in many cognitive theories in anxiety (MacLeod, Mathews, 
& Tata, 1986; Eysenck, 1992; Williams et al., 1988; Beck & Clark, 2007).  
 The direct link between attentional bias and anxiety has also been investigated 
using bias modification techniques (see MacLeod & Mathews, 2012 for a review). In 
one such study (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002), a 
specific attentional bias was induced either towards threat (participants were trained 
to attend to threat-related stimuli) or away from it (they were trained to attend to 
emotionally neutral stimuli). In this study, MacLeod et al. (2002) observed that 
participants with an attentional bias towards threat showed increased vulnerability to 
a stressor (a difficult anagram task) and elevated anxiety. Results of this study suggest 
a direct link between attentional bias and vulnerability to anxiety. 
 As summarized above, the link between anxiety and attentional bias has been 
well established. Early attentional bias towards threat-related information can also 
influence a number of cognitive processes at various levels and in different directions. 
In order to understand the role of attentional bias on information processing in 
anxiety, it is important to clarify how bias-related influences appear at different 
stages of information processing under different conditions. The second empirical 
chapter of this thesis directly examined this question. 
 Context: Task Load 
 According to the load theory of selective attention and cognitive control 
(Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Lavie, 2005), the actual influence of 
distracting information on cognition depends on the type of load experienced at a 
given moment in time by the subject, with the contrast made between perceptual vs 
cognitive/WM load in this model. This theory posits that high perceptual load is 
related to reduced interference by distractors. Accordingly, studies investigating the 
influence of anxiety on performance considering perceptual load showed increased 
distractibility in relation to elevated anxiety only under low perceptual load (Bishop, 
Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007; Bishop, 2009). However, as opposed to perceptual load, 
cognitive (WM) load has been related to increased interference by distractors (Lavie 
et al., 2004). In accordance with this view, the attentional control theory (Eysenck et 
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al., 2007) claims that, if the task is cognitively demanding, adverse effects of anxiety 
on performance increase (also see Berggren & Derakshan, 2013 for a review). While 
anxious individuals are performing such a demanding task, the task requirements may 
use up limited cognitive resources which may otherwise serve for exerting 
compensatory effort to maintain performance quality (performance effectiveness; 
Eysenck et al., 2007). Hence, if the cognitive load of a task is high, anxious people can 
have greater difficulties in performing the task. In line with this view, several studies 
demonstrated that anxiety was related to greater impairments under high compared 
to low cognitive load (MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; Berggren, Koster, & Derakshan, 
2012; Qi et al., 2014a; Qi et al., 2014c). 
ANXIETY 
 In this dissertation, we distinguish between several aspects of anxiety based 
on the previous research in this domain. More specifically, the following aspects of 
anxiety will be considered: (1) State and trait anxiety; (2) Worry. 
State and Trait Anxiety 
 Classically, the distinction is made between two forms of anxiety: state vs. 
trait anxiety. The former is defined as a temporal emotional state in response to 
circumstances perceived as threatening (or uncertain), whereas the latter is defined 
as a stable individual characteristic pertaining to the proneness to experiencing 
anxiety (Spielberger, 1972). 
As mentioned in the previous sections, there is an extensive literature 
demonstrating that high trait anxiety is related to information processing biases, 
impaired attentional control and also reduced WM capacity (see Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Eysenck et al., 2007; Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Moran, 2016 for reviews). 
The interaction between state and trait anxiety is also discussed in several theories in 
anxiety. For example, Williams et al. (1988) proposed that state anxiety is related to 
the threat value evaluation of a stimulus, while trait anxiety is related to attentional 
resources allocated to it. Furthermore, Eysenck (1992) proposed that the impact of 
high trait anxiety on attention is most evident when the level of state anxiety is also 
high. Accordingly, many studies demonstrated increased attentional bias and 
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interference by threat when both trait and state anxiety levels are high (MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1988; Richards, French, Johnson, Naparstek, & Williams, 1992; MacLeod & 
Rutherford, 1992; Egloff & Hock, 2001). 
Several studies also investigated the role of trait and state anxiety on 
performance separately. In such a study, Pacheco-Unguetti et al. (2010) showed that 
while high trait anxiety was related to impairments in attentional control, state 
anxiety was related to vigilance (alerting) and context sensitivity (orienting). Bishop, 
Jenkins and Lawrence (2007) also demonstrated the differential effects of trait and 
state anxiety on information processing. They observed that state anxiety was 
related to greater processing of threat-related stimuli (i.e. increased amygdala 
activity as response to fearful faces), whereas trait anxiety was related to reduced 
attentional control (i.e. reduced lateral prefrontal cortex activity). These findings 
suggest that while trait-anxiety is related to more general deficits in attentional 
control (as manifested mostly by abnormal prefrontal functions), state anxiety is 
related to vigilance and orienting to salient (i.e. threat-related) stimuli (as expressed 
by heightened limbic activations, including in the amygdala). Accordingly, several 
studies have demonstrated that increased state anxiety was related to greater 
attentional bias towards threat (Fox, Russo, Bowels, & Dutton, 2001; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997). However, anxious mood 
has also been associated with performance benefits in sustained attention and 
response inhibition (Robinson, Krimsky, Grillon, 2013; Grillon, Robinson, Mathur, & 
Ernst, 2015). Furthermore, several studies have demonstrated threat-related stimuli 
can facilitate subsequent information processing stages (Lystad, Rokke and Stout, 
2009) and attentional control (Birk, Dennis, Shin, & Urry, 2011) in relation to 
elevated state-anxiety.  
Several investigations have also focused on more complex cognitive processes 
such as WM in relation to state anxiety. In these studies, elevated state anxiety has 
been associated with impaired WM (Lavric, Rippon, & Gray, 2003; Shackman, 
Sarinopoulos, Maxwell, Pizzagalli, Lavric, & Davidson, 2006; Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, & 
Grillion, 2012; Vytal, Cornwell, Letkiewicz, Arkin, & Grillon, 2013). However, these 
studies assessed WM performance using emotionally neutral tasks, hence, the 
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potential influence of threat-related stimuli on this relationship where state-anxiety 
can potentially enhance the performance (Lystad et al., 2009; Birk et al., 2011) could 
not be established. The third empirical chapter of this thesis sought to fill this gap.  
 The different studies mentioned above with regard to the relationship 
between state anxiety and WM (such as Vytal et al., 2012; 2013) mainly manipulated 
state anxiety via threat of shock, which targets mostly the anxious arousal component 
of anxiety (Robinson, Vytal, Cornwell, & Grillon, 2013). State anxiety also has a worry 
(anxious apprehension) component (Liebert & Morris, 1967; Heller & Nitschke, 1998) 
that can be dissociated from its arousal counterpart (Bijsterbosch, Smith, Forster, 
John, & Bishop, 2014). Studies focusing on worry (both at trait and state level) are 
explained in more detail in the following section. 
Worry Component of Anxiety 
Worry is described as a state of having uncontrollable, intrusive, negative 
thoughts about the future (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). It is often 
referred to as the “cognitive component” of anxiety (Mathews, 1990) and associated 
with attentional bias towards threat as well as general impairments in attentional 
control and WM (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Mathews, 1990; Hirsch 
& Mathews, 2012; also see Moran, 2016 for a review). 
The relationship between worry and attentional bias towards threat can be 
bidirectional. Several studies have previously shown that attentional biases towards 
threat increase vulnerability to worrisome thoughts (Hirsch, MacLeod, Mathews, 
Sandher, Siyani, & Hayes, 2011; Krebs, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010); while induced 
worry also increases attentional bias towards threat (Oathes, Squillante, Ray, & 
Nitschke, 2010). Furthermore, other studies investigating the influence of worry on 
WM in the presence of threat-related distractors have shown that trait vulnerability 
to worry was related to inefficient filtering of threat-related distractors from WM 
(Owens, Derakshan, & Richards, 2015; Stout, Shackman, Johnson & Larson, 2015).  
Adverse effect of worry on attentional control and WM can also be observed 
in the absence of threat-related stimuli shown in the environment. According to 
several cognitive theories of anxiety (Processing efficiency theory, Eysenck & Calvo, 
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1992; Attentional control theory, Eysenck et al., 2007), worry uses up the limited 
attentional resources leading in turn to reduced capacity of WM. Accordingly, several 
studies investigating the role of induced worry in attentional control have 
demonstrated worry-related deficits suggesting worry consumes the cognitive 
resources which would otherwise be available for optimal attentional control (Hayes, 
Hirsch, Mathews, 2008; Leigh & Hirsch, 2011). Furthermore, similar results were also 
observed in a sample of patients with generalized anxiety disorders (GAD; 
Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014) which are characterized by 
pathological worry (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Mathews, 1990; Wells, 1995; Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013).  
In spite of the wealth of research concerning the relationship between worry 
and WM, there are still several open issues regarding the actual role of WM capacity. 
Theoretical accounts of worry (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Eysenck et al., 2007) suggest 
that worry lowers or shrinks WM capacity. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
there has not been any study yet investigating the direct link between worry and WM 
capacity. Hence, the fourth empirical chapter of this thesis focused on this question 
by manipulating/inducing worry in order to titrate its possible (interference) effects 
on WM capacity directly. Furthermore, high WM capacity is associated with greater 
attentional control and the ability to inhibit task irrelevant distractors better (Barrett 
et al., 2004). Hence, high WM capacity may also potentially reduce worry-related 
impairments in the presence of distractors. Accordingly, in the fifth empirical chapter 
of this thesis, we dwelt on this question and focused on the putative greater impact 
worry can have on WM when threat-related distractors come into play (i.e. Stout et 
al., 2015). Presumably, these investigations can be helpful in order to gain a better 
understanding of the complex relationship between worry and WM. 
THESIS OUTLINE 
 Considering (cognitive) theories of anxiety and cognitive vulnerability factors 
to anxiety disorders (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Beck & Clark, 1997; Mogg 
& Bradley, 1998; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Eysenck et al., 2007), the general aim of 
the current thesis is to examine modulatory effects of anxiety on core cognitive 
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mechanisms such as attentional control and WM, when this affective variable is 
conceived either as a trait or a state. Within this broad aim, several aspects of our 
approach deserve specific consideration. We will apply (1) a multi-method approach 
including behavioral as well as neurophysiological tasks; (2) focus on specific 
subcomponents of anxiety; (3) focus on causal effects, whenever possible. 
(1) Multi-method approach 
 Anxiety-related effects on attentional control and WM are not always 
detected in the mere quality of performance (performance effectiveness; i.e. 
accuracy rates) since anxiety is more likely to have an impact on processing 
efficiency (i.e. cognitive effort; often investigated via indirect neurophysiological 
measures; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). In line with this 
assumption, some earlier studies have already demonstrated that high anxious 
individuals have reduced WM capacity (Qi et al., 2014a) and inefficient filtering 
of task-irrelevant information from WM (Qi et al., 2014b), as evidenced at the 
neurophysiological (EEG) level, while no behavioral differences were observed in 
these studies as a function of anxiety. According to the attentional control theory 
of anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007), anxious individuals might be utilizing some kind 
of puzzling compensatory strategies in order to keep up with the desired 
performance outcome (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Berggren & Derakshan, 
2013), a strategy which may in turn deplete processing efficiency in a non-
transparent way. Dovetailing with this view, several studies have previously 
shown that anxious individuals exert greater cognitive effort at the 
neurophysiological level, while no behavioral differences were actually observed 
in relation to anxiety (Righi, Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009; Ansari & Derakshan, 
2011a; Basten, Stelzel, & Fiebach, 2012). Hence, to address this issue and the 
likely dissociation in the expression of effects exerted by anxiety on cognition 
(with positive evidence at the neurophysiological level but no such clear 
translation into behavioral performance), we conducted a series of studies using 
both behavioral and neurophysiological (EEG) measures in this work (see 
chapters 2 and 6). 
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(2) Components of anxiety 
 As we have already touched upon here above, anxiety can be decomposed 
into several aspects/non-overlapping components (albeit with a high degree of 
collinearity), including trait anxiety, state anxiety, and worry. Each of these three 
components has different effects on functioning and performance and might, 
therefore, be differentially related to cognitive processes. Although these 
components of anxiety are interrelated, we aimed to investigate the cognitive 
processes associated with each of them. Hence, across the different empirical 
chapters gathered in this thesis, different components of anxiety were 
scrutinized, including trait anxiety (chapter 2 and 6), state anxiety (chapter 3), 
and worry (chapter 4 and 5). 
(3) Causal influences 
 Most of the existing studies in this domain are of cross-sectional nature, 
where the focus is usually put on establishing the existence of a possible link 
between anxiety and (specific) cognitive processes, mostly using correlation or 
regression analyses. Although this is undoubtedly a valuable approach, such 
cross-sectional data do not allow to infer whether specific cognitive processes 
(and more specifically their abnormal or impaired implementation) actually exert 
a causal influence on (the development and maintenance of) anxiety. In order to 
examine the potential causal role of attentional control on anxiety, alternative 
experimental procedures are needed that are suited to experimentally impair or 
improve attentional control in order to be able to gauge their effects on anxiety. 
In order to address the question of causality, we examined in chapter 6 the 
effects of a novel method meant to improve attentional control in subjects at risk 
for anxiety (disorders), with the possibility offered then to assess how this 
improvement causally reduced anxiety in these participants. 
 A more detailed description on how various components of anxiety are related 
to attentional impairments and attentional bias is presented below where we outline 
the specific goals of each empirical chapter included in this thesis.   
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 Chapter 2 
 The specific influence of attentional bias on performance sometimes appears 
as benefit (Lindstorm & Bohlin, 2011; Sessa, Luria, Gotler, Jolicœur, & Dell'Acqua, 
2011), but sometimes as cost in processing speed or accuracy at the behavioral level 
(Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Iordan, Dolcos, & Dolcos, 2013). 
This discrepancy likely depends on specific task characteristics such as (1) the 
relevance of negative information to the task (or the lack thereof) and (2) the actual 
task load (that can be low or high): 
(1) When the negative content is task-irrelevant, it may serve as distractor 
and lead in turn to impairments in task performance (Pessoa, 2009; 
Dolcos, Iordan, & Dolcos, 2011). However, when the negative content is 
task-relevant, it may “paradoxically” lead to performance benefits 
(Pessoa, 2009; Dolcos & Denkova 2014).  
(2) If the perceptual load of the task at hand is deemed high, the interference 
effect of distractors can be reduced, whereas when the cognitive load of 
the task at hand is high, the distractor’s effect can be increased (Lavie et 
al., 2004). 
 Individual differences in levels of (either trait or state) anxiety can be another 
source contributing to modulating the complex relationship between attentional bias 
and performance, due to the strong link between anxiety and attentional bias 
towards threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Furthermore, early attentional biases to threat 
can influence further stages of information processing but the actual nature and 
direction of this effect still remain unclear. Hence, in chapter 2, we focused on the 
role of anxiety in encoding threat-related stimuli into WM at several stages of 
information processing (with the contrast between early/sensory vs. late/post-
perceptual stages of information processing). Since the influence of anxiety on 
performance is highly dependent on task demands (i.e. greater anxiety-related 
impairments are usually observed under high WM load; Qi et al., 2014a), the role of 
task load (high vs low WM load) was also considered. 
 In this study, we used a change detection task (Vogel, McCollough, & 
Machizawa, 2005) with faces where the emotional expression (fearful vs neutral) and 
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WM load (two faces-low load vs four faces-high load) were manipulated using a 
factorial design. Several studies assessing the role of anxiety on WM previously found 
anxiety-related impairments at the neurophysiological/EEG level without any clear 
behavioral differences; however (Qi et al., 2014a; 2014b) suggesting that these two 
measures (EEG vs. behavior) may be differentially sensitive to effects exerted by 
anxiety. Hence, in addition to standard behavioral indices (such as speed and 
accuracy), we also recorded event related potentials (ERPs). 
 In this study, we expected that increased task demands (high WM load) would 
reduce processing efficiency and anxiety would modulate this effect. Furthermore, 
anxiety would be related to greater attentional bias towards threat, which would also 
have an influence on later stages of information processing (as captured by 
modulation of late ERP components).  
 Chapter 3 
 Earlier studies focusing on the relationship between state anxiety and WM 
have indicated anxiety-related impairments in WM (Lavric et al., 2003; Shackman et 
al. 2006), especially under low cognitive load when the task is less demanding (Vytal 
et al., 2012; 2013). However, these studies assessed WM performance using 
emotionally-neutral tasks, while other studies have demonstrated that state anxiety 
actually leads to performance benefits in attention in the presence of threat-related 
information (Lystad et al., 2009; Birk et al., 2011). Hence, effects of state anxiety on 
WM processes appear to depend on the presence of threat-related information, 
although this is still a matter of debate in the literature. Chapter 3 focused on the role 
of state anxiety on working memory considering crucial factors which may strengthen 
this relationship: emotion (threat-related vs. neutral stimuli) and cognitive load (high 
vs. low load). 
 In this study, state anxiety was induced using threat of shock. Participants 
performed a WM task after this anxiety induction. In this task, load and emotion were 
manipulated using a dual task design. Participants had to perform a number 
recognition task where they needed to remember 5 two-digit numbers (high load 
condition - any two-digit numbers, i.e. 39, 43, 22, 18, 76; low load condition – two-
digit multiples of ten , i.e. 30, 10, 90, 60, 80). Between consecutive trials (number 
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recognition task), they also had to perform a (secondary) one-back task. During this 
task, participants were shown two images (both neutral or both fearful) and asked to 
decide if these pictures were the same or not.  
 In this study, we expected to observe modulatory effects of anxiety on 
performance in relation to emotion and cognitive load. Since previous findings 
already indicated impaired WM in relation to state anxiety (i.e. Shackman et al., 
2006), but also performance benefits in the presence of threat-related stimuli (i.e. 
Lystad et al., 2009), we did not have strong predictions with regard to the actual 
direction of these effects, however. Hence, exploratory analyses were conducted 
investigating the role of state anxiety on performance with regard to load and 
emotion. 
  Chapter 4 
 In chapter 4, we focused on the role of the worry component of anxiety on 
WM. Worry is defined as the “cognitive” component of anxiety (Mathews, 1990) 
occupying limited attentional resources and leading to impairments in WM (Eysenck 
et al., 2007). Worry-related impairments in attentional control and WM have been 
studied quite extensively in the past (see Hirsch & Mathews, 2012 for a review). 
However, the direct link between worry and impairments in WM capacity (individual 
differences in the functioning of WM; Shipstead et al., 2015) has not been fully 
examined yet. Chapter 4 sought to address this issue. 
 In this study, participants were assigned either to worry or control (not-
worry/neutral) condition. Participants in the worry condition were instructed to focus 
on a personally-relevant worrying subject, while participants in the control condition 
were instructed to focus on a personally-relevant positive subject (cf. Hayes et al., 
2008). In order to investigate the direct effect of worrying on WM capacity, 
participants performed a WM task (a change detection task with neutral stimuli; 
Vogel et al., 2005) before (pre-manipulation) and after worry/control manipulation 
(post-manipulation).  
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 In this study, we surmised that participants who worried would have 
reductions or attenuated improvements in WM capacity at post vs. pre-manipulation, 
as compared to participants who did not worry on negative content. 
 Chapter 5 
 In chapter 5, we investigated the influence of worry on selective attention to 
threat considering the influence of WM capacity on this relationship. Worry is usually 
related to threat-related biases in information processing (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). 
However, high WM capacity is associated with better attentional control (Barrett et 
al., 2004) and it may also potentially reduce impairments in performance due to 
attentional bias towards threat. Accordingly, this study was designed to examine the 
possible relationship between worry, WMC and attentional bias towards threat.  
 More specifically, in this study, participants first performed a WM task (a 
change detection task with neutral stimuli; Vogel et al., 2005) from which we could 
obtain WM capacity scores. They were then assigned either to a worry or control 
condition. After worry/control manipulation (cf. Hayes et al., 2008), participants 
performed a visual search task (i.e. Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) with happy, angry 
and neutral faces where they needed to focus on a face with a certain emotional 
expression (target face) while ignoring the other ones (crowd; e.g. happy faces 
surrounding an angry one serving as target, or the other way around).  
 We hypothesized that participants in the worry condition would show a 
greater threat-related attentional bias during the subsequent visual search task 
compared to the control condition (without worry induction). However, we also 
hypothesized that WM capacity would moderate the relationship between worry and 
attention selection (visual search task). Specifically, higher WM capacity was expected 
to be related to a smaller attentional bias towards threat in the worry condition. 
 Chapter 6 
 Due to the utmost importance of WM in a wide range of cognitive functions 
and abilities (i.e. general fluid intelligence; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005), recently 
training programs targeting WM have attracted a lot of interest (Jaeggi,  Buschkuehl, 
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Jonides, & Perrig, 2008; Buschkuehl & Jaeggi, 2010; Shipstead, Reddick, & Engle, 
2012). Some of these studies have found training-related gains on WM capacity 
(Harrison, Shipstead, Hicks, Hambrick, Redick, & Engle, 2013), cognitive control 
(Schweizer, Grahn, Hampshire, Mobbs, & Dalgleish, 2013; see Morrison & Chein, 2010 
for a review) and general fluid intelligence (see Au, Sheehan, Tsai, Duncan, 
Buschkuehl, & Jaeggi, 2015 for a review; but see also Harrison et al., 2013; Shipstead 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, WM trainings have also been applied in sub-
clinically/clinically depressed population. Interestingly, these earlier investigations 
showed increased filtering efficiency (Owens, Koster & Derakshan, 2013); decreased 
rumination levels (Siegle, Price, Jones, Ghinassi, Painter, & Thase, 2014); and reduced 
depressed mood (Calkins, McMorran, Siegle, & Otto, 2015) as function of (WM) 
training. However, effects of WM training in anxious population have not been 
investigated in detail yet. Nevertheless, such training paradigm might be helpful to 
investigate the causal status between anxiety and impaired attentional control and 
WM. Accordingly, chapter 6 of this thesis focused on WM training in a (subclinical) 
anxious population, with the aim to assess whether this approach could shield 
anxious individuals from experiencing high levels of negative affect, worry or 
rumination. 
 To guarantee the successful application of the WM training, several 
requirements usually have to be met (Klingberg, 2010; Shipstead et al., 2012): 
(1) Firstly, training should include multiple sessions and take a reasonable amount of 
time in each session (i.e. 30-40 min, Klingberg, 2010). Furthermore, the training 
task should be challenging and engaging enough (e.g., adaptive and customized 
to the actual participant’s performance). The task has to target specific WM 
operations and should not allow developing alternative strategies (i.e. chunking).  
(2) Secondly, the effectiveness of WM training should preferably be assessed via the 
examination of transfer effects to untrained (and seemingly unrelated) tasks. 
Hence, there must be pre-training/post-training sessions where untrained tasks 
(outcome measures) are performed as well. In order to evaluate whether the 
WM training is effective or not, it is important to have several objective outcome 
measures at pre-training/post-training sessions each time.  
CHAPTER 1 
 
22 
(3) Lastly, there must be an active control condition. For an effective control 
condition, participants in this condition should also be involved in training 
somehow. Accordingly, participants in the control condition may either perform 
a non-adaptive version of the WM training task or another task which is 
unrelated to WM. 
 Considering these points, we examined in this study whether an intensive 
three-week WM training procedure would lead to obvious gains in WM and 
attentional control in (sub-clinical) anxious subjects. Furthermore, we explored 
whether training-related gains would be associated with lower anxiety levels.  
 In this study, pre-selected participants with high level of trait anxiety were 
assigned either to a training (experimental condition) or an active control condition 
(control group). For the WM training, the dual n-back task (Jaeggi, Seewer, Nirkko, 
Eckstein, Schroth, Groner, & Gutbrod, 2003) was used. The dual n-back task has two 
main components/modalities: visual and auditory. In this n-back task, participants are 
instructed to indicate whether there is a match between the current trial and a 
number (n) of previous trial in the series either for the visual or auditory information. 
As the “n” increases, the task obviously becomes more difficult, unless training takes 
place. Therefore, the task can be adaptive to participants’ performance. In this study, 
participants in the training condition performed the adaptive version of the dual n-
back task where “n”  changed depending on their performance. In contrast, 
participants in the active control condition performed the non-adaptive version of the 
task (dual-1-back). Training/active control procedure continued for fifteen sessions 
spread over three weeks (occurring only during weekdays). Before and after this 
three-week period, participants were invited to the lab for pre/post testing. During 
pre/post training sessions, participants performed cognitive tasks assessing 
attentional control and WM, namely: resting state EEG as an indirect measure/marker 
of attentional control (cf. Putman, Verkuil, Elsa Arias-Garcia, Pantazi, & van Schie, 
2014); a Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and an Antisaccade-task (Hallett, 1978) 
with emotional faces to assess inhibition in relation to emotional stimuli. 
Furthermore, the Flanker task also had a “stress” condition where participants were 
exposed to random loud noise bursts in order to examine training-related influences 
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on cognitive control under stressful circumstances. In addition to these tasks, 
participants also filled in questionnaires regarding anxiety, worry and attentional 
control. 
 In this study, we expected to observe training-related gains in cognitive 
functioning, as assessed via resting state EEG and performance for the Flanker and 
the Antisaccade tasks. Furthermore, we predicted that these gains might eventually 
help to maintain lower levels of anxiety. 
 Chapter 7 
 In this closing section, we first quickly review and summarize the research 
goals and main findings obtained in the five different empirical chapters compiled in 
this thesis. Thereafter, we provide an integrative discussion of these new results, 
emphasizing their compatibility (or lack thereof) with current and past cognitive 
models of anxiety available in the literature (as introduced earlier here above in this 
section). Lastly, the limitations of our studies and future directions for (cognitive 
neuroscience) research in this area are outlined. 
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   PROCESSING EMOTIONAL FACES IN RELATION 
TO WORKING MEMORY LOAD AND ANXIETY:  
AN EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL STUDY 1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Attentional bias towards threat is a key characteristic of anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007). This study examined the influence of attentional bias on information 
processing patterns under varying levels of task load. We used a face change 
detection task where valence (neutral vs fearful faces) and working memory load (low 
vs high load) were manipulated. In addition to behavioral indices, we measured ERPs 
during encoding (N170) and maintenance of information (CNV). We observed a 
robust load effect on behavioral indexes. N170 activity was modulated by load and 
anxiety with high anxiety associated with greater N170 under high load. CNV activity 
was modulated by load, valence, and anxiety with high anxiety associated with lower 
CNV under high vs low load in the presence of fearful faces. There was a negative 
association between N170 and CNV in the presence of fearful faces as a function of 
load which was particularly pronounced in high-anxious individuals. These results 
suggest a connection between enhanced early processing of fearful faces and 
recruitment of later cognitive resources in high-trait-anxious individuals. 
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Sari, B. A., Koster, E. H., & Derakshan, N. (2016). Processing emotional faces in relation to working 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive theories of anxiety propose that information-processing biases are a 
hallmark feature of anxiety and can contribute to the etiology and maintenance of 
anxiety disorders (Eysenck, 1992; Beck & Clark, 1997). There is an extensive literature 
showing that the presence of threatening information influences performance 
especially in high anxious individuals due to an early attentional bias towards such 
stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; 
Okon-Singer, Hendler, Pessoa, & Shackman, 2015), which in turn influences 
subsequent more elaborate stages of information-processing. At present, it is not 
fully clear, through which mechanisms this early attentional bias in anxiety influences 
later stages of information-processing. 
The expression of attentional bias on task performance can vary, sometimes 
appearing either as benefits (Lindstorm & Bohlin, 2011; Sessa, Luria, Gotler, Joliceur, 
& Dell ‘Acqua, 2011) or as costs (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; 
Iordan, Dolcos, & Dolcos, 2013). Whether an early attentional bias leads to processing 
benefits or costs likely depends on the task characteristics and goal settings, such as 
the relevance of threatening information to the task at hand, as well as task load 
(cognitive/working memory load or perceptual load). With regard to task-relevance, 
when the threatening information is task irrelevant, it may serve as distractor and 
thereby cognitive performance on the ongoing task may be impaired (Pessoa, 2009; 
Dolcos, Iordan, & Dolcos, 2011). However, when threatening information is (directly) 
task relevant, performance benefits may actually emerge as a result of a more 
efficient or better encoding of this highly relevant information (Pessoa, 2009; Dolcos 
& Denkova 2014). According to the load theory of selective attention and cognitive 
control (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Lavie, 2005), the influence of 
distracting information on cognition actually depends on the type of load. High 
perceptual load has been related to reduced distractor interference, whereas high 
cognitive (working memory; WM) load has usually been associated with the opposite 
effect, whereby distractors more strongly impair task performance and target 
processing (Lavie et al., 2004).  
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Given the strong links between anxiety and attentional bias towards 
threatening information (e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988), 
heightened anxiety disposition is thought to influence the effects that threatening 
information has on cognitive performance as well (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). According 
to the attentional control theory of anxiety (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007), the presence of threat-related stimuli would more strongly influence WM 
processes in high anxious individuals. WM is a limited capacity system essential to 
perform complex cognitive tasks (Baddeley, 1992) and recent evidence suggests that 
WM processes (such as shifting and updating) are disrupted in anxious individuals 
when threatening information is presented as distractor (Derakshan & Eysenck, 
2009). The current investigation focused on the role of anxiety on encoding threat-
related information in WM. 
To explore possible modulatory effects of anxiety on the encoding of 
threatening information under varying conditions of WM load, we used a change 
detection task (Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005) with (emotional) faces, 
where valence and WM load were manipulated independently. In this task, each trial 
starts with a complex visual array where participants are instructed to encode specific 
features of objects presented (memory array). Following this array, a retention 
interval is presented during which participants need to maintain and rehearse the 
encoded information. At the end of the retention interval, another visual array 
appears (test array). Participants are asked to compare this second array to the first 
one and indicate whether the same objects (with the same features) are presented 
again or specific features changed between encoding and test (i.e., they have to 
perform a delayed Match-To-Sample Task, see Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Miller, Erickson, 
& Desimone, 1996). Previous work using a change detection task with (neutral) 
shapes showed that high anxious individuals display impaired WM performance in 
conditions of high WM load (Qi et al., 2014a). In another study, using a modified 
(emotional) version of the change detection task, Stout, Shackman and Larson (2013) 
investigated the role of anxiety on filtering efficiency in the presence of threat-related 
vs. neutral distractors. In that study, Stout et al. (2013) observed impaired filtering 
efficiency of threat related distractors in high anxious individuals. However, that 
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study investigated the influence of threatening information only when it was used as 
distractor and therefore, should be ignored. By comparison, much less is known 
regarding possible modulatory effects of anxiety on WM performance under 
conditions where the to-be-encoded information is threatening, where either 
benefits (Lindstorm & Bohlin, 2011; Sessa et al., 2011) or costs (Kensinger & Corkin, 
2003) may actually be observed. 
In the current study, we focused on behavioral as well as ERP components of 
WM performance. At the behavioral level our key dependent variables were accuracy 
levels, sensitivity scores (d prime), and K scores, which provide an index of WM 
efficiency. At the ERP level, we sought to use markers related to early face encoding 
as well as maintenance of information in WM to capture early versus later stages of 
information processing (and their possible modulation by anxiety), respectively. The 
N170 is an early face-specific ERP component, which typically peaks approximately 
150 ms after face onset at occipito-temporal electrodes (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, 
& McCarthy, 1996). This ERP component is often associated with the structural 
encoding of faces, as its amplitude is enhanced in response to face stimuli compared 
to other visual objects that are devoid of a face configuration (Rossion & Jack, 2011). 
At later stages, for the maintenance of information, we focused on the contingent 
negative variation (CNV). The CNV is a slow negative wave which appears following a 
cue (i.e., warning stimulus) and peaks prior to target onset (i.e., imperative stimulus) 
presentation (Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, McCallum, & Winter, 1964). More 
specifically, late-frontal CNV has been associated with (cognitive) effort and resource 
allocation (Leynes, Allen, & Marsh, 1998; Gomez, Flores, & Ledesma, 2007; Brunia, 
Van Boxtel, & Böcker, 2012). 
The main aim of the current study was to gain a better understanding of 
modulatory effects of anxiety on the encoding (N170) and maintenance (CNV) of 
threat-related information in WM when two different cognitive load levels (either 
easy/low load or difficult/high load) were systematically compared to one another. 
Based on the existing literature (Lavie et al., 2004), we predicted that this 
manipulation should influence behavioral performance, with decreased efficiency 
under high compared to low WM load. Importantly, we also surmised that 
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modulatory effects of anxiety on performance in this task would be more evident for 
high relative to low WM load (Qi, et al., 2014c; Berggren & Derakshan, 2013). 
Provided that emotional facial expressions are not task relevant in our study (subjects 
have to focus on the identity of the face stimuli), we did not expect any strong effect 
of this variable on behavioral performance. However, because anxiety usually biases 
early stages of information processing when negative emotional information is 
presented (Fox, Russo, & Georgiou, 2005; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Eysenck et al., 2007), 
we surmised that it could influence the early face encoding stage (at the level of the 
N170). Last, we explored whether the presence of an early attentional bias with 
anxiety as demonstrated by the amplitude of the N170 could influence later 
processing stages during WM maintenance, as demonstrated by the amplitude of the 
CNV. 
METHOD 
 Participants 
 Twenty-nine university students (7 males) aged between 18 - 38 (M = 23, SD = 
4) were recruited from the University of Ghent. The data of 5 participants were 
discarded (due to a high artifact rate - over 50% - during the EEG recording). The 
details of artifact rejection are explained in the data analytic approach section. 
 Task and Procedure 
Face Change Detection Task (Figure 1). Twelve face identities (7 females and 
5 males) were selected from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) and Lundqvist, Flykt, and 
Öhman (1998) databases, each depicting both a neutral or fearful expression. In total 
24 face stimuli were used. Each trial started with a fixation cross. After 500 ms, two 
arrows (pointing either to the left or right) indicated the side of the screen to be 
attended. Following a variable 200-400 ms SOA, either 2 (low WM load) or 4 (high 
WM load) faces were presented for 200 ms (memory array – encoding phase). These 
faces depicted either all neutral or all fearful expressions. After a 2000 ms retention 
interval, a target display was presented. In half of the trials, the same faces shown 
during the memory array were presented. In the other half, the identity of one of the 
faces was replaced by a new one, though the valence of the expression remained 
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unchanged. In these trials, the change occurred only on the cued side (as indicated 
earlier by the arrows). Participants were asked to perform a delayed match to sample 
task (i.e., to decide whether the faces shown during the target display were the same 
or not compared to the faces shown during the memory array). 
The experimental session included one practice block followed by 8 
experimental blocks. In half of these blocks, faces had neutral facial expressions. In 
the other half, faces had fearful expressions. Emotional expression of the faces was 
presented block-wise (cf. Li, Li, & Luo, 2006; Sessa et al., 2011) because presentation 
of negative stimuli in one trial may influence the processing of faces on the 
subsequent trial (carry-over effects). Hence, by presenting neutral and fearful faces in 
separate blocks, the influence of emotional expression could be kept stable over 
time. 
The task started randomly with either a neutral or fearful block and continued 
alternately. The practice block contained 24 trials, while each experimental block 
included 64 trials. In total, there were 512 experimental trials. However, because of a 
programming error in the final 2 blocks, only the first 6 (3 neutral and 3 fearful) blocks 
were included in the analysis for all of the participants. 
 Procedure 
After reading and signing the informed consent form, participants completed 
self-report questionnaire of trait anxiety (State Trait Anxiety Inventory; STAI-TA; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, & Vagg, 1983). They were then informed about the 
EEG procedure and prepared for it. After placement of the electrodes, they were 
asked to perform the face change detection task. Afterwards, they were paid 30 euro 
for their participation. 
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 Data Analytic Approach 
Behavioral Data. Trials with reaction times faster than 100 ms and slower 
than 4000 ms were considered as outlier and not included in the analysis. Moreover, 
only trials within the range of 3 standard deviations from the individual mean were 
included. After applying these criteria, analyses were performed on 98% of the total 
data. 
To examine WM performance, several indices were calculated on the basis of 
accuracy scores. First, we calculated sensitivity scores (d prime, Green & Swets, 
1974). D-prime scores indicate to what extent participants are sensitive to perceiving 
face identity changes during this task. Secondly, we calculated WM capacity scores (K 
score). K scores were calculated by the following formula: K = S x (H - F)/(1 – F) 
(Pashler, 1988). In this formula, K represents WM capacity, S is the set size (WM load) 
to be remembered (1 face or 2 faces), H is the observed hit rate, and F is the 
proportion of false alarms. Hence, the K-score provides an estimation of the number 
of faces which can be encoded and held in WM at any one time in the different 
conditions. K scores may vary between 0-1 for the low WM load (1 face to be 
encoded- condition) and between 0-2 for the high WM load (2 faces to be encoded- 
condition).  
EEG Data. EEG data were acquired from 64 electrodes placed according to the 
extended 10-20 EEG system (Biosemi Active Two System). Additional electrodes were 
placed above and below of the right eye and at the outer canthus of both eyes to 
monitor vertical and horizontal eye movements, respectively. EEG signals were 
referenced online to the CMS-DRL ground at a sampling rate of 512 Hz. They were 
then re-referenced offline to the linked mastoids, using Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0 
(Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). Data were then segmented 100 ms pre 
and 2200 ms post-stimulus onset. The segmented data were corrected for ocular 
movements using the Gratton, Coles and Donchin (1983) algorithm. Baseline 
correction was performed before and after ocular correction based on the entire pre-
stimulus onset (100 ms). The data were then semi-automatically corrected for the 
artifacts using an absolute voltage criterion of ±100 μV. Afterwards, individual epochs 
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were averaged separately for each condition (2 emotion x 2 WM load). Noisy 
channels were interpolated by using a standard spherical splines procedure (Perrin, 
Pernier, Bertrand, & Echailler, 1989). Lastly, a 30 Hz low-pass filter was applied and 
grand-average ERP waveforms were created. 
We focused on the activity during the retention interval for the correct trials. 
Specifically, we focused on the CNV component at frontal site which is related to 
preparatory cognitive effort (Leynes et al., 1998; Wild-Wall, Hohnsbein, & 
Falkenstein, 2006; Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013). 
Since CNV typically peaks closer to target presentation over frontal scalp regions 
(Gomez et al., 2007; Brunia et al., 2012), we exported the mean activity for frontal 
channels (averaged F1, F2, F3, F4, Fz), 500 ms prior to the target presentation (for the 
correct trials only). We also focused on N170 to assess early processing of faces and 
structural encoding (Bentin et al., 1996). We exported the maximal negative peak 
amplitude within a time-window of 150 to 200 ms for two adjacent right occipito-
temporal sites (P8 and PO8), and averaged them. 
Analytical Approach. In order to assess the interaction between WM load and 
emotion, 2 (high vs low WM load) x 2 (neutral vs fearful) ANOVAs were conducted for 
each of the behavioral outcomes (accuracy rate, K score, d-prime), CNV and N170. 
Then, in order to understand how these effects were modulated by anxiety, STAI-TA 
was added as a covariate. If the ANCOVA led to a significant 3 way or 2 way 
interaction with STAI-TA, it was followed-up by correlational analyses.  
For CNV and N170, we calculated difference scores for the correlational 
analyses by subtracting the mean activity during low WM load condition from high 
WM load condition (cf. Ruchkin, Canoune, Johnson, & Ritter, 1995; Yang, Wang, Jin, & 
Li, 2015; Owens, Derakshan, & Richards, 2015). This calculation is useful in order to 
isolate the ERP components of interest while removing the contribution of other 
factors, such as motor preparation (Luck, 2005). 
Finally, we examined if levels of trait anxiety as measured by the STAI-TA 
moderated the trajectory between early and late processing of information as 
indicated by the N170 and CNV components respectively. For this purpose, firstly, 
correlational analyses were performed between CNV and N170 difference scores for 
each of the fearful and neutral conditions separately. Significant correlational 
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analyses were followed by moderation analyses with levels of the STAI-TA as 
moderator of the link between N170 and CNV. We expected that moderation would 
be found with the N170diff influenced by greater levels of anxiety on the CNVdiff, 
compared with medium or lower scores. This procedure was performed using IBM 
SPSS 19 and the macro PROCESS 2.13.2 (Hayes, 2013). Variables were mean centered 
and controlled for heteroscedasticity.  
RESULTS 
 Behavioral Results 
Accuracy. The 2 X 2 ANOVA with WM load (low vs high WM load) x emotion 
(neutral vs fearful) revealed a significant main effect of WM load, F(1, 23) = 85.94, p < 
.001, indicating higher accuracy rate in the low (M = 82%, SD = 11.40) as compared to 
the high WM load condition (M = 68%, SD = 9.43). None of the other main or 
interaction effects were significant, Fs < 1, NS; see table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
Including STAI-TA as a covariate, the ANCOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
WM load, F(1, 22) = 7.28, p = .01. However, the main effect of emotion and the 
interaction effects were not significant, all Fs < 1.7. 
D-prime Scores. The 2 X 2 ANOVA WM load (low vs high WM load) x emotion 
(neutral vs fearful) showed a significant main effect of WM load, F(1, 23) = 18.20, p < 
.001, indicating higher scores in the low (M = 2.29, SD = 1.26) as compared to the high 
WM load condition (M = 1.53, SD = .87). Main effect of emotion and the interaction 
effect did not reach significance, all Fs < 1, NS. Adding STAI-TA as a covariate, no 
significant main effect or interaction effects were found, Fs < 1.1, NS; see table 1 for 
descriptive statistics. 
K-Scores. The 2 X 2 ANOVA with WM load (low vs high WM load) x emotion 
(neutral vs fearful) showed a significant main effect of WM load, F(1, 23) = 56.08, p < 
.001, indicating higher scores in the high (M = 1.23, SD = 0.40) as compared to the low 
WM load condition (M = 0.80, SD = 0.20; main effect of emotion and the interaction 
effect did not reach significance, all Fs < 1, NS). With STAI-TA as a covariate, the main 
effect of WM load remained significant, F(1, 22) = 9.68, p < .01, while the main effect 
of emotion was not, F < 1, NS. Interaction effects did not approach significance (WM 
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load x STAI-TA, F(1, 22) = 1.73, p = .20; WM load x Emotion; F(1, 22) = 1.31, p =.26; 
WM load x Emotion x STAI-TA, F(1, 22) = 1.06, p = .32; Emotion x STAI-TA, F < 1, NS; 
see table 1 for descriptive statistics). 
 
Table 1. Mean Accuracy (in percentage), d-prime and K scores for each of Emotion 
(Fearful, Neutral) and WM Load (High, Low) conditions. SDs are reported in 
parenthesis. 
 
Low WM Load   High WM Load   
 
Neutral Fearful Neutral Fearful 
Accuracy 82.47 (11.52) 81.55 (11.88) 68.45 (10.26) 67.54 (10.15) 
d-score 2.31 (1.40) 2.27 (1.18) 1.55 (0.94) 1.51 (0.90) 
K-score 0.80 (0.21) 0.79 (0.21) 1.26 (0.47) 1.20 (0.44) 
 
 EEG Results 
N170 (Figure 2). The ANOVA did not show significant main effects of WM load 
(F < 1, NS), Emotion (F(1, 23) = 2.41, p = .13), or an interaction between these two 
factors (F < 1, NS). Adding STAI-TA as a covariate, the main effect of load was 
significant, F(1, 22) = 10.47, p < .01, indicating slightly larger N170 for the low (M = -
5.67, SD = 3.83) as compared to the high WM load condition (M = -5.44, SD = 4.67). 
The main effect of Emotion was non-significant, F(1, 22) = 1.04, p = .32. Importantly, 
the interaction between WM load and STAI-TA was significant, F(1, 22) = 10.22, p < 
.01. (Interaction effect for Emotion x STAI-TA, F(1, 22) = 2.10, p = .16; for WM load x 
Emotion and WM load x Emotion x STAI-TA, all Fs < 1, NS). 
The significant interaction between WM load and STAI-TA was followed up by 
correlational analyses. Since Emotion did not modulate this interaction, we averaged 
N170 amplitudes across the two emotion conditions for the low and high WM load 
conditions, separately. Next, a difference score was calculated using the following 
formula: N170diff = N170 for high WM Load – N170 for low WM Load. Elevated 
negativity on this index indicated larger N170 for the high WM load condition as 
compared to low WM load condition. We then examined the correlation between 
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STAI-TA and N170diff. Results revealed a negative relationship between these 
variables (r(24) = -.56, p < .01) indicating that higher levels of anxiety were associated 
with greater recruitment of N170 for the high WM load condition as compared to low 
WM load condition (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2. N170 for each of Emotion (Fearful, Neutral) and WM Load (High, Low) 
conditions for the right – parietal site (averaged P8, PO8). Positive is plotted down. 
Waveforms were filtered with a high cutoff filter of 5 Hz (slope 24 dB/oct) for visual 
inspection. The area of interest is highlighted (150 – 200 ms). 
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Figure 3. Correlation between difference in N170 activity between high and low WM 
load (averaged across emotion) and STAI-TA. 
 
 
 
CNV (Figure 4). The ANOVA showed no significant main effects of WM load; F 
< 1, NS or emotion; F(1, 23) = 2.96, p = .10. However, there was a significant WM load 
x Emotion interaction, F(1, 23) = 5.69, p = .05, indicating larger CNV in the neutral 
condition as compared to the fearful condition under high WM load (Fearful-high WM 
load, M = -0.73, SD = 5.65 vs Neutral-high WM load, M = -3.60, SD = 6.08; t(23) = -
2.85, p < .01) while such difference was not observed under low WM load (Fearful-
low WM load, M = -2.53, SD = 5.29 vs Neutral-low WM load, M = -2.18, SD = 5.20; t < 
1, NS). 
The ANCOVA with STAI-TA as covariate did not show a significant main effect 
of WM load (F<1, NS) or emotion (F(1, 22) = 1.18, p = .29). The WM Load x Emotion 
interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 22) = 3.43, p = .08. Furthermore, there was 
a significant interaction effect between WM load, Emotion, and STAI-TA, F(1, 22) = 
6.47, p < .05 (all other interactions, Fs < 1, NS). The significant three-way interaction 
was followed up by means of correlation analyses. For that purpose, difference scores 
20
30
40
50
60
-5 -3 -1 1 3 5
S
T
A
I 
-T
A
 
N170 diff (µV) 
CHAPTER 2 
 
48 
were first calculated using the following formula: CNVdiff = CNV for high WM Load – 
CNV for low WM Load. Elevated negativity on this index indicates larger CNV for the 
high WM load condition as compared to low WM load condition. This difference score 
was calculated for each emotion condition, separately.  
This analysis revealed a significant positive relationship between STAI-TA and 
CNVdiff for the fearful condition (r(24) = .46, p < .05; see Figure 5), but not for the 
neutral condition (r(22) = -.19, p = .36), indicating that higher levels of anxiety were 
associated with greater CNVdiff. Greater CNVdiff implies reduced CNV activity in the 
high WM load condition as compared to low WM load condition. Hence, this positive 
correlation indicates high levels of anxiety were related to higher levels of CNV 
recruited in the low relative to high WM load condition on fearful trials. CNV activity 
was attenuated under high WM load on fearful trials as a function of high trait 
anxiety. 
In order to investigate whether the correlation coefficient levels between 
CNVdiff and STAI-TA were different from each other for the neutral and fearful trials, 
a Steiger test (Steiger, 1980), which is used for the comparison of dependent 
correlation coefficients, was conducted. This analysis revealed that two correlation 
coefficients were significantly different from each other; z = 2.57, p < .05. 
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Figure 5. Correlation between difference in CNV activity between high and low WM 
load for the fearful condition and STAI-TA. 
 
 
 
Influences of N170 Activity on CNV Activity Considering Level of Anxiety. 
There was a marginally significant negative correlation between CNVdiff and N170diff 
for the fearful trials; r(24) = -.35, p = .09. Moderation analysis with STAI-TA as 
moderator and N170diff as the independent variable revealed a marginally significant 
interaction effect of N170diff and STAI-TA predicting CNVdiff in the fearful condition, 
b = -0.081, t = 2.02, p = .06. This interaction showed that the N170diff and CNVdiff 
were negatively correlated at higher levels of trait anxiety, b = -1.293, t = 2.20, p < .05 
(figure 6). No moderation was found at medium (b = -0.542, t = 1.75, p = .1) or lower 
(b = 0.209, t < 1, NS) levels of anxiety. Importantly, correlational analysis between 
CNVdiff and N170diff for the neutral trials was not significant, r(24) = .23, p = .29. 
 
 
 
 
20
30
40
50
60
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
S
T
A
I 
-T
A
 
CNV diff - Fearful (µV) 
 ANXIETY AND EMOTIONAL FACE PROCESSING 
 
51 
 
Figure 6. Relationship between CNV and N170 for different levels of STAI-TA scores 
indicating difference in N170 activity between high and low WM load is conversely 
related to the difference in CNV activity between high and low WM load for high STAI-
TA scores (R2 = .35). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The current study focused on anxiety-related information processing biases. 
Specifically, the role of trait anxiety on the processing of emotional (threat-related) 
information in WM under different WM load levels was investigated. We predicted 
that high WM load would require more processing resources, leading to decreased 
processing efficiency of performance and trait anxiety would modulate this effect. 
Furthermore, anxiety would be related to biases in early attention towards threat 
(indexed by the amplitude of the N170) which might also influence retention of 
material at further stages of processing (indexed by the amplitude of CNV). In this 
investigation, participants performed a face change detection task where emotional 
expressions of faces (fearful vs neutral) and WM load (low load vs high load) were 
manipulated. The main results can be summarized as follows: (1) at the behavioral 
level there was a clear effect of load but not of emotion or anxiety; (2) at the ERP 
level, N170 activity was modulated by WM load in relation to anxiety; (3) For CNV 
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activity, there was an interaction between WM load and emotion, which was also 
modulated by anxiety; (4) there was a trend showing that the difference in the 
amplitude of the N170 between high and low WM load was conversely related to the 
difference in the amplitude of the CNV activity between high and low WM load at 
high levels of trait anxiety suggesting an interplay between early and late information 
processing in anxiety. These findings are further discussed below. 
The behavioral results of the current study demonstrated a robust effect of 
WM load. We observed significantly lower accuracy rates, sensitivity scores, and 
higher WM capacity scores under high WM load relative to low WM load. Effects of 
emotion or an interaction between emotion and WM load did not emerge in any of 
the behavioral indices and were not modulated by anxiety either. A lack of anxiety 
effect on behavioral indices is not surprising as such indices are reflective of a 
summative indication of a multitude of WM processes ranging from early encoding to 
maintenance, and finally generation of a response. The influence of anxiety may 
emerge as processing costs or benefits at different stages of WM operations (i.e. 
impairments in maintenance; Qi, Ding, & Li, 2014b). Furthermore, according to 
prominent theories of anxiety, anxiety vulnerability should exert its effects mainly on 
processing efficiency, i.e., the manner in which cognitive resources are recruited 
towards a specified goal outcome, rather than the effectiveness of the performance 
outcome, i.e., accuracy rates (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Berggren & 
Derakshan, 2103). Similarly, there have been many studies observing effects of 
anxiety at the ERP level with no anxiety modulations emerging at the behavioral level 
(e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Qi et al., 2014a; Qi et al., 2014b). 
The ERP components of interest were measured at different time windows 
during the retention interval: N170 (for early processing) and CNV (for late 
processing). Since the early face-specific component of the N170 is mainly related to 
structural encoding of faces, the absence of valence-specific effects for the N170 is 
not surprising (Rossion & Jack, 2011; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). Previous research 
shows that the amplitude of the N170 increases as WM load (number of faces to be 
encoded) increases (Morgan, Klein, Boehm, Shapiro, & Linden, 2008; Langeslag, 
Morgan, Jackson, Linden, & Van Strien, 2009). While in our study, N170 activity was 
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not modulated by WM load or emotion, its interaction with anxiety indicated that 
high levels of anxiety vulnerability were associated with greater N170 amplitudes 
under high relative to low WM load. Thus, our findings show that the main effect of 
WM load could depend on levels of anxiety vulnerability with high trait anxious 
individuals processing the faces to a greater extent under high WM load relative to 
low WM load. One possible explanation for that can be a hypervigilance account of 
anxiety (see Eysenck, 1992) which associates anxiety with increased monitoring of the 
environment for potential threat. Enhanced visual processing in relation to elevated 
anxiety is also shown by Berggren, Blonievsky, and Derakshan (2015). In this study, 
participants had to detect an additional stimulus while performing a visual search 
task. Berggren and colleagues (2015) demonstrated that high anxious participants 
had greater sensitivity while detecting the additional stimulus suggesting increased 
monitoring and widened attention in relation to elevated anxiety. Similarly, other 
studies investigating the role of anxiety on processing task-irrelevant stimulus under 
high and low perceptual task demands showed that high anxiety was related to 
greater allocation of attention to additional/task-irrelevant stimulus as such high 
anxious participants processed the additional stimulus even under high perceptual 
load conditions (Moriya & Tanno, 2010; Sadeh & Bredemeier, 2011).  
Our findings regarding the CNV were very interesting. While we did not 
observe a main effect of WM load or emotion, the interaction between load and 
emotion revealed that the CNV response was greater under high WM load compared 
with low WM for neutral faces, with the reverse found for the CNV response for 
fearful faces: lower CNV under high relative to low WM load. Previous literature has 
showed that the CNV amplitude is sensitive to the recruitment of cognitive resources 
in relation to task demands and cognitive effort, as well as motivational factors 
towards achieving task goals (McEvoy, Smith, & Gevins, 1998; Wild-Wall et al., 2006; 
Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Judah et al., 2013; Schevernels, Krebs, Santens, Woldorff, 
& Boehler, 2014). Accordingly, increased CNV activity under high WM load as 
compared to low WM load may reflect increased levels of cognitive effort in response 
to the greater attentional demands required under high load. However, this effect 
was observed only when faces depicted neutral expressions as there was lower a CNV 
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in response to fearful expressions under high relative to low WM load. Furthermore, 
this was even more evident for high anxious individuals. These results may indicate 
high anxious individuals have difficulties in exerting cognitive effort in response to 
task demand when they have invested processing resources in fearful faces.  
Importantly, the N170/CNV relationship under high relative to low WM load 
was modulated by trait anxiety levels such that anxiety showed a moderating effect 
on the amplitude of the N170 and its potential in predicting the amplitude of the CNV 
when expressions were fearful. In this regard, higher levels of anxiety and higher 
levels of the N170 were associated with a lower CNV response. This finding suggests 
that when cognitive resources are taxed under high WM load, fearful faces are 
processed to a larger extent in anxious individuals. Enhanced processing of fearful 
distracting stimuli in the context of the current design can reflect an early attentional 
bias towards threat in anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). While speculative, the results of 
the current investigation are suggestive of a possible relationship between early 
distractibility by fear in anxiety that compromises the mechanisms behind 
recruitment of prefrontal control further. It should also be noted that our results with 
regard to N170/CNV relationship was only marginally significant which might be due 
to a small sample size. Hence, future studies are recommended with a larger sample 
size. 
In summary, results of the current investigation suggest that anxiety is related 
to enhanced distractibility by fearful expressions at early stages of processing that can 
potentially impact the recruitment of cognitive effort at subsequent stages of 
processing that depend upon the effortful and efficient recruitment of responses 
towards task goals. Furthermore, these processes were negatively related to each 
other suggesting an interplay between early vs late information processing. This study 
is amongst the first to assess encoding of threat-related information in WM with 
respect to early and late stages of processing. Results of the current study are 
valuable to understand anxiety-related information-processing biases and 
impairments, which are hallmark of anxiety disorders (Eysenck, 1992). Future studies 
are recommended to focus on different ERP components in different time windows in 
order to gain greater understanding of this relationship.  
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 THE EFFECTS OF STATE ANXIETY ON 
WORKING MEMORY IN RELATION TO 
EMOTION AND COGNITIVE LOAD
1
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Attentional bias to threat, a vulnerability factor to anxiety and negative affect, is 
usually associated with impaired attentional control and working memory (WM), 
especially in individuals with high trait anxiety; however, research concerning state 
anxiety effects is rather scarce (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Hence, the current 
investigation focused on the effects of state anxiety on WM in the presence of threat-
related stimuli under varying levels of cognitive load. For this purpose, we used an 
experimental paradigm which combines two tasks: 1-back task (to ensure encoding of 
fearful/neutral stimuli); and a number recognition task (to manipulate cognitive load). 
Prior to the start of the experiment, state anxiety was manipulated via threat of 
shock. Participants in the anxiety/experimental condition (N = 29) were told that they 
would receive electrical shock in the second part of the experiment while participants 
in the control condition (N = 29) were told that they would never receive any 
electrical shock. Results demonstrated that elevated state anxiety (self-reported 
anxiety scores after the manipulation as well as pre to post manipulation changes in 
these scores) was related to reduced interference by threat-related stimuli, under 
high load condition selectively. This effect was not observed under the low load 
condition. As such, these findings provide a better understanding of the modulatory 
effects of state anxiety on WM performance, which seem to depend on both the 
presence of threat-related information in the environment and cognitive load. 
 
 
  
1 Sari, B. A., Pourtois, G., Derakshan, N., & Koster, E.H. (2016). The effects of state anxiety on working 
memory in relation to emotion and cognitive load. Unpublished manuscript. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Attentional bias, defined as the exaggerated tendency to attend to 
threatening stimuli in the environment (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007), is a characteristic feature of anxiety and anxiety 
disorders (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Eysenck, 1992; Beck & Clark, 1997). 
There is a wealth of studies documenting the role of attentional bias on performance 
in relation to elevated trait anxiety (i.e., when it is conceived as a stable disposition or 
personality characteristic), yet evidence with regard to the possible influences of 
state anxiety is much less documented in the literature (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
State anxiety is usually described as a transient emotional state of tension and 
apprehension, while trait anxiety is referred to as a personality disposition 
characterized by proneness to interpret situations as threatening, and the tendency 
to respond to such situations with elevated state anxiety (Spielberger, 1972; Elwood, 
Wolitzky-Taylor, & Olatunji, 2012). A substantial amount of studies focused on the 
role of trait-anxiety on cognitive performance have demonstrated that high trait 
anxiety is related to impaired attentional control and working memory (WM) in the 
presence of threat-related distractors (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and also established a 
link between trait anxiety and general impairments in attentional control and WM 
(see Eysenck, Santos, Derakshan, & Calvo, 2007; Berggren & Derakshan, 2013 for 
reviews).  
Many studies have investigated the nature and extent of the interaction effect 
between trait and state anxiety in the past. These investigations often pointed out 
that high trait anxiety in combination with high state anxiety was most strongly 
associated with increased attentional bias and greater interference by threat-related 
stimuli (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Richards, French, Johnson, Naparstek, & 
Williams, 1992; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Egloff & Hock, 2001) as well as reduced 
WM capacity (Sorg & Whitney, 1992).  
Relative to research on trait anxiety, studies examining effects of state anxiety 
(in isolation) on threat processing are the exception rather than the rule. Some of 
these investigations demonstrated that (similar to trait anxiety) elevated state anxiety 
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also increased attention to threat-related stimuli (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 
2001; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997; Bishop, 
Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007). Furthermore, Lystad, Rokke and Stout (2009) showed 
that the presentation of a negative stimulus facilitated processing of subsequent 
(neutral) stimuli in relation to high state anxiety, suggesting anxiety-related 
performance benefits. Indeed, several investigations assessing the role of state 
anxiety on sustained attention and response inhibition have demonstrated that 
elevated state anxiety is related to better response inhibition (Robinson, Krimsky, 
Grillon, 2013; Grillon, Robinson, Mathur, & Ernst, 2015). These performance benefits 
can be explained in terms of heightened vigilance as a function of state anxiety 
(Eysenck, 1992). Heightened vigilance can lead to enhanced monitoring and increased 
attention which may facilitate in turn task performance. In line with this view, 
Pacheco-Unguetti, Acosta, Callejas and Lupianez (2010) demonstrated that high state 
anxiety was related to greater orienting to sensory events and maintaining vigilant 
state functions (Posner & Petersen, 1990). 
In addition to studies focusing on attention, several studies also investigated 
the role of state anxiety on more complex cognitive processes, such as WM.  WM is a 
cognitive system with limited capacity which is essential to perform complex tasks 
(Baddeley, 1992). Using an n-back task with spatial and verbal components, 
Shackman and colleagues showed that elevated state anxiety was specifically related 
to impaired spatial WM while such an effect was not observed for verbal WM 
(Shackman, Sarinopoulos, Maxwell, Pizzagalli, Lavric, & Davidson, 2006; also see 
Lavric, Rippon, & Grey, 2003). However, other studies investigating the relationship 
between state anxiety and WM demonstrated that state anxiety was also related to 
impairments in verbal WM, yet it might depend on the task load level (Vytal, 
Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillon, 2012; Vytal, Cornwell, Letkiewicz, Arkin, & Grillon, 2013). In 
these investigations, Vytal et al. (2012; 2013), observed impairments in verbal WM 
only under low cognitive load when the task was less demanding. However, these 
studies only used emotionally neutral tasks (n-back task with letters) to investigate 
the relationship between WM and state anxiety, leaving the influence of threat-
related stimuli on this relationship unexplored. Therefore, the current investigation 
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focused on the effect of state anxiety on WM considering cognitive load and (threat-
related) stimulus content (emotionality). For this purpose, we used a WM task which 
allowed us to examine WM processing under varying levels of cognitive load in the 
presence of either neutral or threat-related stimuli. The experimental paradigm 
elected combined two interspersed tasks, namely a 1-back task (to ensure encoding 
of emotional information) and a number recognition task (for manipulation of 
cognitive load). The current paradigm provides a variant (with the addition of an 
emotional component) of the task previously used by de Fockert, Rees, Frith and 
Lavie (2001). Before the WM task, state anxiety was induced via threat of shock 
(Robinson, Vytal, Cornwell, & Grillon, 2013). Half of the participants were told that 
they would receive electrical shock during the second part of the experiment (anxiety 
condition) while the other half were told they would not receive any electrical shock 
(control condition). 
Our study seeks to better understand the complex relationship between state-
anxiety and WM, when considering emotion and cognitive load as possible 
modulatory factors. We formulated several predictions. First, we expected to observe 
a strong effect of cognitive load on task performance, with lower accuracy rates in the 
high as compared to the low cognitive load level, regardless of anxiety levels. 
Furthermore, we expected to observe that (state) anxiety would modulate the 
processing of emotional material selectively, given the close link between anxiety and 
the processing of threat-related information (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). This effect was 
expected to be further modulated by cognitive load since anxiety-related effects on 
performance can vary depending on task demands (Eysenck et al., 2007; Vytal et al., 
2012; Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Rossi & Pourtois, 2015). Considering previous 
mixed findings showing that state anxiety can be related to performance benefits in 
the presence of threat-related stimuli (i.e. Lystad et al., 2009) as well as impairments 
in WM (i.e. Vytal et al., 2012), we did not formulate, however, strong predictions with 
regard to the directions of emotion and load effects. Hence, exploratory analyses 
were conducted assessing the influence of anxiety on WM performance considering 
emotion and cognitive load. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Fifty-eight participants (13 male) aged between 17- 47 (M = 24, SD = 6) were 
recruited from the campus at Ghent University. They were first randomly assigned to 
either ‘anxiety’ (N = 29) or ‘control’ (N = 29) condition. The data for 10 participants 
were removed from subsequent analyses due to an excessive error rate (>50%). The 
final sample included 25 participants in the ‘anxiety’ and 23 participants in the 
‘control’ condition.  
Materials and Procedure 
Questionnaires. Self-report questionnaires of trait and state anxiety (State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI-SA, STAI-TA; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, & Vagg, 
1983) were administered. STAI is a 40-item (20 items in state sub-scale and 20 items 
in trait sub-scale) self-report instrument with good psychometric properties 
(Spielberger & Reheiser, 2004). Respondents indicate the degree to which they 
experience each of the items on a four-point scale (1=“almost never” to 4=“almost 
always”). We also assessed mood ratings (happiness, sadness, calmness and anxiety) 
by means of 0-100 mm visual analogue scales (VAS; 0 = not at all, 100 = extremely). 
Working Memory Task 
Stimuli. Fearful and neutral images from the International Affective Picture 
Set (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) were used. For each category, 16 images 
were eventually chosen. The numbers of the IAPS pictures used were as follows: 
fearful: 1120, 1201, 1274, 3051, 3530, 6200, 6210, 6230, 6243, 6250, 6300, 6370, 
6550, 6570, 6571, 9405; neutral: 7620, 7595, 7560, 7510, 7504, 7500, 7496, 7495, 
7234, 7205, 7130, 7037, 7036, 5535, 2745.1,7700. 
Experimental Paradigm. The WM task was based on the task devised 
previously by de Fockert et al. (2001). Participants were asked to perform two 
different tasks on each and every trial: a one back task and a number recognition task 
(see Figure 1). 
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The task started with the presentation of 5 numbers (each digit; 0.4o x 0.6o) 
for 1500 ms. Participants were asked to memorize them. Afterwards, two pictures (5o 
x 6o) appeared on the screen consecutively. Each picture was presented for 500 ms 
with a 1250-ms ISI. Participants were asked if these two pictures were the same or 
not (one-back “matching” task). They gave their answers only when they saw the 
“response” screen which remained for 1250 ms. Finally, a (single) number appeared 
on the screen and participants had to indicate (as accurately as possible) whether this 
number was one of the 5 numbers that they had seen at the beginning of the trial 
(number recognition task). 
Within this task, two main factors were manipulated; the level of cognitive 
load (low vs. high) and the emotionality of the pictures (being neutral or threat-
related). In the low cognitive load condition, the numbers were always ten-fold, two 
digit numbers (10, 20, …, 90). By comparison, in the high cognitive load condition, the 
number list included all possible two digit numbers (10, 11, 12,…., 99). Within a trial, 
the emotional content of the two pictures (either neutral or threat-related) did not 
differ. If two pictures presented were the same, the trial was termed a match one-
back trial. If the number presented at the end of the trial matched one of the (five) 
numbers presented at the beginning, it was termed a match number recognition trial.  
Before starting the task, there was a practice session with 15 neutral trials. 
The pictures used for the practice were different than the ones used in the main task. 
There were two main blocks that differed with regard to cognitive load: a low 
cognitive load and a high cognitive load block. The starting load level was 
counterbalanced across participants. In each block (n = 48 trials), neutral and fearful 
pictures were presented equally often in random order. Emotionality and match/no-
match status varied across trials, in a random fashion. The task lasted approximately 
20 minutes. 
  
EFFECTS OF STATE ANXIETY ON WORKING MEMORY 
 
69 
Figure 1. Decomposition of a trial. The left panel refers to the high cognitive 
load condition (any random 2-digit 5 numbers) while the right panel refers to the low 
cognitive load condition (5 numbers of 10-folds).  
 
 
Procedure. Participants read and signed the informed consent form. They 
then completed the state and trait anxiety questionnaires and provided mood ratings 
using the VAS (time point 1). They were told that the study would consist of two 
parts: a cognitive part and a pain perception part. The pain perception part was 
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announced to induce state anxiety. Participants were also told that they would be 
asked to rate their mood at various intervals during the experiment. Half of the 
participants were told that they would receive an electric shock (anxiety condition) 
during the pain perception part. The electric shock equipment was visible to 
participants. The electric shock machine was turned on, cables were attached to it, 
and the necessary arrangements were made to operate the machine. However, 
electric shocks were not delivered at any point during the experiment. Other 
participants were told that they would not receive any electrical shock (control 
condition). After the participants were informed about which condition they were 
assigned to, they were asked to fill in the state anxiety questionnaire and provided 
VAS mood ratings again (time point 2). They then completed the WM task which was 
introduced as the ‘cognitive part’ of the study. When the task was finished, they were 
asked to fill in the state anxiety questionnaire and provided VAS mood ratings for the 
last time (time point 3). In the end, they were debriefed and interviewed to assess 
whether the pain perception scenario was believable. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were paid 5 euro for their contribution. 
Data Analytic Approach. The main dependent variable of the WM task was 
accuracy rate in the number recognition task2. In order to investigate the effects of 
cognitive load and emotion on task performance, we first conducted a 2 (high vs low 
cognitive load) x 2 (neutral vs fearful) ANOVA. Next, condition (anxiety vs control) was 
included as a between-subject factor in the analysis to investigate whether the 
relationship between cognitive load and emotion differed as a function of condition. 
Provided that there were considerable individual differences in response to 
the state anxiety manipulation (cf. Grol, Koster, Bruyneel, & De Raedt, 2014; Sari, 
Koster, & Derakshan, 2016), further analyses focused on WM task performance also 
considered the level of anxiety as covariate regardless of the condition participants 
were initially assigned to. This approach allowed us to take into account inter-
individual differences in state anxiety and increase statistical power by conserving 
greater degrees of freedom. Self-report anxiety scores assessed via STAI-SA and VAS 
at post-manipulation (time 2) were included in the analyses as they are the most 
reflective of the level of state anxiety just before the WM task. The other VAS ratings 
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on sadness, calmness and happiness were mainly included to reduce the focus on 
anxiety and assess the specificity of the state anxiety induction. In addition, STAI-SA 
scores and VAS anxiety ratings at post-manipulation, pre to post manipulation change 
in anxiety levels were also considered (cf., Grol et al., 2014), because the contrast 
with former emotional state might have an influence on latter emotional experience 
(affective contrast theory, Bacon, Rood, & Washburn, 1914; Manstead, Wagner, & 
MacDonald, 1983). Change scores were calculated by subtracting level of anxiety at 
pre-manipulation from post-manipulation: STAI-SA/VAS anxiety at post-manipulation 
– STAI-SA/VAS anxiety at pre-manipulation. Higher scores in these indexes indicated 
greater increase in anxiety following the state anxiety induction.  
In order to investigate how the actual level of state anxiety modulated the 
relationship between cognitive load and emotion, 2 (high vs low cognitive load) x 2 
(neutral vs fearful) ANCOVAs were conducted with post-manipulation anxiety levels 
as covariate (both for STAI-SA scores and VAS anxiety ratings separately). Similar 
analyses were repeated also using pre-post manipulation change scores in anxiety 
levels as covariate. Significant three-way interactions were followed-up by 
correlational analyses. To this end, we first calculated interference scores by 
subtracting accuracy scores in fearful trials from the accuracy scores in neutral trials 
(Accuracy Neutral – Accuracy Fear) for each of the cognitive load conditions 
separately. Greater scores in these indexes indicated greater interference by fearful 
stimuli. Correlational analyses were conducted for low and high cognitive load 
conditions separately; and in order to investigate whether these two dependent 
correlation coefficients were significantly different from each other in strength 
Steiger test (Steiger, 1980) was performed. 
RESULTS 
Group Characteristics  
Trait anxiety scores did not significantly differ between the control (M = 37.7, 
SD = 9.34) and anxiety (M = 38.90, SD = 10.48) conditions, t < 1, NS. The two groups 
also did not differ from each other in terms of age (Control condition, M = 24, SD = 5; 
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Anxiety condition, M = 24, SD = 7), t < 1, NS; and gender; X2(1, N = 48) = .25, p = .62. 
All participants reported that the pain perception scenario was believable. 
Mood induction Check 
 Conditions did not significantly differ from each other in mood ratings and 
STAI-SA scores at the beginning of the experiment (time point 1; all ts < 1.3, NS). After 
the mood manipulation (time point 2), participants in the anxiety condition were 
significantly more anxious (VAS anxiety ratings, t(46) = 2.15, p < .05; STAI-SA, t(46) = 
2.66, p = .01) than in the control condition. Importantly, the two conditions did not 
differ on any of the other ratings for sadness, happiness and calmness after 
manipulation (all ts < 1.2, NS). At the end of the experiment, the two groups did not 
differ from each other in any of the mood ratings or STAI-SA scores (all ts < 1.6, NS). 
Mean scores are presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Mean VAS ratings and STAI-SA scores at pre-manipulation, post-manipulation 
and after the task for anxiety and control conditions. SDs are reported in parenthesis.  
 
  Pre-manipulation Post-manipulation After the Task 
  
Anxiety 
condition 
Control 
condition 
Anxiety 
condition 
Control 
condition 
Anxiety 
condition 
Control 
condition 
STAI-SA 38 (13) 33 (11) 42 (13)   * 32 (11) 40 (12) 36 (11) 
Anxiety Ratings 27 (33) 18 (22) 29 (29)   * 14 (17) 26 (31) 15 (18) 
Happiness Ratings 69 (23) 69 (21) 67 (23) 73 (21) 63 (25) 71 (20) 
Calmness Ratings 70 (24) 72 (26) 65 (28) 74 (25) 67 (28) 68 (21) 
Sadness Ratings 21 (29) 19 (26) 24 (28) 20 (25) 21 (26) 18 (23) 
* Indicates a significant difference between the anxiety and control conditions, p < .05 
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 Working Memory Task 
 The 2 X 2 ANOVA with cognitive load (low vs high cognitive load) x emotion 
(neutral vs fearful) as within-subject factors showed a significant main effect of 
cognitive load, F(1, 47) = 71.18, p < .001, indicating, as expected, higher accuracy 
rates in the low (M = 78%, SD = 11) as compared to the high cognitive load condition 
(M = 65%, SD = 9). There was no significant main effect of emotion or two-way 
interaction effect (all Fs < 1, NS; See Figure 2 for descriptive statistics). When the 
condition was included as a between-subject factor, there was a significant main 
effect of load, F(1, 46) = 71.05, p < .001. However, main effect of emotion (F < 1, NS) 
and interaction effects were not significant (for emotion x condition interaction, F(1, 
46) = 2.67, p = .11; for all other interaction effects, Fs < 1.6, NS). 
Figure 2. Mean accuracy rates in each condition for number recognition (WM) task 
(bars indicate standard errors). 
 
  
Including STAI-SA post-manipulation scores as covariate, the ANCOVA 
revealed significant main effects of cognitive load, F(1, 46) = 10.23, p < .01; and 
emotion, F(1, 46) = 4.73, p < .05 (Fearful trials, M = 71.62%, SD = 9.19; Neutral trials M 
= 71.53%, SD = 10.28). There was also a significant emotion x STAI-SA interaction, F(1, 
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46) = 5.38, p < .05. This two-way interaction was subsumed under the (marginally) 
significant cognitive load x emotion x STAI-SA interaction (F(1, 46) = 3.45, p = .07). All 
other interaction effects were non-significant, all Fs < 2.4, NS. Correlational analyses 
showed that there was a significant negative relationship between interference 
scores and STAI-SA in high cognitive load condition, r(48) = -.41, p < .01 (Figure 3). 
This correlation was still significant after controlling for STAI-TA scores by partial 
correlation, r(48) = -.36, p = .01. Such correlation was not found in low cognitive load 
condition, r(48) = -.03, p = .83. Furthermore, these two correlation coefficients were 
marginally different from each other, Steiger’s z =1.90, p = .06. The significant 
negative correlation between STAI-SA and interference scores indicated that higher 
level of state anxiety was related to lower interference by threat in the high cognitive 
load condition. 
 
Figure 3. Correlation between interference scores in high cognitive load condition and 
STAI-SA scores at post-manipulation. 
 
 
When pre-post manipulation changes in STAI-SA scores were used as a 
covariate, the ANCOVA showed a significant main effect of cognitive load, F(1, 46) = 
60.88, p < .001; while the main effect of emotion did not approach significance, F < 1, 
NS. Furthermore, there was a significant cognitive load x emotion x STAI-SA change 
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score interaction, F(1, 46) = 4.73, p < .05. Other interaction effects were non-
significant (all Fs < 2.5, NS). This significant three-way interaction was followed-up by 
correlational analyses. There was a significant negative relationship between 
interference scores and STAI-SA change scores in the high cognitive load condition, 
r(48) = -.37, p < .01 (Figure 4). This correlation was still significant after controlling for 
STAI-TA scores by partial correlation, r(48) = -.40, p < .01. However, such correlation 
was not observed in low cognitive load condition, r(48) = .07, p = .64. Furthermore, 
these two correlation coefficients were also significantly different form each other, 
Steiger’s z =2.18, p < .05. The significant negative correlation between STAI-SA change 
scores and interference scores indicated that elevated anxiety pre to post-
manipulation was associated with lower interference by threat in the high cognitive 
load condition. 
 
Figure 4. Correlation between interference scores in high cognitive load condition and 
change in STAI-SA scores pre to post manipulation. 
 
 
Using VAS anxiety post-manipulation ratings as a covariate, the ANCOVA 
revealed significant main effects of cognitive load, F(1, 46) = 52.45, p < .001; and 
emotion, F(1, 46) = 4.24, p < .05. There was also a significant interaction between 
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emotion and VAS anxiety, F(1, 46) = 10.41, p < .01. Other interaction effects were not 
significant, all Fs < 1.7, NS. The two-way interaction was followed-up by correlational 
analyses between VAS anxiety ratings and accuracy rates in fearful and neutral 
conditions separately averaged across cognitive load conditions. These analyses 
revealed a significant negative relationship between VAS anxiety ratings and accuracy 
rates in the neutral condition, r(48) = -.33, p < .05; but not in the fearful condition, 
r(48) = .03, p = .85. 
Lastly, we included pre-post manipulation change in VAS anxiety ratings as 
covariate. Results revealed a significant main effect of cognitive load only, F(1, 46) = 
70.55, p < .001 (For the main effect of emotion, F < 1, NS; for all other interaction 
effects, Fs < 2.2, NS). 
DISCUSSION 
 The current study investigated the relationship between state anxiety and WM 
in the presence of threat-related stimuli considering cognitive load. We expected to 
observe impairments in WM performance under high compared to low cognitive load 
regardless of anxiety. Emotion effect (interference by threat-related stimuli) was 
expected to emerge in relation to state-anxiety depending on changes in task 
demands (high vs low cognitive load). As expected, our results showed that 
participants had lower accuracy rates under high compared to low cognitive load 
condition. A main effect of emotion was observed only in relation to anxiety. More 
specifically, results demonstrated that elevated state-anxiety was related to reduced 
interference by threat under high cognitive load condition; and this effect was most 
pronounced in relation to pre- to post-manipulation increase in the level of state 
anxiety, as assessed via STAI-SA. Similar results were not observed in relation to VAS 
anxiety ratings. Furthermore, cognitive load and emotion effects did not vary as a 
function of condition (anxiety vs control). The possible implications of these findings 
are discussed below. 
 Our results are in line with the previous studies investigating the role of state-
anxiety in attention where elevated state-anxiety facilitated subsequent cognitive 
processes after the presentation of threat-related stimuli (Lystad et al., 2013; Birk, 
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Shin, Dennis, & Urry, 2011). State anxiety-related benefits on performance could be 
due to increased vigilance which can lead to increased monitoring and broader 
attention (Eysenck, 1992; Robinson et al., 2013; Berggren, Blonievsky, & Derakshan, 
2015; Grillon et al., 2015; but also see Birk et al., 2011). Furthermore, current findings 
are also in accordance with mood congruency accounts (Bower, 1981); as anxious 
mood can apparently enhance performance in the presence of threat-related stimuli 
(Lystad et al., 2013). 
Findings of the current study are different from previous studies where 
adverse effects of state-anxiety were observed on WM when using emotionally 
neutral WM tasks (Lavric et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 2006; Vytal et al., 2012; 2013). 
This discrepancy between previous findings and our results suggests that the effects 
of state-anxiety on WM can differ based on the mere presence of threat-related (and 
presumably mood-congruent) stimuli in the environment. Furthermore, Vytal et al. 
(2012; 2013) observed anxiety-related effects on WM under low cognitive load; 
whereas, in the current study, we mainly observed anxiety-related effects under high 
cognitive load. Vytal et al. (2012; also see King & Schaefer, 2011) explained the lack of 
anxiety-related effects under high cognitive load in terms of decrements in anxious 
mood in this condition. However, it is unlikely that this has been the case in the 
current study since the possibility of decrement in anxious mood under high cognitive 
load does not explain why performance benefits were observed in this condition in 
relation to elevated anxiety; and also why no effects of anxiety (either benefit or cost) 
were observed under low cognitive load. Lack of anxiety-related effects under low 
cognitive load in our study is also in accordance with studies in trait anxiety proposing 
that anxiety-related effects on WM become more evident when the task is cognitively 
demanding (i.e. Qi et al., 2014; also see Berggren & Derakshan, 2013 for a review). 
The results of the current study suggest beneficial effects of state anxiety on 
WM in the presence of threat-related stimuli; and this effect remained significant 
even after controlling for trait anxiety. However, it should be noted that participants 
were not pre-selected based on trait anxiety; and the average level of trait anxiety 
was only moderate (STAI-TA scores in the current investigation, M= 38, SD = 9.86; 
average normative STAI-TA scores of Dutch student population, M = 35, SD = 8.40; Van 
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der Ploeg, 1982). Hence, based on our findings, it is difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions with regard to the role of trait anxiety (or the tack thereof), which is 
closely associated with clinical anxiety (Eysenck, 1992). Recently, Vytal, Arkin, 
Overstreet, Lieberman and Grillon (2016) investigated the role of state anxiety on 
WM in a sample of GAD patients and healthy controls; and they observed differential 
effects of state anxiety on performance in these two groups. While GAD patients had 
impaired WM regardless of the cognitive load (level) in the anxiety condition (threat 
of shock), healthy controls in the anxiety condition had impaired WM only under low 
cognitive load. Furthermore, Vytal et al. (2016) observed that (similar to our results) 
healthy controls had improved WM under high cognitive load in the anxiety 
condition; yet this gain has been associated with reduced anxious mood under high 
cognitive load. 
It should also be noted that, in the current study, we did not observe any 
significant differences on WM performance in relation to cognitive load and emotion 
as a function of condition (anxiety vs control). However, load and emotion effects 
were modulated via individual differences in state anxiety levels regardless of the 
condition. This finding is inline with previous studies where there were considerable 
individual differences in response to mood manipulation; and the effect of mood 
manipulation on performance was observed when these differences were taken into 
account (Grol et al., 2014; Sari et al., 2016). Furthermore, the relationship between 
cognitive load and emotion was specifically modulated by STAI-SA scores, yet similar 
results could not be found using VAS anxiety ratings. These two measures are 
typically highly correlated with one another (i.e. correlation coefficient between VAS 
ratings and STAI-SA scores after the manipulation; r(48) = .80, p < .001); and both of 
them are considered valid instruments to assess momentary fluctuations in levels of 
state anxiety, STAI-SA (Rossi & Pourtois, 2012). Presumably, in the current 
investigation, the use of a multidimensional scale targeting different aspects of 
anxiety (i.e. apprehension, tension, nervousness, worry, arousal; Spielberger & 
Reheiser, 2004; 2009) might have been more sensitive to capture fine-grained 
qualitative changes in the actual mood state of the participant as a result of the mood 
induction procedure. Because the STAI-SA might have provided a compound measure 
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of these different aspects/dimensions, it could potentially explain why it did account 
for a differential performance level across the different conditions in our study, unlike 
the simpler and undifferentiated VASes used here.  
In the current study, we manipulated state anxiety using (the prospect of) 
threat of shock which targets mainly anxious arousal component of anxiety (Phelps, 
O’Connor, Gatenby, Gore, Grillon, & Davis, 2001; Robinson, Vytal, Cornwell, & Grillon, 
2013). Hence, it is difficult to ascertain whether the effects we observed were specific 
to state anxiety (i.e., anticipatory anxiety) or heightened arousal levels. Besides 
arousal or (hyper)vigilance, anxiety usually has a strong cognitive component in the 
form of worry (anxious apprehension; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Heller & Nitschke, 
1998; Mathews, 1990); and the worry component of anxiety is also closely related to 
impairments in WM and attentional bias towards threat (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). 
Hence, future studies are desired to focus on the distinction between anxious arousal 
and worry; and also investigate WM performance (benefit or cost) in relation to 
induced worry in order to better elucidate under which circumstances state anxiety 
dynamically influences WM. 
The current study investigated the role of state anxiety on WM in the 
presence of threat considering low/high task demands. Results suggest anxiety-
related performance benefits in WM in the presence of threat-related stimuli, under 
high cognitive demands selectively. As such, this study allows to gain a better 
understanding of the nature and extent of modulatory effects exerted by state-
anxiety on WM in (unselected) healthy adult participants. Future studies are needed 
to assess whether worry for example, as opposed to state anxiety as such or broadly 
defined, can eventually underlie this gain in WM in the presence of threat-related 
information in the environment when negative affect is transiently experienced. This 
line of research might ultimately be valuable to explore cognitive vulnerability factors 
in anxiety disorders. 
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   THE EFFECTS OF ACTIVE WORRYING ON 
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY 
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ABSTRACT 
According to the Attentional Control Theory of Anxiety (Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos & Calvo, 2007), worry, a crucial component of anxiety, impairs task 
performance outcome(s) through its direct effect on working memory capacity 
(WMC), by using up the limited resources available for performance thus reducing 
attentional control. We tested this hypothesis in the current study by examining the 
causal influence of active worrying on WMC in a sample of undergraduate university 
students assigned either to a worry condition (N = 32) in which state worry was 
induced or to a non-worry control condition (N = 32). Participants performed a 
change detection task before and after the worry/control manipulation. Mediation 
analyses showed that the level of self-reported worry mediated the effects of 
condition on change in WMC as demonstrated by the significant indirect effect of 
worry and the resulting non-significant direct effect of condition on change in WMC. 
Similar results were obtained when using state anxiety measures as mediating 
factors. Results of the current study are amongst the first to demonstrate that worry 
impairs WMC and as such have important implications for understanding the impact 
of worry in educational as well as clinical outcomes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Worry has been described as a state of experiencing uncontrollable, 
apprehensive, and intrusive negative thoughts about the future (Borkovec, Robinson, 
Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). It is considered as a main cognitive characteristic of 
anxiety (Eysenck, 1982; Mathews, 1990), believed to hijack important attentional 
resources from a limited working memory capacity (WMC) system, leaving fewer 
resources available for task demands, thus reducing attentional control (e.g., 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). 
According to the attentional control theory of anxiety (ACT; Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007), worry is a key mechanism explaining why efficient processing 
of the main executive functions of working memory are hampered in anxiety, leading 
to impaired or inefficient task performance.  
While worry provides a mechanism by which the effects of anxiety on 
cognitive performance outcomes can be explained, there have been relatively few 
studies examining the possible causal influence of worry on cognitive performance. 
Hayes, Hirsch, and Mathews (2008) assessed the effects of worrying on performance 
using a random key-pressing task measuring attentional control. During this task, 
participants were asked to press any one of 15 buttons available upon hearing a 
beep. Randomness of button press was interpreted as a measure of attentional 
control since producing a more novel and random sequence requires a greater level 
of attention as compared to following a regular and practiced sequence. In that study, 
participants were assigned to a ‘worry’ condition where they were instructed to think 
of a personally relevant worrying concern and a ‘control’ condition where they were 
asked to think of a personally relevant positive future event while completing this 
task. Hayes et al. (2008) found that high trait worry was associated with fewer 
random button presses. Furthermore, high trait worriers produced less random 
sequences during the worry condition as compared to the control condition, which 
was not the case for the low worriers. This latter result was consistent with the 
prediction that state worry reduces processing efficiency, especially in individuals 
with trait characteristics compatible with this thinking style (see Eysenck et al., 2007). 
This finding was replicated in a sample of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) patients 
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(see Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014) who conducted the same 
task with the addition of completing an n-back working memory task first. In this 
study, working memory performance was also shown to be affected with GAD 
participants performing worse on the n-back task than control subjects. 
More recently, two studies have looked at how trait vulnerability to worry 
modulates cognitive as well as neural processes related to attentional control. Stout, 
Shackman, Johnson and Larson (2015) using an emotional working memory (WM) 
task in healthy participants assessed the role of worry and anxiety in relation to 
working memory on filtering efficiency using an emotional face change detection task 
with faces depicting threatening and neutral expressions. In this task, participants 
were required to focus on the target faces and indicate if they had changed in a 
subsequent recall phase while ignoring the distracter faces. Results of this study 
demonstrated an increased filtering cost both for neutral and threat distracters in 
high trait anxious individuals. Furthermore, trait worry also increased filtering costs 
but for the threat related distractors only. In another study, using a modified version 
of the flanker task under low and high working memory load, where angry and 
neutral facial expressions of emotions served as distractors, Owens, Derakshan and 
Richards (2015) found that trait vulnerability to worry was associated with a greater 
recruitment of the N2 ERP component upon the inhibition of distractors with this 
neurophysiological effect being greater under high working memory load, providing 
support for the notion that trait worry reduces attentional control especially under 
conditions where attentional resources compete to meet task demands.  
Extending recent demonstrations that trait vulnerability to worry reduces 
processing efficiency, the current study sought to establish that this effect can be 
explained through the effect of worry on WMC. Recent theoretical accounts (see 
Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall, & Engle, 2014) have argued that WMC, i.e., the efficacy 
by which goal relevant information is attended, stored, and maintained while task 
irrelevant information is suppressed, is strongly related to attentional control. This 
suggests that in line with former predictions of ACT, active worrying should reduce 
WMC. To our knowledge, no study has directly examined the impact of active 
worrying on WMC in an unselected population. However, this research question is 
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key in gaining a better understanding of how anxiety related impairments on 
cognitive performance in situations such as examinations for example, where the 
efficient regulation of attentional control is needed under competing task demands, 
could emerge. We assessed WMC using a modified visual change detection task (CDT) 
with (neutral) shapes (Owens, Koster & Derakshan, 2013) that was based on (Vogel, 
McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005). During this task, participants were instructed to 
remember the orientation of shapes and monitor change occurring between the 
sample display and the test display. In order to observe the influence of active 
worrying, we used a worry manipulation similar to Hayes et al. (2008). In a between 
subjects design, participants were asked to focus on either a worrisome concern 
(worry condition) or positive future event (control condition). They performed the 
CDT before and after the manipulation. This enabled us to test how active worrying 
causally influenced WMC. During the experiment, mood ratings in response to worry 
were also obtained. We predicted that increased worrying would be related to 
impaired WMC with reductions or limited improvements in WMC post vs. pre 
manipulation for the worry as compared to control condition. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty-four participants (27 male, 37 female) aged between 18-53 (M = 27, SD = 
8) were recruited via advertisements from the campus of Birkbeck University of 
London (N = 39) and Ghent University (N = 25). They were compensated 5 GBP/5 Euro 
or given course credit for their contribution. The first participant was randomly 
assigned to either the ‘Worry’ (N = 32) or a ‘Control’ (N = 32) condition and 
subsequent participants were assigned to the different conditions alternately. Data 
from 10 participants were excluded either due to difficulties during the manipulation 
(i.e., they could not think of a personally relevant worrisome future event, N = 3), 
poor accuracy on the change detection task (less than 50% accuracy, N = 4), high 
response bias (false alarms more than 2.5 SD of the mean, N = 3), leaving a final 
sample of 54 individuals (26 in the ‘Worry’ and 28 in the ‘Control’ condition). 
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Materials and Procedure 
Questionnaires. Participants completed the trait and state anxiety scales of 
the STAI (State Trait Anxiety Inventory; STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & 
Jacobs, 1983), the trait worry (Penn State Worry Questionnaire; PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) and the trait rumination scales (Ruminative Responses 
Scale, RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). During the experiment state worry 
and state anxiety were also assessed via 0 – 100 mm visual analogue scales (VAS; 0 = 
not at all, 100 = extremely). 
Change Detection Task. A schematic overview of the trial sequence is 
presented in Figure 1. Each trial started with a fixation cross with an arrow above 
pointing either to the right or left (700 ms). This arrow served as cue and participants 
were informed to attend to the side of the screen indicated by this symbolic cue. 
Afterwards, either 2 or 4 rectangles appeared at the right and left side of the screen 
for 100 ms (3° away from the fixation cross, within a region of 4° x 7.2°; memory 
array). Participants were asked to memorize the orientation of the red rectangles on 
the attended side. After a retention interval of 900 ms, the rectangles reappeared at 
the right and left side of screen (test array). Participants were instructed to indicate 
whether the orientation of one of the (four or two) red rectangles they had 
memorized had changed or not within a two second interval, as accurately as 
possible. 
The task included two item, four item, and distractor conditions. In the two 
item and four item conditions, all rectangles were red in color while the distractor 
condition included two blue rectangles as distractors in addition to the two red 
rectangles. In each condition, the rectangles appeared on random positions with a 
minimum of 2° distance from each other. There were 4 possible orientations for the 
rectangles: vertical, horizontal, 45° left and 45° right tilted. All possible conditions 
were randomly distributed within the task. There were 4 possible orientations for the 
rectangles: vertical, horizontal, 45° left and 45° right tilted. Fitting these criteria, we 
had 98 stimuli set for the four item, 105 stimuli set for the two-item and 101 stimuli 
set for distractor condition. The same stimuli set was not presented more than once 
during the task. All possible conditions were randomly distributed within the task. 
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The task included four experimental blocks including 48 trials each (in half of 
the trials orientation of a rectangle has changed and in the other half it remained the 
same). Participants practiced the task until they reached an accuracy level of > 50% 
before starting the main experimental trials. 
Procedure. Participants first read and signed the consent form. Then, they 
completed STAI-TA, PSWQ and RRS. Next, they performed the CDT, after which they 
provided mood ratings using VAS on the extent to which they felt worried, relaxed, 
happy and anxious (pre-manipulation). Afterwards, participants were assigned either 
to worry or control condition where they were asked to think of a personally relevant 
future event (in line with Stefanopoulou et al., 2014). In the worry condition 
participants focused on a personal concern or a worrisome event, whereas the 
control condition participants focused on a positive event. Since worry is strongly 
related to low self-esteem and beliefs about personal inadequacies (Davey & Levy, 
1998), finding a personally relevant future scenario was strongly emphasized. Next, 
participants were shortly interviewed by the experimenter about these events for 
approximately 2 minutes. They were asked to discuss the positive (control condition) 
or negative (worry condition) aspects of the events they were focusing on. Once the 
interview was terminated, participants were told to actively keep thinking about the 
future events they just described until the end of the experiment. Then, mood ratings 
were taken for the second time (post-manipulation) alongside a question about the 
personal relevance of the event they had described. In addition to the mood ratings, 
participants also completed STAI-SA. Finally, they performed the CDT for the second 
time after which mood ratings were assessed for the final time (after the task). In the 
end, participants were asked to rate the frequency by which they had thought about 
the personal topic they had described earlier. 
Data Analytic Approach. In order to assess performance on the CDT, we 
calculated WMC scores via the widely used formula (Pashler, 1988): K = S x (H - F)/(1-
F) where K (WMC) is calculated as a function of S: the set size of the array, H: the 
observed hit rate and F: proportion of false alarms. In keeping with Lee, Cowan, 
Vogel, Valle-Inclan and Hackley (2010) and Owens et al. (2013), we calculated WMC 
for the four-item condition, eliminating possible ceiling or floor effects which can 
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occur from two-item condition or distracter condition. In order to assess the level of 
worry during the task performance, we averaged the VAS scores for the worry ratings 
obtained after the manipulation (before starting CDT for the second time) and at the 
end of the task to produce an average score of worry (worry level). Since worry is 
defined as a more verbal and cognitive form of state anxiety (Mathews, 1990; 
Eysenck et al., 2007), we also calculated the same index for the VAS anxiety ratings 
(VAS anxiety level). In addition, STAI-SA scores were also included in our analysis. 
Strong correlations were observed amongst levels of worry, STAI-SA and VAS 
measures of anxiety (worry level and VAS anxiety level, r(54) = .83, p < .001; worry 
level and STAI-SA, r(54) = .73, p < .001; VAS anxiety level and STAI-SA, r(54) = .62, p < 
.001). Other VAS ratings on relaxed mood and happiness were obtained to reduce the 
sole focus on anxiety which could enhance anxious mood. Since the focus of the study 
was change in WMC as a function of the worry manipulation, we calculated change 
scores in WMC by subtracting the scores at pre-manipulation from the scores at post-
manipulation. Larger change in WMC scores indicated improved performance at post-
manipulation compared to pre-manipulation. Due to the variability in responding to 
mood manipulation (cf. Grol, Koster, Bruyneel & De Raedt, 2014) further analyses 
focused on the relationship between condition and WMC considering the level of 
worry or anxiety. 
To test the main hypothesis, mediation analysis with condition as the 
independent variable, worry level as the mediating (intervening) factor, and change in 
WMC as dependent variable was conducted. Figure 2 depicts the tested model. In 
order to test the conditions of the mediation model (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006), 
significance of the indirect effect (path ab), the total effect (effect of condition on 
change in WMC scores without taking worry level into account (path c); and the direct 
effect (i.e., effect of condition on WMC scores after considering worry level (path c’) 
were investigated. 
Significance of the indirect effect was tested using a bootstrapping approach 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) via random resampling (Hayes, 2013). We estimated 50,000 
bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence intervals, excluding 0 for the indirect effect 
to be significant. These settings were chosen to increases the stability of the results.2 
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Significance of total effect (path c) and direct effect (path c’) were tested and 
reported via regression coefficients. Similar mediation analyses were repeated with 
STAI-SA and VAS anxiety level as intervening variables, separately. All mediation 
models were controlled for heteroscedasticity. Analyses were conducted using IBM 
SPSS 19 and the macro PROCESS 2.13.2 (Hayes, 2013). 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical diagram for indirect, total, and direct effects of condition on 
change in working memory capacity with either level of worry, anxiety or STAI-SA as 
an intervening variable. 
 
 
 
  
2 Although bootstrapping is a recommended method that is also robust in smaller sample sizes, in 
our study the upper-lower bounds of the confidence intervals varied slightly upon repetition of the 
analyses. Increasing the number of bootstrap samples is one of the ways to overcome this problem 
(Hayes, 2013). Hence, we used 50,000 bias-corrected bootstrap while 5000 or 10,000 are usually 
acceptable numbers. 
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RESULTS 
Condition Description 
Participants in the worry and control condition did not differ from each other 
on STAI-TA, PSWQ or RRS (all ts < 1, NS). There were no group differences in age (t < 
1, NS) or gender distribution (c2 (1, N = 54) = .32, p = .57).  
Mood induction Check 
Mood ratings at the beginning of the experiment (pre-manipulation) were 
compatible across conditions, all ts < 1.2, NS. As expected, participants in the worry 
condition were more worried, less relaxed, more anxious, and less happy than in the 
control condition (all ts > 4.5, all ps <.001) after the manipulation (post manipulation; 
see table 1 for descriptive statistics), although there was substantial individual 
variability within conditions. Furthermore, the worry condition had higher STAI-SA 
scores (M = 48, SD = 9) relative to the control condition (M = 36, SD = 11); t(52) = 
4.39, p < .001). Participants in the worry condition reported that the selected future 
event was highly personal, and reported that on average they spent about 67% of the 
time thinking about their personal topic at post manipulation. There were no 
condition differences in ratings of relevance, t (52) = 1.38, p = .17, or on time spent 
thinking about their personal topic, t < 1, NS. At the end of the experiment, 
participants in the worry condition were still significantly more worried, less relaxed, 
more anxious, and less happy compared to participants in the control condition: all ts 
> 3.7, all ps < .01 (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Mean VAS scores at pre-manipulation, post-manipulation and at the end of 
the task for worry and control conditions. SDs are reported in parenthesis. 
 
  Pre-manipulation Post-manipulation After the Task 
  
Control 
group 
Worry 
group 
Control 
group 
Worry 
group 
Control 
group 
Worry 
group 
Worry Ratings 28 (26) 28 (24) 21 (19)  55 (24) 17 (16)  46 (22) 
Relax Ratings 66 (24) 57 (31) 79 (17)  51 (20) 77 (17)  56 (25) 
Happy Ratings 71 (18) 70 (19) 82 (14)  59 (23) 80 (17)  60 (24) 
Anxiety Ratings 26 (25) 26 (24) 19 (22)  52 (22) 17 (22)  42 (21) 
 
 
Change Detection Task 
The worry and control condition did not significantly differ from each other on 
WMC prior to the experimental manipulation, t < 1, NS (Worry: M = 1.42, SD = .76; 
Control: M = 1.53, SD = 1.05). Furthermore, participants did not differ from each 
other based on the location they were recruited from (UK or Belgium) in terms of 
WMC at pre-manipulation, post-manipulation or pre to post change scores (all ts < .1, 
NS). 
Results of the bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure showed that the 
indirect effect of condition on change in WMC via worry was significant (path ab, b = -
.41; boot 95% CI = [-1.0632, -.0001]) with medium-to-large effect size (K2 = .18, boot 
95% CI = [.0204, .4162]; Preacher & Kelley, 2011). The direct effect (path c’, b = .06, 
t(51) < 1) was not significant. The total effect (path c, b = -.35, t(52) = -1.47, p = .15) 
did not reach significance. These results indicate that worry mediated the relationship 
between condition and change in WMC. Figure 3a shows the relationship between 
the level of worry and the change in WMC in each condition. 
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Results of the bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure also showed significant 
indirect effects of condition on change in WMC via VAS Anxiety level (path ab, b = -
.48; boot 95% CI = [-1.0429, -.1484] and via STAI-SA (path ab, b = -.26; boot 95% CI = [-
.8254, -.0519] separately. Both effects represented medium-to-large effect sizes (for 
VAS Anxiety level, K2 = .24, boot 95% CI = [.0766, .4537]; for STAI-SA, K2 = .14, boot 
95% CI = [.0325, .3360]; Preacher & Kelley, 2011). The direct effects were not 
significant in either of the analyses (path c’, all ts < 1, NS). Results indicate that the 
level of state anxiety scores assessed via VAS anxiety and also STAI-SA mediated the 
relationship between condition and WMC change (See figure 3b –for VAS anxiety 
level- and 3c –for STAI-SA- for the relationship between state-anxiety and change on 
WMC in the worry and control conditions separately) 3.  
It is noteworthy to mention that our mediation model did not fit the criteria of 
traditional full mediation model where the total effect should be significant (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). However, recent theoretical approaches on mediation analyses 
(Mathieu & Taylor, 2006; Hayes, 2009) have offered new insights into the validity of 
mediation where the significance of the total effect is no longer a prerequisite, 
usually referred to as an indirect effect model (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). In an indirect 
effect model, a significant indirect effect is expected while the direct effect is not 
significant and the pre-requisite of the significance of the total effect is not required. 
This model indicates that the independent variable influences the dependent variable 
only through an intervening factor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Mediation analyses with condition as an independent variable, change scores in WMC 
as a dependent variable and the level of worry as intervening factor in the distractor 
condition (b = −.0580; boot 95% CI = [−.3724, .1774]) and two-item condition (b = 
−.1227; boot 95% CI = [−.2923, 0801]) did not lead to significant indirect effects. 
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Figure 3. (a) Relationship between the level of worry and the change in WMC 
in each condition. (b) Relationship between the level of anxiety and the change in 
WMC in each condition. (c) Relationship between STAI-SA scores and the change in 
WMC in each condition. 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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(c) 
 
 
Additional analysis 
We also assessed the relationship between the time participants spent 
thinking about their personal topic and change in WMC. In the worry condition, 
correlational analysis indicated a negative relationship between these variables (r(26) 
= -.54, p < .01) suggesting that the time participants spent thinking about their 
personal topics was associated with smaller improvements in WMC. This relationship 
was not found in the control condition (r(28) = .08, p = .68). These two correlation 
coefficients differed from each other significantly (Fisher’s z = 2.38, p < .05). 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the direct influence of 
active worry on WMC. In keeping with the predictions of the ACT (Eysenck et al., 
2007), active worry was expected to reduce processing efficiency and lead to reduced 
WMC. The results were in line with that prediction. Our mediation model found that 
levels of active worry mediated the relationship between condition and changes in 
WMC indicating that worrying interfered with improvements in WMC. Furthermore, 
the time participants spent thinking about their personal topic was also related to 
smaller improvements in WMC in the worry condition. These results are among the 
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first to demonstrate a direct effect of active worrying on a measure of WMC and in 
this sense have direct implications for theories of anxiety and worry (e.g., Eysenck et 
al., 2007; Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) that attempt to 
understand the main mechanism by which anxiety related effects impair performance 
outcome(s). Accordingly, our results showed that worrying likely depletes resources 
of working memory that are needed for efficient task performance providing the first 
direct support for one of the main predictions of the ACT (Derakshan & Eysenck, 
2009). 
In recent research, it has been demonstrated that high levels of trait 
susceptibility to worry are associated with reduced attentional control in the 
presence of threat related distractors (Stout et al., 2015; Owens et al., 2015) with 
other work showing that active worrying can have a detrimental effect on working 
memory performance in a healthy population (Hayes et al., 2008) as well as in GAD 
patients (Stefanopoulou et al., 2014). Our results extend these findings by shedding 
light on a mechanism by which worrying can adversely affect working memory 
through its influence on WMC. Interestingly, in line with previous work (e.g., Stout et 
al., 2015) our results showed that higher levels of anxiety were also related to greater 
detriments on WMC. Impaired WMC using the CDT in anxiety has also been 
documented elsewhere (Qi, Chen, Hitchman, Zeng, Ding, Li, & Hu, 2014). In this study, 
Qi et al. (2014) observed reduced WMC at the neurophysiological level for high 
anxious participants suggesting disrupted processing efficiency by anxiety. This result 
was more evident when the task was more difficult and higher WMC was required. 
The authors explained these results in terms of elevated worry due to a stressful 
situation (task difficulty) in high anxious individuals.  
Understanding the influence of worry on processing efficiency is valuable for 
educational as well as clinical reasons. An important implication of these results can 
be found in academic and evaluative conditions where worrying can have serious and 
severe (deleterious) effects on cognitive performance outcome(s) through its direct 
depletion of WMC leading to adverse consequences on academic achievement levels 
that are dependent upon WMC (Owens, Stevenson, Hadwin, & Norgate, 2012). 
Accordingly, results of the current study show that worrying can harm WMC and in 
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situations such as academic evaluations where WMC resources are needed for task 
demands it can exert a direct detrimental effect on outcomes. Secondly, excessive 
worrying is one of the main characteristics of mood and anxiety disorders (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Hence, clarifying the role of worry on 
processing efficiency and WMC would help to gain greater insight into the cognitive 
risk factors of onset and maintenance of these disorders. According to recent models 
of working memory (see Shipstead et al., 2014; Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012), WMC and 
attentional control are highly inter-linked at a conceptual as well as a measurement 
level. Given the wealth of accumulating evidence documenting attentional control 
deficits in anxiety, the investigation that reduced WMC can explain the onset and 
recurrence of anxiety related symptomatology is imperative to developing clinical 
models of anxiety that are keen to understand the causal mechanisms behind anxiety 
related disorders. In this respect, there is an increasing interest in targeting working 
memory through adaptive cognitive training regimes meant to establish not only 
plasticity induced changes in cognitive function (Owens et al., 2013) but also training-
dependent reductions in anxious symptomatology over time (e.g., Sari, Koster, 
Pourtois, & Derakshan, 2015). The current findings motivate the targeting of WMC to 
reduce the effects of worry related thoughts on a wide range of behavioral outcomes. 
The present study established that worrying can cause disruptions to WMC. 
Interestingly, condition did not influence WMC directly but through the levels of state 
worry and anxiety implying the importance of individual differences in emotional 
reactivity. This might be related to trait factors like trait anxiety. However, the current 
study did not investigate the role trait worry/anxiety. In a related manner, given the 
vast evidence on attentional bias towards negative emotional stimuli being conceived 
as a well-known vulnerability factor for anxiety (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007) active worrying might be related to 
increased attentional bias towards threat, as well as hypervigilance for threat (see 
Eysenck, 1992) leading in turn to detriments to performance. To this end, future 
studies are recommended to examine how worrying can increase attentional bias for 
threat through reducing WMC. Furthermore, here we found that both state anxiety 
and worry were related to impairments in working memory. Since worry is described 
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as a cognitive component of anxiety (Mathews, 1990), it is not surprising that 
increased level of worry led to elevated anxiety and similar results were observed 
both for worry and anxiety. Given the high correlation between worry and anxiety it is 
impossible to conclude that the effect observed on WMC is specific only for worry. 
Thus, although this study was framed in terms of worry capturing attentional 
resources and impairing working memory storage, other mechanisms could also be at 
play. For instance, anxiety or heightened arousal may have an influence on working 
memory as increased anxious arousal was associated with impaired spatial working 
memory (Shackman, Sarinopoulous, Maxwell, Pizzagalli, Lavric, & Davidson, 2006; 
Lavric, Rippon & Gray, 2003). Future studies could focus on this distinction in order to 
understand the unique role of worry on working memory in situations where anxiety 
and worry are less entangled. Another limitation of the current study was limited 
sample size. In order to obtain stable confidence intervals in our sample size, the 
number of bootstrap samples had to be increased. 
In conclusion, the current study provides further evidence that worrying can 
reduce WMC. This suggests a mechanism by which the detrimental effects of anxiety 
and worry on performance outcome can be explained. 
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THE EFFECTS OF ACTIVE WORRYING  
ON THREAT-RELATED INFORMATION PROCESSING  
CONSIDERING THE MODULATORY ROLE OF  
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY
1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Worry is usually conceived as the cognitive component of anxiety that is closely associated 
with threat-related biases in attention (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012), but the mechanisms 
underlying the effects of this key component on attentional processes as well as more 
fundamental executive functions such as attentional control and working memory capacity 
(WMC) are currently not well understood. In this respect, high WMC, and the ability to resist 
distractor interference (Barrett et al., 2004), can potentially reduce the effect of worry-
related impairments on performance. The current study investigated the influence of worry 
on attentional bias to threat and examined the possible moderating role of WMC therein. For 
this purpose, participants first performed a change detection task (with neutral stimuli) 
where WMC was assessed. Then they were assigned either to worry (N = 49) or control (N = 
49) condition. Participants in the worry condition were asked to think of a personally relevant 
worrisome concern and participants in the control condition were asked to think of a 
personally relevant positive event. After the worry/control manipulation, participants 
performed a visual search task with happy, angry and neutral faces to investigate threat-
related attentional bias. We predicted that (1) participants in the worry condition would have 
greater attentional bias to threat during the visual search task than the participants in the 
control condition; and (2) WMC would moderate the relationship between condition (worry 
vs control) and attentional bias, specifically, high-WMC participants would exhibit less 
attentional bias to threat. However, results failed to find an effect of worry (vs control) on 
visual search task performance, and WMC did not moderate the relationship between worry 
and attentional bias. Implications of these findings, limitations and future directions are 
discussed within the framework of current theoretical models of worry and anxiety. 
 
 
1 
Sari, B. A., Derakshan, N., Pourtois, G., & Koster, E.H. (2016). The effects of active worrying on threat-
related information processing considering the modulatory role of working memory capacity. 
Unpublished manuscript.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Worry is described as a state of having uncontrollable, intrusive, negative 
thoughts about the future (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). It is a 
crucial cognitive component of anxiety that is closely related to attentional biases 
toward threat (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 
2007) which may occupy the limited attentional resources leading to impaired task 
performance (Mathews, 1990; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007; Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012). However, previous research suggested that some individuals are 
better able to ignore distracting information by recruiting high-level cognitive 
processes such as attentional control and working memory capacity (Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002; Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). This suggests that better attentional 
control and working memory capacity can also reduce the susceptibility to threat-
related distraction and attentional biases. The current study sought to examine this 
issue in greater detail. 
Attentional bias in high anxiety is usually characterized by facilitated 
engagement towards threat-related stimuli and also impaired disengagement from 
such stimuli (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010). Besides being 
preferentially biased toward threat, there is also ample evidence that associates 
anxiety with high worry. According to the cognitive model of pathological worry 
(Hirsch & Mathews, 2012), biased attention can play an important role in the onset 
(i.e. engagement with threat) and maintenance (i.e. difficulties to disengage from 
threat) of worry, with reciprocal links between worry and attentional bias. In line with 
this prediction, several studies previously showed that when attentional bias toward 
threat is induced, so is increased vulnerability to worrisome thoughts (Hirsch, 
MacLeod, Mathews, Sandher, Siyani, & Hayes, 2011; Krebs, Hirsch, & Mathews, 
2010). The reverse effect has also been documented in the literature in the past. For 
example, the influence of worrying on threat-related attentional bias processes was 
observed in a study by Oathes, Squillante, Ray, and Nitschke (2010). In that study, 
participants were asked to think of a worrisome concern in the worry condition; and 
performed mental arithmetic in the control condition. Then they performed a dot-
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probe task with threat-related and neutral words. Oathes et al. (2010) observed 
increased attention to threat-related words during the dot-probe task after the worry 
induction procedure. Collectively, these studies demonstrate a close link between 
worry and threat-related attentional biases. However, individual differences in high-
level cognitive processes (i.e. working memory capacity; WMC) can presumably also 
play an important role in the interference of attentional capture by threat (Derryberry 
& Reed, 2002; Barrett et al., 2004; Stout, Shackman, & Larson, 2013). Nonetheless, it 
is currently unclear whether the link between worry and attentional bias is 
modulated by individual differences in high-level cognitive functions. Therefore, the 
current study sought to fill this gap by examining how this relationship (i.e., worry and 
attentional bias to threat) may be modulated by  WMC, as WMC is a critical cognitive 
construct which is strongly related to various cognitive abilities (Luck & Vogel, 2013), 
such as attentional control (Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall, & Engle, 2014) and general 
fluid intelligence (Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005).  
Working memory is a limited capacity cognitive system which is essential to 
perform complex tasks (Baddeley, 1992). The capacity of working memory is 
determined greatly by one’s ability to process task-relevant information while 
resisting distractor interference (Shipstead, Harrison, & Engle, 2012). Several studies 
already demonstrated that trait vulnerability to worry is associated with impaired 
filtering of threat-related distracters from working memory (Stout, Shackman, 
Johnson, & Larson, 2015; Owens, Derakshan, & Richards, 2015). However, in these 
studies, WM performance and threat-related information processing were 
investigated within the same task, making it difficult to distinguish the role of 
individual differences in WMC on reducing threat interference. Furthermore, these 
studies mainly focused on trait vulnerability to worry, yet the influence of active 
worrying where worry-related effects on performance can be directly observed (i.e. 
Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008; Sari, Koster, & Derakshan, 2016) was not examined 
systematically in these earlier investigations. Therefore, the current study 
experimentally induced worry and examined its effect on selective attention to threat 
considering the role of WMC; using two different tasks meant (1) to assess WMC; and 
(2) to measure threat-related attentional bias. 
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In the present study, in order to assess WMC, a change detection task with 
neutral stimuli (rectangles) was used (Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005). 
During this change detection task, participants are briefly shown two or four 
rectangles and instructed to monitor changes in the orientation of these rectangles 
from the initial display to a second display. Change detection task is considered a 
valid instrument to assess WMC (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 2005; Shipstead, 
Harrison, & Engle, 2015). In this task, individuals with high WMC are expected to 
show high performance regardless of the set-size (i.e. two or four rectangles); 
whereas individuals with a low WMC are likely to show performance decrements as 
the set-size increases.  
To examine threat-related attentional bias, a visual search task (i.e. Öhman, 
Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) with emotional (happy, neutral or angry) faces was used. In 
the visual search task, participants are shown several faces forming a circle or array. 
These faces have either all the same facial expressions (target-present trials; i.e. all 
happy faces) or one of them has a different facial expression (target-absent trials; i.e. 
one angry face among happy faces; all combinations are possible). Participants are 
asked to respond if they detect a face with a different facial expression (odd one out), 
as fast as possible. Based on their response times, indices with regard to attentional 
engagement (i.e. how fast participants detect an angry face among neutral faces as 
compared to a happy face among the same neutral faces) and attentional 
disengagement (i.e. how fast participants detect a neutral face among happy faces as 
compared to a neutral face among angry faces) were calculated. Higher scores on 
these indices indicate biased attention in favor of threat-related (angry faces) stimuli. 
In order to examine the influence of active worrying on threat-related attentional 
processes, a worry/control manipulation (cf. Hayes et al., 2008) was applied before 
the visual search task. During this manipulation, participants in the worry condition 
were asked to specify a personally relevant worrisome concern, and in the control 
condition participants were asked to specify a personally relevant positive future 
event. Afterwards, they were asked to either focus the negative theme (worry 
condition) or positive event (control condition). 
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We examined the following set of hypotheses: We expected that (1) 
participants in the worry condition would express a larger attentional bias to 
threatening information during the visual search task than the participants in the 
control condition; and (2) WMC would moderate the relationship between condition 
(worry vs control) and engagement/disengagement scores. Specifically, individuals 
with high WMC were expected to be able to better control their attentional bias to 
threat. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Ninety-eight participants (25 males) aged between 18-49 years (M = 24 years, 
SD = 6) were recruited from the campus of Birkbeck University of London (N = 31) and 
University of Ghent (N = 67). They were compensated 5 GBP/5 Euro or given course 
credit for their participation. The first participant was randomly assigned to either 
worry (N = 49) or control (N = 49) condition and subsequent participants were 
assigned to the different conditions alternatingly. Data from 9 participants were 
removed due to poor accuracy on the change detection task, less than 50% accuracy, 
N = 6; poor accuracy on the visual search task, less than 50% accuracy, N = 2; missing 
target-absent trials in visual search task, more than 50%, N = 1; leaving 89 individuals 
(46 in the ‘Worry’ and 43 in the ‘Control’ condition) in the final sample. 
Materials and Procedure 
Questionnaires. Trait anxiety was assessed using the trait version of State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-TA; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 
1983). The STAI-TA is a well-validated 20 item self-report instrument (Spielberger & 
Reheiser, 2004). Respondents indicate the degree to which they experience each of 
the items on four-point scale (1=“almost never” to 4=“almost always”). Trait worry 
was assessed via Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990). PSWQ is 16-item self-report measure with five-point scale (1 = “not 
at all typical of me” to 5 = “very typical of me”). The PSWQ demonstrates good 
psychometric properties (Meyer et al., 1990; Startup & Erickson, 2006). Lastly, the 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) was 
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administered to measure trait rumination. The RRS is a 22 item self-report measure 
with a four-point scale (1=“almost never” to 4=“almost always”) containing items 
with regard to two subcomponents of rumination: brooding and reflection (Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). RRS also possess satisfactory psychometric 
properties (Treynor et al., 2003). During the experiment, state worry and state 
anxiety levels were assessed via 0 – 100 mm visual analogue scales (VAS; 0 = “not at 
all”  to 100 = “extremely”). VAS is considered a valid and reliable instrument to assess 
state anxiety (Rossi & Pourtois, 2012). 
Change Detection Task. Figure 1 shows a schematic overview of a trial 
sequence. Each trial started with a fixation cross and an arrow above pointing either 
right or left (700 ms). Participants were asked to attend to the side of the screen 
indicated by this arrow. Afterwards, either 2 or 4 rectangles appeared at the right and 
left side of the screen (3° away from the fixation cross; within a region of 4° x 7.2°; 
memory array; 100 ms). Participants were instructed to memorize the orientation of 
the red rectangles on the attended side. After a brief retention period (900 ms), the 
rectangles appeared again on the right and left side of screen (test array, 2000 ms or 
until the response). In this array, participants were asked to indicate whether the 
orientation of one of the red rectangles at the attended side had changed or not (i.e., 
two-alternative forced choice task). 
There were three conditions in this task: two-item, four-item, and distractor 
conditions. In the two-item and four-item conditions, all rectangles were red while in 
the distractor condition, there were two blue distracting rectangles in addition to two 
red rectangles. Rectangles appeared on random positions with a minimum of 2° 
distance from each other. There were 4 possible orientations: vertical, horizontal, 45° 
left and 45° right tilted. Matching these criteria, 98 stimulus sets were used for the 
four-item, 105 stimulus sets for the two-item and 101 stimulus sets for the distractor 
condition. All possible conditions were randomly presented within the task. 
The task had 4 experimental blocks consisting 48 trials in each. Participants 
practiced the task until they performed above 50% correct.  
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Visual Search Task. Each trial started with a fixation cross (1250 ms). 
Following the fixation cross, eight faces (2 º29’ x 4 º29’) forming a circle were 
presented (Figure 2). Each of the faces was 8 º15’ away from the center of the circle. 
These faces were depicting neutral, happy or angry expressions (12 face identities; 6 
males, 6 females; Ekman & Friesen, 1976; Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998).  
There were two different types of trial in this task: target-present trials and 
target-absent trials. In the target-present trials, while 7 of the faces (crowd) had the 
same facial expression, 1 face (target) had a different facial expression. Each facial 
expression was presented both as crowd and target. Fitting this criteria, there were 6 
target/crowd pairs: Neutral/Happy, Neutral/Angry, Happy/Neutral, Happy/Angry, 
Angry/Happy, Angry/Neutral. There were 24 trials for each of these pairs and 144 
target-present trials in total. Additionally there were 36 target-absent trials where all 
faces had the same facial expressions (12 trials for each facial expression). 
Participants were instructed to press the indicated button, as fast as possible when 
they had detected a face with a different expression during the target-present trials, 
but wait until the end of the trial without pressing any button during the target-
absent trials. Each trial was presented for 5000 ms or until the response. All possible 
conditions were randomly presented during the task.  
Figure 2. Example of a happy face in an angry crowd in visual search task. 
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Procedure. Participants first read and signed the consent form. Then, they 
filled in questionnaires. After the questionnaires, they performed the change 
detection task. Subsequently, they provided mood ratings (with regard to worry, 
anxiety, happiness, relax) using VAS (pre-manipulation). Afterwards, they were asked 
to think of a personally relevant future event about which they felt worried (worry 
condition) or positive (control condition). They were also shortly interviewed by the 
experimenter (~2 minutes) about the positive (control condition) or negative (worry 
conditions) aspects of these events (cf. Hayes et al., 2008; Sari et al., 2016). Once the 
interview was over, participants were asked to keep thinking about these events until 
the end of the experiment. Then they filled in VAS for the second time (post-
manipulation). They were also asked to rate about the personal relevance of the 
events they described. Afterwards, they performed visual search task. At the end of 
visual search task, participants provided VAS mood ratings one more time (after the 
task). In the last VAS, participants were also asked to indicate how often they thought 
about the future event they described at the beginning of the experiment. 
Data Reduction and Analytic Approach. In order to assess the performance 
on the change detection task, we calculated WMC using a typical formula (Pashler, 
1988): K = S x (H - F)/(1-F) where K represents WMC, S is the set size to remember, H 
is observed hit rate and F is false alarm. In keeping with several studies using change 
detection task (Lee, Cowan, Vogel, Rolan, Valle-Inclan, & Hackley, 2010; Owens, 
Koster, & Derakshan, 2013; Sari et al., 2016), we used K scores only for four-item 
condition. We did not include the two-item condition or distracter condition since 
these are susceptible to possible ceiling or floor effects. 
For the visual search task, analyses were conducted on correct target-present 
trials (< 3% of the data was excluded due to errors). Trials deviating more than 3 SD 
from the individual mean RT were also discarded (< 1%). Next, we calculated 
engagement (1) and disengagement (2) scores separately based on mean RTs in trials 
with neutral target or neutral crowd: 
(1) Engagement scores were calculated by subtracting mean RTs for Angry 
Target/ Neutral Crowd trials from Happy Target/Neutral Crowd trials 
(Happy/Neutral – Angry/Neutral). 
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(2) Disengagement scores were calculated by subtracting mean RTs for 
Neutral Target/Happy Crowd trials from Neutral Target/Angry Crowd 
trials (Neutral/Angry – Neutral/Happy). 
Higher scores in these indexes indicated greater attentional bias towards 
negative faces.  
We first investigated whether condition had an effect on mean RTs for the 
trial types used to calculate engagement scores by means of a 2 (Angry Target/ 
Neutral Crowd trials vs Happy Target/Neutral Crowd trials) x 2 (control vs worry) 
ANOVA. A similar analysis was also repeated for the mean RTs for the trial types used 
to calculate disengagement scores: a 2 (Neutral Target/ Angry Crowd trials vs Neutral 
Target/Happy Crowd trials) x 2 (control vs worry) ANOVA was used. Next, we 
investigated (1) whether condition (worry vs control) or WMC had an effect on 
engagement/disengagement scores; and (2) whether WMC moderated the 
relationship between the condition and engagement or disengagement via 
moderation analyses. These analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS 19 and the 
macro PROCESS 2.13.2 (Hayes, 2013). Results are reported by means of regression 
coefficients. Variables were mean centered and controlled for heteroscedasticity. 
RESULT 
Group Characteristics 
Questionnaires. Participants in the Worry and Control conditions did not 
significantly differ from each other on STAI-TA, PSWQ or RRS (all ts < 1.35, NS). 
Conditions also did not significantly differ from each other in terms of age (t < 1, NS) 
or gender distribution (X2(1, N = 89) = .01, p = .94). 
Mood induction Check. There were no condition differences on any of the 
mood ratings before the worry/control manipulation (pre-manipulation; all ts < 1.2, 
NS; see table 1 for descriptive statistics). As expected, participants in the worry 
condition were more worried, less relaxed, more anxious, and less happy than the 
participants in the control condition (all ts > 7, all ps <.001) after the manipulation 
(post manipulation). Participants also reported that the future events they described 
were highly personal (85%) and on average they spent 61% of the time thinking about 
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these events throughout the experiment (when asked at post manipulation). There 
were no significant condition differences in ratings of relevance, t (87) = 1.78, p = .082, 
or on time spent thinking about their personal concern, t < 1, NS. At the end of the 
experiment, participants in the worry condition were still significantly more worried, 
less relaxed, more anxious, and less happy compared to participants in the control 
condition (all ts > 4, all ps < .001). 
Table 1. Mean VAS ratings at pre-manipulation, post-manipulation and after the task 
for worry and control conditions. SDs are reported in parenthesis. 
 
  Pre-manipulation Post-manipulation After the Task 
  
Control 
condition 
Worry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
Worry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
Worry 
condition 
Worry  Ratings 27 (24) 32 (28) 23 (19)  64 (22) 24 (19)  51 (25) 
Relax Ratings 62 (21) 57 (26) 72 (22)  35 (19) 65 (19)  45 (22) 
Happy Ratings 65 (20) 66 (20) 79 (17)  38 (19) 68 (21)  50 (21) 
Anxiety Ratings 31 (25) 32 (24) 26 (23)  58 (20) 27 (23)  50 (22) 
 
Change Detection Task. The worry and control conditions did not significantly 
differ from each other in their levels of WMC, t < 1, NS (worry condition, M = 1.59, SD 
= .82; control condition, M = 1.45, SD = .80). Participants also did not differ from each 
other based on the location they were recruited from (either UK or Belgium) in terms 
of WMC (t < 1, NS). 
Visual Search Task 
Performance did not differ based on the location participants were recruited 
from (UK or Belgium) in terms of engagement (t < 1, NS), or disengagement (t < 1, 
NS). Mean reaction times for each target/crowd pairs are presented in Figure 3. 
 
2
In the worry condition, there was one participant who had a very low rating (22%) about the personal 
relevance of worrisome event. Excluding this participant, worry and control conditions were still not 
different from each other in terms of personal relevance ratings, t(86) = 1.49, p = .14. Furthermore, 
inclusion or exclusion of this participant did not change the results of the further analyses either. 
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Figure 3. Mean reaction times for each target/crowd pairs in visual search task (bars 
indicate standard errors).  
 
 
 
Engagement. The 2 X 2 ANOVA with trial type (Angry Target/ Neutral Crowd vs 
Happy Target/Neutral Crowd) and condition (control vs worry) showed a significant 
main effect of trial type only (F(1, 87) = 83.33, p < .001) indicating slower RTs in Angry 
Target/ Neutral Crowd trials (M = 2146, SD = 447) as compared to Happy 
Target/Neutral Crowd trials (M = 1925, SD = 380). Main effect of condition or trial 
type x condition interaction did not reach significance (F <1, NS). 
Disengagement.  The 2 X 2 ANOVA with trial type (Neutral Target/Angry 
Crowd trials vs Neutral Target/Happy Crowd trials) and condition (control vs worry) 
showed a significant main effect of trial type only (F(1, 87) = 126.06, p < .001) 
indicating slower RTs in Neutral Target/Angry Crowd trials (M = 2385, SD = 432) as 
compared to Neutral Target/Happy Crowd trials (M = 2095, SD = 406). Main effect of 
condition or trial type x condition interaction did not reach significance (F <1, NS)3. 
 
 
 
3
Considering inter-individual differences in mood manipulation, we also conducted correlational 
analyses between engagement/disengagement scores and averaged VAS worry ratings at post-
manipulation and at the end of the task (cf. Sari et al., 2016). These analysis did not reveal any 
significant relationship between the average VAS worry ratings and engagement (r(89) = -.06, p = .61); 
or disengagement scores (r(89) = -.04, p = .71). 
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Moderation Analyses. Results from the moderation analyses showed that 
neither condition nor WMC had significant effects on visual search task performance 
(either engagement or disengagement scores); and there was no significant 
moderating effect of WMC on the relationship between condition and visual search 
task performance. Effect of condition, WMC and condition x WMC interaction (which 
refers to moderating effect of WMC on the relationship between condition and visual 
search task performance) on engagement/disengagement are reported in table 2.  
Table 2. Linear model of predictors of Engagement and Disengagement scores. 
 
ENGAGEMENT 
    
 
b SE B t p 
Constant -218.94 24.37 -8.98 p < .001 
WMC 26.18 29.2 0.9 p = .37 
Condition -6.65 48.88 -0.14 p = .89 
WMC x Condition 40.45 58.45 0.69 p = .49 
     DISENGAGEMENT 
   
 
b SE B t p 
Constant 288.83 26.34 10.97 p < .001 
WMC 37.92 34.98 1.08 p = .28 
Condition -26.42 52.77 -0.5 p = .62 
WMC x Condition 23.42 70.55 0.33 p = .74 
 
DISCUSSION 
 In this study, we focused on the role of active worrying on threat-related 
information processing considering the possible modulatory role of WMC therein. We 
predicted that worrying would be related to greater attentional bias to threat during 
visual search task and that WMC could moderate this relationship. Specifically, we 
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hypothesized that high WMC would be related to reduced attentional bias in the 
worry condition. Our results showed that condition (worry, control) was not related 
to any of the attentional bias indices (either engagement or disengagement) in visual 
search task. Furthermore, WMC did not moderate the relationship between condition 
and visual search task performance either. These null findings are further discussed 
below. 
 In the current investigation, contrary to what is suggested in prominent 
theories of worry and anxiety (Eysenck, 1992; Hirsch & Matthews, 2012; Eysenck et 
al., 2007), we failed to show increased attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli 
in relation to induced worry. However, there have been previous studies showing that 
anxiety, but not worry, was related to impairments in attentional control (Forster, 
Elizalde, Castle, & Bishop, 2013), or distractor inhibition (Moser, Becker, & Moran, 
2012). Based on their results, Moser et al. (2012) suggested that attentional capture 
by salient stimuli may not be directly related to the worry component of anxiety (but 
see Stout et al., 2014). 
The influence of worry on behavioral performance might also have gone 
undetected with the measures selected in our study (tapping primarily into 
effectiveness as opposed to efficiency), indirectly supporting processing efficiency 
accounts in anxiety; such as the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) 
and the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007). According to these theories, 
anxiety mainly impairs processing efficiency (relationship between the performance 
outcome and the active use of cognitive resources; often assessed via 
neurophysiological measures) rather than performance effectiveness (outcome, 
quality of the performance; often assessed via behavioral measures such as accuracy 
rates). In the current investigation, visual search task performance was assessed by 
response times, following standard practice. Several studies regarded response times 
as a measure of processing efficiency (i.e. Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 2008). 
However, this approach has been later criticized since response time is also a 
behavioral outcome which does not directly assess processing efficiency (Eysenck & 
Derakshan, 2011; Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Basten, Stelzel, & Fiebach, 2012). Hence, 
more direct assessment techniques such as neurophysiological measures are 
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recommended to investigate processing efficiency and more specifically how this 
variable is susceptible to worry induction (state anxiety) and effects of WMC. 
Accordingly, several studies previously reported anxiety-related impairments 
confined at the neurophysiological rather than the behavioral level (i.e. Qi et al., 
2014a; Qi, Ding, & Li, 2014b). However, in the present study, we did not have any 
neurophysiological measure where worry-related effects could possibly be more 
evident. In line with this assumption, using a visual search task (with neutral, angry, 
happy faces) similar to the one used in the present study, Derakshan and Koster 
(2010) previously investigated the role of trait anxiety in threat-processing. Results of 
that study indicated that there was a response delay in relation to emotional faces; 
yet this emotion effect was not threat-specific. High anxious participants had delayed 
response in both happy target/angry crowd and angry target/happy crowd 
conditions. Hence, threat-related processes with regard to engagement and 
disengagement could not be distinguished based on response times. 
The current study was conducted in unselected, healthy subjects. However, 
influences of induced worry on performance might have been more clearly observed 
among individuals with high trait vulnerability to worry or stress (see Stefanopoulou, 
Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014; Owens et al., 2015). Furthermore, the worry 
induction procedure we used may also not be potent enough to observe strong and 
reliable worry-related effects on visual search task performance in healthy individuals 
(at the sub clinical level). Using a worry induction procedure, similar to the one used 
in the present study, Stefanopoulou et al., (2014) previously investigated the 
influence of active worrying on attentional control in GAD patients and healthy 
controls. In this study, Stefanopoulou et al. reported that GAD patients had more 
negative thoughts following the mood induction as compared to healthy controls.  
Lastly, the current study also failed to observe modulatory effect of WMC on 
the relationship between condition (worry vs control) and processing of threat-
related information (engagement/disengagement scores). Because the lack of 
(statistical) evidence does not necessarily prove the absence of evidence, caution is 
definitely needed regarding the interpretation of this null finding. We note however 
that we failed to reveal such as modulatory effect of WMC in the present case 
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although the worry mood induction was found to be successful. We therefore 
conclude that it remains inconclusive if WMC truly exerts a reliable modulatory role in 
the complex interplay of worry with (threat-related) attentional biases. 
In summary, the results of the current investigation failed to demonstrate a 
clear and significant relationship between worry and attentional bias towards threat. 
The possible moderating role of WMC on this relationship was not confirmed. Future 
studies are recommended focusing on the other component of anxiety (i.e., anxious 
arousal; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Heller & Nitschke, 1998) as well as 
neurophysiological measures underlying visual search task performance; and also 
considering pre-selection of participants (i.e. high trait worriers) in order to have a 
better understanding of modulatory effects of WMC on  threat-related attentional 
biases expressed as a function of worry or anxiety. 
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   TRAINING WORKING MEMORY TO IMPROVE  
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL IN ANXIETY:  
A PROOF-OF-PRINCIPLE STUDY  
USING BEHAVIORAL AND  
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Trait anxiety is associated with impairments in attentional control and processing efficiency 
(see Berggren & Derakshan, 2013, for a review). Working memory training using the adaptive 
dual n-back task has shown to improve attentional control in subclinical depression with 
transfer effects at the behavioral and neural level on a working memory task (Owens, Koster 
& Derakshan, 2013). Here, we examined the beneficial effects of working memory training on 
attentional control in pre-selected high trait anxious individuals who underwent a three week 
daily training intervention using the adaptive dual n-back task. Pre and post outcome 
measures of attentional control were assessed using a Flanker task that included a stress 
induction and an emotional Antisaccade task (with angry and neutral faces as target). Resting 
state EEG (Theta/Beta ratio) was recorded to as a neural marker of trait attentional control. 
Our results showed that adaptive working memory training improved attentional control with 
transfer effects on the Flanker task and resting state EEG, but effects of training on the 
Antisaccade task were less conclusive. Finally, training related gains were associated with 
lower levels of trait anxiety at post (vs pre) intervention. Our results demonstrate that 
adaptive working memory training in anxiety can have beneficial effects on attentional 
control and cognitive performance that may protect against emotional vulnerability in 
individuals at risk of developing clinical anxiety. 
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1 Sari, B. A., Koster, E. H., Pourtois, G., & Derakshan, N. (2015). Training working memory to improve 
attentional control in anxiety: A proof-of-principle study using behavioral and electrophysiological 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive views on anxiety pose that deficits in attentional processes can 
causally contribute to the etiology and maintenance of anxiety (see Eysenck, 1992; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005 for reviews). Despite a wealth of 
findings and substantial progress in such research, it is still unclear whether 
attentional processes indeed play a causal role in anxiety (Van Bockstaele, 
Verschuere, Tibboel, De Houwer, Crombez, & Koster, 2014). In recent years, 
innovative methods have manipulated attentional processes to understand if there is 
a causal relationship between attentional processes and anxiety. So far, most 
research has focused on manipulating attentional bias which involves reducing 
exaggerated attention to fear-relevant information in anxiety (see Koster, Fox, & 
MacLeod, 2009). Based on theories of attentional control and anxiety (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) the current study is among the first to examine the 
effect of manipulating cognitive control on anxiety related distractibility and anxiety 
vulnerability at the behavioral and neural level. We start with a basic description of 
attentional control theory (ACT) and then explain the relevance of manipulating 
attentional control. 
Attentional Control Theory 
The attentional system can be divided into two sub-systems, a top-down 
(goal-directed, volitional) and bottom-up (stimulus-driven, reflexive) subsystem 
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) claims that anxiety impairs the 
balance between these subsystems by reducing the influence of top down, goal 
directed processes biasing the increased influence of bottom up, stimulus driven 
processes (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000). 
Substantial evidence using a multitude of methods now shows that anxiety impairs 
the efficiency by which the main central executive functions of working memory, 
namely the inhibition, shifting and updating of information, guide goal-directed 
behavior, reducing attentional control (see Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck & 
Derakshan, 2011; Berggren & Derakshan, 2013, for reviews). Extending the main 
assumptions of ACT (see Berggren & Derakshan, 2013), it seems that establishing a 
causal mechanism by which impaired attentional control can exacerbate anxiety’s 
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effects on performance outcome(s) through its emphasis on attention and 
maintenance on worrisome and ruminative thoughts, is imperative. A direct impact of 
reduced attentional control is the ‘hidden’ cost of compensatory processes that serve 
to maintain performance outcomes in high anxious individuals (e.g., Ansari & 
Derakshan, 2011a, Basten, Stelzel, & Fiebach, 2011, 2012; Righi, Mecacci, & Viggiano, 
2009) exaggerating in turn the effects of anxiety on processing efficiency.  
Recent theoretical accounts indicate a strong link between attentional control 
and working memory (see, Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall, & Engle, 2014) as successful 
operation of working memory requires efficient use of attentional control in order to 
suppress task irrelevant information while processing goal-relevant information. 
Recent findings (e.g., Qi, Chen, Hitchman, Zeng, Ding, Li, & Hu, 2014) have confirmed 
the long standing assumption (see Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998) that anxiety is 
associated with reduced working memory capacity. Working memory can possibly 
mediate the relationship between anxiety and cognitive performance (Qi, Zeng, Luo, 
Duan, Ding, Hu, & Hong, 2014; Owens, Stevenson, Hadwin, & Norgate, 2012), with 
impairments in working memory capacity exaggerating the effects of anxiety on 
cognitive performance (Wright, Dobson, & Sears, 2014). 
Manipulating attentional control 
Adaptive cognitive training paradigms using the dual n-back training paradigm 
(Jaeggi, Seewer, Nirkko, Eckstein, Schroth, Groner, & Gutbrod, 2003) have been 
successful in improving a number executive processes such as general fluid 
intelligence (Au, Sheehan, Tsai, Duncan, Buschkuehl, & Jaeggi, 2014), inhibition and 
working memory capacity (Owens, Koster, & Derakshan, 2013) and cognitive control 
(Schweizer, Grahn, Hampshire, Mobbs, & Dalgleish, 2013), with training-related gains 
on untrained tasks measuring similar (near transfer) or different (far transfer) 
processes (but see Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012). The adaptive dual n-back task is 
a working memory task where two streams of information – visual and auditory - 
need to be processed simultaneously. In this task, participants are asked to indicate 
whether there has been a match either for the visual or auditory information 
between the current trial and a number (n) trials back in the series. The task can get 
progressively more difficult with the level of ‘n’ increasing as participant performance 
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improves, thus providing an adaptive training. Such adaptive cognitive training 
techniques hold important implications for improving clinical outcome(s) in 
emotionally vulnerable populations. For example, Owens et al. (2013; see also 
Schweizer et al., 2013) using a dual n-back task investigated if training could improve 
cognitive control in individuals with sub-clinical levels of depression. Adaptive training 
and non-adaptive control groups underwent the intervention for eight days over a 
two week period. The adaptive training group’s performance could increase in 
difficulty up to 4-back level while the non-adaptive control group only practiced the 1-
back version of the task, without adaptation as a function of performance 
improvement. Training-related gains were found to transfer to behavioral and neural 
measures of working memory capacity and the efficiency of filtering of irrelevant 
information in the adaptive training compared to the control group. Other recent 
findings have also shown benefits of cognitive training in improvements on cognitive 
control. For example, Siegle, Price, Jones, Ghinassi, Painter and Thase (2014) showed 
that cognitive control training can have beneficial effects on reducing rumination in 
clinically depressed patients. Furthermore, Cohen, Mor and Henik (2015) showed 
training related gains on state rumination using a cognitive control training task that 
emphasized distractor interference. Finally, a study by Bomyea and Amir (2011) 
demonstrated that cognitive control training led to decreased intrusive thoughts, a 
hallmark of affective disorders including anxiety disorders. 
The Current Study 
Most studies performed so far have examined the beneficial effects of 
cognitive control training in the context of depression. Provided the relevance of 
impaired attentional control in anxiety (cf. Eysenck et al., 2007), the current study 
sought to determine if daily training for 15 days distributed over a three weeks period 
on the adaptive dual n-back task can result in improved attentional control in 
preselected high anxious individuals low on different measures of attentional control 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002). We included a training group and an active control group. 
The training group performed an adaptive dual n-back task and the control group 
performed a non-adaptive dual 1 back task. To examine transfer of training, pre and 
post intervention measures of attentional control included: A Flanker task measuring 
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distractor interference, an Antisaccade task with emotional faces as target to assess 
attentional control and inhibition in relation to emotional material, and resting state 
EEG (Theta/Beta) ratio, an index of prefrontal cortex related attentional control 
(Putman, Verkuil, Elsa Arias-Garcia, Pantazi, & van Schie, 2014). We now describe the 
selection of this transfer in more detail. 
The Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) was based on a modified version 
used in Berggren and Derakshan (2013). In this task, two types of arrows (distracter 
arrow, target arrow) indicating right or left were presented. Participants were 
instructed to ignore the distracter arrows and indicate the direction of the target 
arrow. The Flanker task has been used extensively in the literature in studies where 
distractor interference has been investigated (Shipstead, Harrison, & Engle, 2012; 
Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). Since high working memory capacity has 
been found to eliminate the adverse effect of acute stress (Otto et al., 2013), the 
Flanker task also included a state anxiety manipulation of presenting loud bursts of 
white noise randomly in half of the blocks. State anxiety manipulations using white 
noise have previously found to be successful (see Rossi & Pourtois, 2014). Using this 
manipulation, we aimed to assess selective attention under challenging conditions 
where the need to address the task demands is considered to place greater 
challenges on working memory functions for high anxious individuals (see Derakshan 
& Eysenck, 1997; Berggren, Richards, Taylor, & Derakshan, 2013). 
The Antisaccade task (Hallet, 1978) was based on Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, 
Shoker and Eysenck (2009; Exp 2). This task is a well validated and extensively used 
measure of attentional control in normal (see Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; Ettinger, 
Ffytche, Kumari, Kathmann, Reuter, Zelaya et al., 2008) and emotionally vulnerable 
populations suffering from anxiety and depression (see Berrgren & Derakshan, 2013, 
for a review). During the Antisaccade task, participants are required to saccade 
towards (prosaccade) or away from (antisaccade) an abrupt peripheral target flashed 
on the screen, as quickly as possible. Anxiety has been associated with a slowing on 
antisaccade latencies requiring the efficient exercise of attentional control processes 
of working memory in relation to target inhibition (e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2010; 
2011a, Derakshan et al., 2009; Exp 1), and when the targets were angry facial 
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expressions of emotion (Derakshan et al., 2009; Exp 2). Here, we used angry and 
neutral facial expressions as targets and were interested to observe training related 
gains on antisaccade latencies in relation to the inhibition of angry targets, predicting 
that training would result in faster antisaccade latencies especially for to-be-inhibited 
angry targets.  
As a neurophysiological measure during the antisaccade trial, keeping with 
Ansari and Derakshan (2011a), we used Event Related brain Potentials (ERPs) focusing 
on the time window 50 ms prior to target presentation to observe if training affected 
changes in ERP activity in this interval which is known to predict antisaccade 
performance (Everling, Matthews, & Flohr, 2001). Ansari and Derakshan (2011a) 
previously found impaired performance efficiency during this interval as indexed by 
lower fronto-central negativity in high compared with low-anxious participants. 
Hence, given the sensitivity and reliability of this period in explaining antisaccade 
performance, we focused our analysis on this specific interval.  
Resting state electroencephalography (EEG) as an alternative 
electrophysiological measure of trait attentional control was used. Via resting state 
EEG, we quantified neural activity in different frequency bands (i.e. theta band, 4-7 hz 
for slow oscillations; beta band, 13-30 hz for fast oscillations). Changes in power in 
these different frequency bands have been taken as an index of increased or 
decreased attentional control. For example, slow wave oscillation is mostly involved 
in stimulus driven processes whereas fast wave oscillation is related more to top 
down regulation of control and attention (Knyazev, 2007). Hence, an increased ratio 
between these two frequency bands was taken to indicate decreased cognitive or 
attentional control. For example, increased slow wave/fast wave ratio (SW/FW; 
theta/beta) is related to attentional problems such as Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD; Clarke, Barry, McCarthy, & Selikowitz, 2001; Arns, Conners, & 
Kraemer, 2012; but see Buyck & Wiersema, 2014b). Furthermore, Buyck and 
Wiersema (2014a) showed that specifically the inattentive subtype of ADHDwas 
related to abnormal SW/FW over the life span. Additionally, SW/FW negatively 
correlates with self-reported attentional control (Putman, van Peer, Maimari, & van 
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der Werff, 2010; Putman et al., 2014) confirming that the SW/FW index can be used 
as a valid neurophysiological marker or correlate of attentional control.  
Predictions 
We predicted that participants in the adaptive training group would show 
improvement in working memory performance throughout the training period. 
Secondly, we predicted that such training related gains would transfer to attentional 
control processes at the neurophysiological level, as measured by the SW/FW, as well 
as performance on the Flanker task as a behavioral measure of distractor inhibition 
and the Antisaccade task as a measure of inhibition both at behavioral and 
neurophysiological levels. Lastly, due to the close links between WM and attentional 
control (Shipstead et al, 2014) extensive WM training was expected to lead to 
improvements in attentional control and eventually reduction in trait anxiety levels. 
 METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were student volunteers recruited via advertisements from the 
campus of Birkbeck University, London. They were pre-selected on the basis of their 
elevated trait anxiety scores on the trait anxiety scale of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; STAI-TA ≥ 50) and 
low scores on the Derryberry and Reed’s (2002) attentional control scale (ACS ≤ 60). 
Derryberry and Reed (2002) showed that such individuals are most strongly biased to 
process negative information. Participants were semi-randomly (the task started 
randomly either with the eyes open or closed condition and continued alternately) 
assigned either to the control (dual 1-back training: N = 16) or training (dual n-back 
training: N = 17) group. The training and control groups did not differ from each other 
on either STAI-TA (Control, M = 57.81, SD = 5.52; Training, M = 60.18, SD = 8.43; t < 1, 
NS) or ACS scores (Control, M = 45.88, SD = 8.15; for Training, M = 43.65, SD = 7.18; t 
< 1, NS) at baseline. The two groups had similar age (Control, M =26, SD = 5; Training, 
M =25, SD = 6; t < 1, NS) and gender distribution (Control, 2 males-14 females; 
Training, 6 males-11 females; 2 (1, N = 33) = 2.33, p = .13). Seven participants did not 
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complete the study during the training without providing a reason (3 from control 
and 4 from training group). Participants were compensated 50 GBP, or given course 
credit for their participation. 
Among the participants who completed the study, training and control groups 
also did not differ from each other either on STAI-TA scores (Control, M = 57.92, SD = 
5.53; Training, M = 60.92, SD = 8.68; t(24) = 1.05, p = .30), ACS scores (Control, M = 
45.85, SD = 8.99; Training, M = 43.08, SD = 6.95; t < 1, NS ) at baseline, age (Control, 
M = 26, SD = 5; Training, M = 23, SD = 5; t(24) = 1.51, p = .39) or gender (Control, 1 
males - 12 females; Training, 5 males - 8 females; c2(1, N = 26) = 3.47, p = .06). At pre-
intervention, training and control groups did not differ from each other on STAI-SA 
scores either (Training group, M = 47.62, SD = 10.17; Control group, M = 51.69, SD = 
9.27, t < 1, NS). 
Materials and Tasks 
Self-report scales. Participants completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI-TA, STAI-SA; Spielberger et al., 1983), the Attentional Control Scale (ACS; 
Derryberry & Reed, 2002), and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, 
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) at pre and post intervention in the lab. The STAI-
TA, STAI-SA and ACS each contain 20 questions and are presented on a 4 point Likert 
type scale. PSWQ has 16 items and is presented on a 5 point Likert type scale. While 
the STAI-TA, ACS, PSWQ measure trait characteristics, the STAI-SA measures state 
characteristics. The main interest of the current study is on trait anxiety assessed via 
STAI-TA. 
Resting State EEG. Resting state EEG was recorded during 8 one-minute long 
blocks of alternating eyes open or eyes closed conditions (cf. Putman, Arias-Garcia, 
Pantazi & van Schie, 2012). The task started either with eyes open or closed 
conditions and continued alternately. Starting block was randomly decided for each 
participant. Since brain activity during an open or closed eyes condition may differ, 
the mean activity between these conditions is recommended to be the most 
informative index (Barry, Clarke, Johnstone, Magee, & Rushby, 2007). Hence, power 
densities for the three frontal electrodes (F3, Fz, F4) were averaged across these two 
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conditions. Slow wave oscillations were represented by theta, in the 4-7 Hz frequency 
band while fast wave oscillations were captured by beta, in the 13-30 Hz frequency 
band activity during this state. The ratio between frontal slow wave and fast wave 
(SW/FW) activity was calculated as an index of attentional control (see Putman et al. 
2010, 2014), with higher scores indicating lower attentional control levels. 
Flanker task. This task was a modification of the Flanker task used in Berggren 
& Derakshan (2013). Each trial started with a fixation cross for 500 ms. The distractor 
cues which were 2 sets of 2 arrows (<< or >>) appeared 3.1° above and below from 
fixation, pointing right or left (for a random duration between 12 to 26 ms depending 
on the monitor refresh rate -75 Hz. 98% of the time, duration was either 13 or 14 ms). 
Afterwards, a target arrow, which was a single set of 2 arrows pointing right or left, 
appeared in the middle of the screen. Participants were instructed to ignore the 
distracting cues and indicate the direction of the target arrow. In half of the trials, 
both target and distractor cue arrows showed the same direction (compatible) and in 
the other half they showed opposite directions (incompatible). Upon starting the 
task, the participants were informed they might hear a loud white noise (103 dbA) 
during the task. In half of the blocks, the white noise (perceived as aversive) was 
randomly presented during the inter trial interval (noise blocks) and there was no 
noise in the other half of blocks (safe blocks). Participants were informed whether 
they would hear a white noise at the beginning of each block. On noise blocks the 
noise was presented on ~10% of the trials. There were 4 blocks in total, each 
including 72 trials. Starting block was randomly determined. Participants in the 
training and control group did not differ from each other in terms of the condition of 
the block they started with, 2 (1, N = 33) = 1.59, p = .30. 
Antisaccade task. This task was based on Ansari and Derakshan (2011b) with 
angry and neutral facial expressions (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998) serving as 
target. There were 16 experimental blocks (8 antisaccade and 8 prosaccade) each 
containing 40 trials. These two facial expressions were distributed evenly within 
blocks. After a short practice session, the experimental blocks started either with an 
antisaccade or a prosaccade block, and continued alternately. Each trial started with a 
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fixation cross for a variable duration ranging from 2600 to 3600 ms, and participants 
were instructed to fixate the cross whenever on the screen. Shortly after the fixation 
cross disappeared (200 ms gap), a face (3.3° × 6°) appeared 11° away from the center 
of the screen either at the right or left side along the horizontal axis.  
After a short practice session, the experimental blocks started either with an 
antisaccade or a prosaccade block, and continued alternately. On prosaccade blocks, 
participants were instructed to look at the face and on antisaccade blocks, they were 
instructed to look away from the face to its mirror position on the screen as fast as 
possible without looking at it. Faces were presented for 600ms. 
Adaptive Dual n- back Training Task. This online training task was similar to 
Owens et al. (2013) and based on the work of Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, and Perrig 
(2008). Participants were presented a 3 by 3 grid with a fixation cross in the central 
cell (see Figure 1). A green square appeared in one of the remaining 8 cells. Five-
hundred ms after the appearance of the square, a letter (c, h, k, l, q, r, s, or t) was 
spoken. Participants were asked to remember the position of the square and the 
letter spoken. If there was a match between the n trials back and the current one, 
they were asked to respond. If there was a position match, they pressed the “A” key 
on the keyboard. If there was a sound match, they pressed the “L” key. If both were 
matching, they were asked to press both keys. In case of no match, participants were 
instructed not to press any key. Each training session consisted of 20 blocks with 20 + 
n trial in each (for example, in a 2-back block there were 20+2=22 trials; in a 3 back 
block there were 20+3=23 trials). In each of the blocks, there were equal numbers of 
matches (4 for the position, 4 for the letter, 2 for both). Positions and the letter 
spoken were randomly distributed within the task. There were 15 seconds fixed 
breaks between blocks and participants could not terminate the task once it started. 
Each session lasted approximately 30 minutes. Level of task difficulty (n) increased 
depending on performance such that if accuracy on both the position and letter 
match was 95% or above, level of n increased by 1 in the following block. However, if 
accuracy rate was between 75% - 95%, participants continued with the same level. If 
their performance got worse (less than 75% accuracy), task difficulty decreased by 
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one level of n. Participants were informed about the difficulty of the level in the 
beginning of each block. 
 
Figure 1. The flow of n-back task. An example of a 2-back trial.  
 
 
 
Non-adaptive dual 1-back control task. The control group completed 20 
blocks of dual 1-back trials across the training days regardless of their performance. 
Here, participants were asked to respond if there was either a position, letter (or 
both) match with the previous trial.  
Accuracy rate per training block for each participant was recorded online and 
immediately visible to the experimenter, as performance of participants was routinely 
monitored remotely by the experimenter. If accuracy rates were lower than regular, 
the participant was contacted in due time by the experimenter. No noticeable 
difference between the participants in the control group and the training group were 
observed on adherence to the instructions on the time of training during this period. 
Procedure 
Prescreened participants were invited to the lab where they completed the 
STAI-TA, ACS and PSWQ. They were then prepared for EEG testing and resting state 
EEG was recorded. Participants then performed the Antisaccade task. Afterwards EEG 
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equipment was removed and the experiment continued with the Flanker task (due to 
the concerns about the length of the experiment session, EEG was not recorded 
during the Flanker task). Participants completed the STAI-SA before and after the task 
for assessments of state anxiety before and after the stress manipulation via white 
noise. 
Finally, participants were given an introduction to the training task and were 
able to practice a few trials with the experimenter in the lab for familiarization with 
the task and to ensure that they had understood the instructions correctly. They were 
told that they should complete the task for 3 weeks at approximately the same time 
every week-day. Participants were able to see a summary of their daily performance 
and progress after each session. Additionally, they were told that the experimenter 
would be tracking their performance and completion rates on a daily basis. After the 
3-week period, participants were invited back to the lab again for post-intervention 
measurements where they completed the same tasks and questionnaires as at pre-
intervention. 
EEG Data Acquisition 
EEG data was recorded from 30 Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in fitted cap 
(EASYCAP) according to 10/20 system (F3, Fz, F4, FC1, FC2, FC5, FC6, C3, Cz, C4, CP5, 
CP6, P3, Pz, P4). Electrode impedances were kept below 5kΩ. All electrodes were 
referenced on-line to the mean of left and right mastoids. Forehead was used as 
ground. Horizontal eye movements (HEOG) were recorded with electrodes placed on 
the outer canthi of the eyes and vertical eye movements (VEOG) were recorded from 
an electrode placed below the left eye. Data was amplified between 0.1 and 125 Hz, 
sampled at 1000 Hz and offline filtered with a bandpass frequency of 0.01-30 Hz for 
the Antisaccade task and 0.01-100 Hz for the resting state EEG. Data was 
automatically corrected for eye blinks and ocular artifacts. For the Antisaccade task, 
baseline correction was performed before and after ocular correction based on the 
pre-stimulus onset (300 ms). Artifact rejection criteria were set to ±90µV for the 
antisaccade task and ±100µV for the resting state EEG. After applying these criteria, 
at pre-intervention 79% and at post-intervention 83% of the resting state EEG data 
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remained. For the antisaccade task, 12% of the data at pre-intervention and 6% of the 
data at post-intervention were removed due to artefacts. 
RESULTS 
Performance on the Training and Control Dual n-back Tasks 
Figure 2 shows performance improvement on the dual n-back task in the 
training group. Working memory performance improved as indicated by greater 
levels of difficulty attained towards the end of training from mean performance in the 
first three days of training (M = 1.85, SD = .58) to the last three days (M = 2.49, SD = 
1.10), t(12) = 3.57, p < .01. By comparison, the control group showed 94% accuracy 
overall and their scores did not vary from the first n-back session (95%) to the last n-
back session (95%). 
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Resting State EEG 
 Figure 3 shows the SW/FW EEG index for control and training groups at pre 
and post interventions, respectively. Data for 2 participants (1 from control, 1 from 
training) were lost during recording. Data were analyzed using a Mixed ANOVA with 
Time (pre-intervention, post-intervention) as within subjects factor and Group 
(Training, Control) as between subjects factor. There was no main effect of time, F < 
1, but an interaction between Time and Group emerged, F(1,22) = 4.90, p < .05, that 
showed reductions in SW/FW from pre to post intervention in the training group (M 
=.11, SD = .22) that were greater than the changes observed in the control group (M = 
-.08, SD = .19), t(22) = 2.21, p < .05 who in fact even showed an increase in SW/FW. 
There were no group differences at pre- or post- intervention, both ts<1. 
 
Figure 3. Gains in attentional control (reductions in SW/FW ratio) for control and 
training group separately. 
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Flanker task 
Data for 3 participants in the control group were discarded due to low 
accuracy rate (greater than 2.5 SD of the mean), slow reaction time (RTs slower than 
2.5 SD) and extreme stress due to loud bursts. Only RTs for correct trials were 
considered. RTs exceeding 3 SD of the individual mean scores were also discarded. 
The analyses were run on 92% of the total pre-intervention and 93% of the post-
intervention data. 
Consistent with Berggren and Derakshan (2013), we calculated interference 
scores by subtracting RTs on compatible trials from RTs on incompatible trials. 
Interference scores were subjected to a Time (pre, post intervention) X Group 
(Control, Training) X Condition (Safe, Noise) Mixed ANOVA. A main effect of time, 
F(1,21) = 6.89, p < .05 showed that interference scores were lower at post (M = 74, SD 
= 30) compared with pre-intervention (M = 87, SD = 36). There was a main effect of 
condition, F(1,21) = 5.00, p < .05, with greater interference scores for noise (M = 84, 
SD = 35) than safe blocks (M = 77, SD = 29), which was qualified by a time X condition 
interaction, F(1,21) = 4.60, p < .05, indicative of greater reductions in interference in 
the safe (86 vs 68, t = 3.34, p < .01) compared with the noise condition, (88 vs 79, t = 
1.45, p = .16). This observation was corroborated by a three way interaction of time X 
condition X group, F(1, 21) = 7.46, p < .05, where the training group showed 
significant reductions in interference in both safe and noise conditions from pre to 
post-intervention (both ts > 2.48, ps < .05), whereas the control group only showed a 
marginally significant reduction in the safe block (t = 2.18, p = .056) but not in the 
noise block (t < 1, NS; see Figure 4) 2. 
  
2 There was a marginal group difference at pre-test for the control group for the noise block, t(21) = 
1.74, p = .10, but for the safe block, t(21) = 1.26, p = .22. There was no group difference at the post-
test for the noise block, t < 1, NS and a marginal difference for the safe block, t(21) = 1.77, p = .09. 
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In order to assess state anxiety level during the Flanker task we averaged STAI-
SA scores before and after the Flanker task. Time (pre, post intervention) X Group 
(Control, Training) mixed ANOVA led to significant main effect of time indicating 
lower scores at post-intervention (M = 48.24, SD = 7.67) as compared to pre-
intervention (M = 50.85, SD = 9.11), F(1, 21) = 6.86, p < .05 but no interaction effect 
emerged F(1, 21) = 2.29, p = .15. 
 
Figure 4. Gains in interference reduction for Flanker task for noise and safe blocks in 
control and training groups.  
 
 
 
Antisaccade task 
One participant’s data was discarded due to the small percentage of accurate 
trials (2.5 SD lower than the mean). Analyses were run on correct saccades which 
were defined as the first saccade in the right direction after target onset (86% of trials 
at pre-intervention and 90% of trials at post intervention). Groups did not differ from 
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each other either at pre or at post intervention in terms of correct saccades (all ts < 1, 
NS). In keeping with Ansari and Derakshan (2011b), saccades faster than 80 ms and 
slower than 500 ms were removed. Using Brain Vision Analyzer, leftward and 
rightward saccades were separated and the difference between the potentials of the 
left and right HEOG electrodes was calculated and saccades were identified as peaks. 
Peaks exceeding 50 µV on the correct/expected direction (polarity) were marked as 
valid saccades. 
There were two main dependent variables: (i) Latencies of correct saccades, 
which were defined as the elapsed time between target onset and a saccade (i.e., 
peak in the HEOG) in the right direction, and (ii) central negativity, which was 
measured in the interval of 50 ms prior to target presentation, in line with Ansari and 
Derakshan (2011a) and Everling et al. (2001). Here, for central negativity, we 
averaged the activity of the electrodes at the central sites available (C3, Cz, C4)3. 
Latencies. Group comparisons for the antisaccade latencies at pre-
intervention was marginally significant for neutral trials (Control, M = 269, SD = 37; 
Training, M = 244, SD = 25), t(23) = 2.00, p = .058 and significant for the angry trials 
(Control, M = 268, SD = 32; Training, M = 243, SD = 26), t(23) = 2.15, p < .05, indicating 
slower reaction times for the control group as compared to the training group. Hence, 
analyses on the post-intervention antisaccade latencies were run separately for each 
emotional condition controlling for the baseline differences. ANCOVA with 
antisaccade latencies as a dependent variable, group (control, training) as a fixed 
factor and pre-intervention antisaccade latencies as a covariate revealed no group 
differences for either of the conditions (neutral faces: control, M = 253, SD = 31; 
training, M = 221, SD = 31, F (1, 22) = 2.05, p = .17; angry faces: control, M = 252, SD = 
28; training, M = 221, SD = 29, F (1, 22) = 2.32, p = .14). 
 
 
 
 
3 In keeping with Ansari and Derakshan (2011a) and Everling et al. (2001), we also looked at the 
frontal negativity (averaged F3, F4, Fz). However, due to technical problems these channels were 
considerably noisy as compared to central ones and did not lead to any significant group X time X 
valence interactions, F < 1, NS (for antisaccade); F(1, 23) = 1.06, p = .31 (for prosaccade). 
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For the prosaccade latencies, a Mixed ANOVA with Time (pre-intervention, 
post-intervention) and valence (neutral, angry) as within subjects factors and Group 
(Training, Control) as between subjects factor was run. There was a marginal valence 
x group interaction; F(1, 23) = 4.24, p = .051, indicating that the control group was 
slower on angry (M = 176, SD = 15) vs neutral trials (M = 175, SD = 15), as opposed to 
the training group who showed slower latencies on neutral (M = 167, SD = 13) 
compared to angry trials (M = 165, SD = 12). No other effect reached significance 
(Time x Group interaction, F(1,23) = 2.19, p = .153, all the other Fs < 1, NS.). 
 
Figure 5a. Central Negativity for pre to post-intervention (positive value indicates 
increased negativity) for the control group for neutral and angry trials. Negative is 
plotted down. Waveforms were filtered with a high cutoff filter of 5 Hz (slope 24 
dB/oct) for visual inspection. 
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Figure 5b. Central Negativity for pre to post-intervention (positive value indicates 
increased negativity) for the training group for neutral and angry trials. Negative is 
plotted down. Waveforms were filtered with a high cutoff filter of 5 Hz (slope 24 
dB/oct) for visual inspection.  
  
 
 Central Negativity. Figure 5 shows the grand averaged waveforms for 
antisaccade trials pre to post intervention difference, for neutral and angry trials. A 
mixed ANOVA with Time (pre – post intervention) X Valence (angry, neutral) X Group 
(training, control) showed a significant main effect of Time, F(1,23) = 10.80, p < .01, 
indicative of a greater negativity at post intervention (M = -1.19, SD = 1.03) vs pre-
intervention (M = -0.88, SD = .89). A trend effect of valence, F(1,23) = 3.23, p = .09, 
indicated greater negativity for angry (M = -1.14, SD = .92) vs neutral (M = -.93, SD = 
1.03), and a marginal interaction between valence x time, F(1, 23) = 2.98, p = .10, with 
a greater increase in negativity for neutral faces (-.7 vs -1.16) vs angry faces (-1.06 vs -
1.23) were found. The three way interaction of time X valence X group, F(1, 23) = 
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5.43, p < .05, revealed that the control group had greater increase in negativity (Mdiff 
= -0.78; t = 3.77, p < .01) on neutral trials, and no increase on angry trials, t < 1. The 
training group on the other hand showed a marginal increase on angry trials (Mdiff = -
.24; t = 1.85, p = .08, two tailed), and no increase on neutral trials, t < 1. 
 Self-reported Symptomatology 
Separate mixed ANOVAs for each scale (ACS, PSWQ, STAI-TA) with time (pre-
intervention, post-intervention) as within subjects factor and group (training, control) 
as between subjects factor revealed no significant main effect of time for ACS, F (1, 
24) = 2.41, p = .13; PSWQ, F < 1, NS; STAI-TA, F (1, 24) = 1.56, p = .22. Furthermore, no 
group X time interactions were observed for any of these scales (F < 1, NS for all 
scales). There were no group differences for ACS, PSWQ and STAI either at the pre-
intervention or at the post-intervention (all ts < 1, NS, see Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics.). Separate paired t-tests for each group revealed no significant difference 
pre to post intervention for the control group in any of these scales either (PSWQ, 
ACS, t < 1, NS; STAI-TA, t(12) = 1.12, p = 29). The training group also did not show any 
significant improvement on scores on the PSWQ and STAI (ts < 1, NS), but there was a 
significant trend for an increase in attentional control post vs pre intervention, t(12) = 
1.89, p = .08. 
Table 1. Mean self-reported symptomatology at pre- and post-intervention for 
control and training group separately (SDs are presented in parentheses). 
 
  Pre-intervention Post-intervention 
 
Control Training Control Training 
ACS 45 (12) 44 (8) 46 (10) 45 (9) 
PSWQ 64 (12) 66 (7) 62 (11) 65 (9) 
STAI-TA 57 (8) 56 (9) 55 (9) 55 (9) 
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Training improvement and changes in self-reported trait anxiety 
Following previous recommendations on the role of training engagement in 
reducing negative symptomatology (see Siegle et al., 2014), we also considered how 
engagement with and improvement on the training task was associated with changes 
in self-reported trait anxiety. Here, the level of training-related improvement (i.e., 
mean level of difficulty in the first three days of training to the last three days) was 
taken as an index of the level of engagement. Based on this index, we divided the 
training group into two (high-engaged group, N = 7, M = 1.12, SD = 0.33; low-engaged 
group, N = 6, M = 0.07, SD = 0.37) by a median split and conducted an ANOVA with 
change in trait anxiety (pre-intervention – post-intervention) as a dependent variable 
and engagement level as a between subjects factor. There was a significant effect of 
task engagement on change in trait anxiety, F(1, 11) = 14.01, p < .01. The high-
engaged group showed a greater decrease (Mdifference = 4.86, SD = 3.29) in trait 
anxiety scores as compared to the low-engaged group (Mdifference = -3.33, SD = 
4.59) who showed a slight increase in trait anxiety scores. In line with these results, 
we considered the full variation in level of engagement and trait anxiety and 
performed a correlational analysis between the level of engagement and change in 
self-reported trait anxiety (see Figure 6). Level of engagement with the training task 
was positively correlated with greater reductions in self-reported trait anxiety pre to 
post intervention in the training group, r(13) = .59, p < .05. 
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Figure 6. The relationship between training improvement/level of engagement 
(averaged performance on last 3 days – first 3 days) and reduction in trait anxiety 
scores.  
DISCUSSION 
 The current study set out to examine whether extensive working memory 
training can improve attentional control processes in high trait anxious individuals. 
We used resting state EEG measures as an indirect neural index of trait attentional 
control, the flanker task as a behavioral measure of distractor interference with and 
without threat, and the antisaccade task with emotional faces as a measure of 
valence-specific inhibitory control. The causal roles of attentional control and working 
memory capacity as determinants of emotional vulnerability and resilience are 
becoming increasingly important in both theoretical models of anxiety and 
depression (see Berggren, & Derakshan, 2013; Waugh, & Koster, 2014) and in 
explaining exaggerated processing styles for negative information as well as clinical 
applications of such models in reducing ruminative styles of thinking (e.g., Cohen et 
al., 2015; Siegle et al., 2014).  
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Given recent theoretical debates on the usefulness of working memory 
training (e.g., Shipstead et al., 2012), it is of crucial importance to examine cognitive 
transfer of training-related gains onto untrained tasks using multiple outcome 
measures. In this proof-of-principle study, we examined whether adaptive training vs. 
an active control training resulted in improved attentional control on behavioral as 
well as neural levels in various transfer tasks. Moreover, we were interested to see if 
training could lead to reductions in self-reported anxious symptomatology. The main 
results are that working memory training resulted in improved attentional control at 
the behavioral level assessed via the Flanker task and neural level observed in terms 
of SW/FW. Furthermore, level of training-related improvement was associated with 
reductions in levels of trait anxiety. We discuss the implications of these findings 
below. 
Training related gains at the behavioral level were examined via the Flanker 
task that included a stress-related manipulation in order to assess distractor 
interference and cognitive control under conditions of high anxiety and competing 
task demands. Moreover, we examined transfer to emotional information processing 
on the Antisaccade task that included angry and neutral facial expressions as targets. 
At post intervention participants in both training and control groups showed 
improvements on the Flanker task in terms of their ability to resist distracting 
interference when identifying targets with this effect being greater in flanker blocks 
where state anxiety was manipulated via bursts of white noise. Crucially, when 
exposed to unpredictable bursts of white noise, participants in the training group 
showed an improvement compared with baseline whereas those assigned to the 
control group showed no significant improvement but rather a cost under these 
conditions. These results suggest that working memory training helped enhance 
cognitive performance under stressful situations when the efficient exercise of 
attentional control was required to cope with the (likely) presentation of an external 
aversive stimulus and enforce focusing on the (Flanker) task at hand. This 
interpretation dovetails with the results of the study by Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps 
and Daw (2013) that showed that during a learning task participants high in working 
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memory capacity did not suffer from the detrimental effects of stress as compared to 
the participants low in working memory capacity that did so. 
Training-related gains seemed not to transfer to performance on the 
antisaccade task as assessed by antisaccade latencies and error rates. A closer 
examination of neural activity right before the onset of saccades during the 50 ms 
interval prior to target presentation showed no significant increase of central 
negativity for the training group, with the control group showing an increment only 
for neutral facial expressions during antisaccade trials. However, this increment on 
central negativity was not reflected on behavioral task performance. Hence, 
increased central negativity without any behavioral improvement may in fact reflect 
the inefficient use of cognitive resources towards achieving behavioral outcomes (see 
Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a,b) suggestive of the fact that in the absence of anxiety-
related difference in terms of antisaccade latencies increased cognitive effort without 
any advantage on performance may reflect deficiencies in processing efficiency 
towards the desired behavioral outcome. Nevertheless, results with regard to 
antisaccade performance were not in the expected direction.  
One plausible explanation for the lack of a significant transfer effect could be 
related to the use of emotional targets in the antisaccade task which may have 
necessitated some form of emotional working memory training or control (see 
Schweizer, Hampshire, & Dalgleish, 2011) facilitating the specific processes underlying 
selective attention to and inhibition of threat-related material. Accordingly, future 
studies should investigate the transfer of training related gains on an Antisaccade task 
that incorporates neutral shaped objects (e.g., oval shapes e.g., Derakshan, Saville & 
Course-Choi, in preparation) rather than emotional faces. It is worth mentioning that 
the working memory training transfer effects in Owens et al (2013) were also 
observed in relation to enhanced inhibitory control and the filtering of irrelevant 
information devoid of emotional content. Furthermore, the antisaccade task used in 
the current study followed a blocked design (separate blocks for antisaccade and 
prosaccade trials). Future research can examine training related effects on a more 
challenging version of a mixed antisaccade task where anti and prosaccade trials are 
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mixed (Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 2008; Vanlessen, De Raedt, Mueller, Rossi, & 
Pourtois, in press). 
Finally, working memory training resulted in transfer of gains to resting state 
EEG, as measured by SW/FW ratio. The ratio between the power density in SW and 
FW band frequencies has been previously related to trait attentional control (Putman 
et al., 2014). While increased SW/FW is related to attentional problems (Clarke et al., 
2001; Arns et al., 2011), decreased SW/FW is related to better attentional control 
(Putman et al., 2012, 2014). In our study, we observed a reduced SW/FW for the 
training group only. Although improvement on a trait-like measure in a short time 
period (3 weeks) is remarkable, trait-like improvements like fluid intelligence (Au et 
al., 2014; Schweizer et al., 2011) or WM capacity (Schweizer et al., 2013; Owens et al., 
2011) were observed as a function of WM training in many other studies as well. This 
finding is valuable as it may indicate that working memory training can yield 
improvements in attentional control mechanisms at the neurophysiological level. 
Training Related Gains on Anxiety Vulnerability, and Clinical Implications 
 An interesting finding concerns the relationship between training-related 
improvements and changes in self-reported anxiety which was amongst our primary 
goals. Although we did not observe any group differences on anxiety scores at post-
intervention, we found decreased anxiety scores for participants who improved the 
most on the training task. While high-engaged participants showed decreases in 
levels of trait anxiety, low-engaged participants showed the opposite pattern. The 
relationship between training improvement and decreased anxiety was also evident 
at a correlational level indicating that increased engagement was related to 
decreased anxiety scores. This finding is valuable as it may indicate that the higher 
engagement with the task, the greater processing efficiency and reductions in anxious 
symptomatology. From a motivational perspective, this finding extends previous 
claims that higher levels of motivation could predict greater engagement with the 
task, which might in turn be related to enhanced training related gains (Jaeggi, 
Buschkuehl, Shah, & Jonides, 2014). Furthermore, this finding resembles effects 
obtained in clinical depression (Siegle et al., 2014) where applied cognitive training in 
a depressed population undergoing psychotherapy and medication led to additional 
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benefits in treatment outcome for participants who engaged with the task to a 
greater level. Due to the limitations considered with our small sample sizes in each 
group replication with a larger sample to examine the relationship between training 
related gains and anxiety would be highly desirable. 
Conclusions, Limitations and Future Directions 
In line with the ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007), we observed that improved levels 
of working memory performance was related to improved attentional control, 
especially when participants were required to perform the flanker task under stress, 
as well as to reductions in self-reported anxious symptomatology post relative to pre 
intervention, and resting state neurophysiological indices of attentional control. Such 
improvements were observed under conditions where anxiety elicited effects could 
be maximally observed (Berggren, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Berggren & Derakshan, 
2013). It can be argued that working memory training led to increases in the 
regulation of top-down control mechanisms, thereby resulting in decreased 
interference from bottom-up influences in trait vulnerability to anxiety. Despite such 
improvements in performance and resting state EEG, the transfer effects on 
inhibitory control as assessed by the antisaccade task were less conclusive and future 
research should examine the possible transfer effects of adaptive cognitive training 
using the dual n-back on non-emotional versions of the antisaccade task (e.g., 
Derakshan et al., in preparation). While the current study elucidates the link between 
attentional control and anxiety within the ACT framework, and sheds some light on 
the mechanisms in working memory responsible for the effects of anxiety on 
performance, it opens up fruitful avenues for future work to explore further the exact 
processes that need targeting in training paradigms. Here, working memory was 
trained and training related gains on attentional control was assessed in a broad 
fashion. Currently, the state of the literature on training does not specify whether 
distinct components of attention are trained. If working memory training influences 
attentional control in a broad sense one would expect changes across a range of 
different attentional tasks. However, provided that training related transfer was not 
observed on every attention task in the current study this begs the question how 
each of the specific attentional processes (e.g., either inhibition, shifting or updating 
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information) might be influenced as a function of working memory training. 
Moreover, whether these effects then generalize to other processes of working 
memory remains an open question (see Shipstead et al., 2012). 
It will be beneficial for future studies to consider having follow-up sessions of 
testing to examine the stability of the obtained transfer effects. Although extensive 
working memory training studies are resource extensive, future research should have 
a greater number of participants in each group. Our sample sizes in the current 
investigation were small, which made it difficult to eliminate the effects of individual 
differences at group level and might be responsible for some of the baseline 
differences between the training and control group, for example on antisaccade 
latencies. Although, these differences were statistically controlled, with a greater 
sample size more solid conclusions can be reached. 
In conclusion, this study contributes to our understanding of the causal 
relationship between attentional control mechanisms and anxiety. Our findings 
suggest that working memory training may have a beneficial contribution to improve 
attention or inhibition-control deficits typically associated with anxiety, and the 
vulnerability to develop anxiety disorders. The results of the current investigation 
pave the way for more extensive and multilevel investigations of how working 
memory training through its influence on attentional control may help protect against 
trait vulnerability to anxiety.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
RECAPITULATION OF THE RESEARCH GOALS 
 The main focus of this dissertation was on anxiety and cognitive vulnerability 
factors in anxiety. Anxiety refers to an unpleasant, apprehensive emotional state in 
response to perceived threat (Rachman, 1998). Although it essentially is an adaptive 
state in order to deal with dangerous/threatening situations, prolonged anxiety in the 
absence of an actual threat can be rather maladaptive; and this is typically the case 
with anxiety disorders (Eysenck, 1992; Barlow, 2002; Gray & McNaughton, 2003; 
Clark & Beck, 2011).  Anxiety disorders are one of the most prevalent psychological 
disorders especially in western developed countries (global prevalence rate 
considering 6-month to 12-month estimates ranges from 2.4% to 29.8%; Baxter, 
Scott, Vos, Whiteford, 2013; see also Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). 
Prominent theories and models in anxiety emphasized the importance of cognitive 
risk factors of anxiety since these factors greatly contribute to the etiology and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Eysenck, Santos, Derakshan, & Calvo, 2007; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). These theories 
proposed that anxiety is related to information processing biases with regard to 
threat-related stimuli (Beck & Clark, 1997; Williams et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007); 
but also general impairments in core cognitive mechanisms such as working memory 
(WM) and attentional control (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Berggren & 
Derakshan, 2013). 
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WM is a limited capacity cognitive system which is essential to perform 
complex tasks (Baddeley, 1992); and capacity of WM is explained in terms of one’s 
ability to process task-relevant information while resisting distracter interference 
(Shipstead, Harrison, & Engle, 2012). WM processes are also closely associated with 
attentional control (Baddeley, 2003; Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012; Shipstead, Lindsey, 
Marshall, & Engle, 2014). Hence, inefficient recruitment of attentional control can be 
related to inefficient functioning of WM as well. Efficient processing of attentional 
control is dependent on the complex interaction between two sub-systems of 
attention: a Bottom-up system (stimulus-driven and reflexive) and a Top-down one 
(goal-directed and volitional; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Theeuwes, 2010; Posner & 
Petersen, 1990). 
 Considering the importance of cognitive theoretical accounts of anxiety, in this 
dissertation, we systematically investigated anxiety-related information processing 
biases and impairments in attentional control and WM. More specifically, we 
examined bottom-up influences; such as, attentional bias to threat (Chapter 2, 3, and 
5); and also general impairments in top-down attentional control and WM (chapter 4, 
and 6). Research goals within each chapter are briefly recapitulated below.  
 A wealth of research demonstrated a strong link between anxiety and 
attentional bias (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007 for a review). However, the influence of 
early attentional bias to threat on further stages of information processing in relation 
to trait anxiety has not been thoroughly examined. Chapter 2 aimed to address this 
issue. In chapter 2, we investigated the role of trait anxiety on encoding (early 
processing) and maintenance (late processing) of threat-related stimuli and explored 
the possible interaction between these early and late processes. Since anxiety is 
mainly associated with impairments in processing efficiency rather than performance 
effectiveness (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007), in addition to behavioral 
indices, we included event related potentials (ERPs) in order to obtain a clearer 
picture of neural events (with a focus on their electrophysiological time-course in the 
present case) potentially giving rise to specific behavioral effects. Furthermore, the 
impact of cognitive (WM) load was also considered, because anxiety-related effects 
on performance are critically dependent on task demands and the amount of 
   GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
169 
cognitive efforts that need to be invested in a given task (Eysenck et al., 2007; 
Berggren & Derakshan, 2013).  
 Chapter 3 also focused on anxiety related-effects on WM considering 
attentional bias and task load, yet in this chapter, we focused on examining the 
influence of state anxiety. Previous findings have shown that state anxiety was 
related to impairments in WM using emotionally neutral tasks (Lavric, Rippon, & Gray, 
2003; Shackman, Sarinopoulos, Maxwell, Pizzagalli, Lavric, & Davidson, 2006; Vytal, 
Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillion, 2012; Vytall, Cornwell, Letkiewicz, Arkin, & Grillion, 2013); 
but also anxiety-related benefits in attentional control in the presence of threat-
related stimuli in the environment (Lystad, Rokke and Stout, 2009; Birk, Dennis, Shin, 
& Urry, 2011). Hence, the effect of state-anxiety on WM in the presence of threat-
related stimuli is still not entirely clear. In chapter 3, we attempted to investigate this 
issue. Both chapters 2 and 3, aimed to gain a better understanding of the effects of 
anxiety (at trait and state level) on WM in relation to attentional bias and (cognitive) 
task load. 
 In chapters 4 and 5, the focus was on the worry component of anxiety. Worry 
is referred to as a key “cognitive component” of anxiety and it is closely associated 
with impairments in attentional control and WM (Mathews, 1990; Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). However, the direct relationship between worry and 
WM capacity has not been fully investigated yet. In chapter 4, by experimentally 
manipulating levels of worry, and obtaining WM capacity scores before and after the 
manipulation, we sought to examine whether worry induces a cognitive cost, 
depleting working memory resources.  
 In chapter 5, we investigated worry-related influences in processing of threat-
related stimuli. Worry has been associated with threat-related biases in information 
processing (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). By experimentally inducing worry, before 
performing a visual search task with threat-related (angry faces) stimuli, we aimed to 
observe direct influences of worrying on selective attention to threat. Furthermore, 
we also considered the effect of WM capacity on this relationship. WM capacity is 
associated with better attentional control and reduced interference by distractor 
(Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). Accordingly, high WM capacity can reduce the 
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impact of worry on performance in the presence of threat-related distractors. Hence, 
chapter 5 focused on the influence of worry on selective attention to threat and 
possible moderating role of WM capacity on this relationship. In essence, in chapters 
4 and 5, we aimed to investigate the direct relationship between worry, WM, and also 
attentional bias to threat by manipulating levels of worry experimentally. 
 Lastly, in chapter 6 the causal status of the relationship between anxiety and 
impairments in WM was investigated. For this purpose, a WM training (dual-n-back 
training; Jaeggi et al., 2003) was applied in a (sub clinical) high-trait-anxious sample. 
Participants were randomly assigned either to a training or an active control 
condition. In order to investigate training-related gains, participants performed 
several cognitive tasks assessing attentional control and WM; filled in questionnaires 
with regard to anxiety, attentional control, and worry before and after the 
training/active control procedure. In this study, in addition to training-related gains in 
attentional control and WM, the relationship between improvement in WM training 
task and self-reported anxious symptomatology was also explored systematically. 
 In the following sections, the main findings of the experimental research 
conducted in chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are reported; before their theoretical and 
practical implications are discussed. Furthermore, limitations and future directions 
are addressed. Finally, we end this section by formulating concluding remarks and 
general recommendations for future research in this area. 
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
In chapter 2, in order to investigate the influence of trait anxiety on processing 
threat-related information under varying WM (cognitive) load conditions, we used a 
standard face change detection task where emotion (neutral vs fearful faces) and WM 
load (high vs low load) were manipulated using a factorial design. At the behavioral 
level, we focused on accuracy rates, sensitivity scores (d prime), and WM capacity (K 
scores). In our ERP analyses, we focused on the N170 occipito-temporal component 
(as a marker for early face processing and encoding) and the contingent negative 
variation (CNV; for late information processing, maintaining, and anticipatory 
cognitive effort). The main findings were as follows: (1) at the behavioral level a clear 
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effect of WM load was observed, yet, regardless of the actual emotional facial 
expression held in WM and levels of anxiety. As expected, participants had lower 
accuracy rates, lower sensitivity scores, and higher WM capacity scores under high 
compared to low WM load condition. (2) For the N170 ERP component, we observed 
an interaction effect between WM load and anxiety. This interaction indicated that 
higher levels of anxiety were related to a larger N170 amplitude under high compared 
to low WM load. (3) For the subsequent CNV activity, there was an interaction effect 
between WM load, emotion and anxiety indicating that higher levels of anxiety were 
related to a lower CNV activity under high compared to low WM load in the presence 
of fearful faces. (4) Lastly, we observed a trend suggesting an interplay between N170 
and CNV activity. More specifically, difference in the amplitude of the N170 between 
high and low WM load was inversely related to the difference in the amplitude of the 
CNV activity between high and low WM load in the presence of fearful faces. 
Moreover, this relationship was more evident at higher levels of anxiety. The findings 
of this study suggest a possible connection between enhanced (early/perceptual) 
processing of fearful faces (indexed by N170 activity) and reduced (post-perceptual) 
processing efficiency of WM in response to task demands (indexed by CNV activity) in 
individuals with high trait anxiety. 
In chapter 3, the influence of state anxiety on WM was investigated 
considering cognitive load and emotion. We used a WM task which combines two 
subsequent tasks: a number recognition task (where cognitive/WM load was 
manipulated); a one-back task with pictures (where emotionality was manipulated via 
threat-related vs neutral pictures). State-anxiety was manipulated via threat of shock 
before starting the task. In this investigation, we observed that state-anxiety was 
related to interference by threat-related stimuli during the number recognition task 
only under high cognitive load condition. More specifically, higher pre to post 
increments in the level of state anxiety were related to lower interference by threat 
under high cognitive load condition. Similar results were obtained in relation to state 
anxiety levels after the mood induction procedure. There was a negative relationship 
between state anxiety levels and interference scores under high cognitive load. The 
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findings of this investigation suggest state anxiety-related performance benefits in 
WM in the presence of threat-related stimuli under high cognitive load. 
In chapter 4, in order to examine the influence of active worrying on WM 
capacity, participants were assigned either to a worry condition where they were 
asked to focus on a personal worrisome concern or to a control condition where they 
were asked to focus on a personal positive topic (cf. Hayes, Hirsch, Mathews, 2008). 
WM capacity was assessed before and after the worry/control manipulation using a 
change detection task with neutral stimuli (Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005). 
The results indicated that participants in the worry condition had greater reductions 
(or attenuated improvements) in WM capacity in relation to elevated worry. The 
findings of this study dovetail with the assumption that worry consumes limited 
attentional resources leading in turn to impairments in WM capacity. 
In chapter 5, effects of worry on selective attention to threat were scrutinized 
considering the possible influence of WM capacity on this relationship. Similar to the 
procedure in chapter 4, participants first performed a change detection task with 
neutral shapes (Vogel et al., 2005) to assess WM capacity. Next, they were assigned 
to a worry or control condition where worry/control manipulation took place (cf. 
Hayes et al., 2008). Afterwards, participants performed a visual search task (i.e. 
Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) with happy, neutral or angry faces. The results 
showed that condition (worry vs control) did not influence visual search task 
performance under any of the task conditions. Furthermore, the relationship 
between condition (worry vs control) and visual search task performance did not 
emerge in any level of the WM capacity either. 
In chapter 6, we applied WM training in an (subclinical) anxious sample. 
Participants were assigned either to training or active control condition. Before and 
after the training/control interventions, we measured resting state EEG where slow 
wave/fast wave ratio (SW/FW; cf. Putman, Verkuil, Elsa Arias-Garcia, Pantazi, & van 
Schie, 2014); a modified version of Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) with stress 
(presentation of random loud bursts) and safe (regular Flanker task) conditions; and 
an Antisaccade task (Hallet, 1978) with emotional (angry vs neutral) faces. During the 
anti-saccade task, in addition to saccade latencies, we also focused on ERPs (central 
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negativity) prior to target presentation. At pre-post intervention sessions, participants 
also filled in questionnaires with regard to anxiety, worry, and attentional control. 
Main findings were as follows: (1) Training-related gains were observed in resting 
state EEG; participants in the training condition had reduced SW/FW (lower SW/FW is 
usually associated with better attentional control; Putman et al., 2014) at pre to post 
intervention. (2) Participants in both training and control conditions showed 
improvements on the Flanker task in the safe condition. However, only participants in 
the training condition showed improvements in the stress condition. (3) Training-
related gains were not observed either in saccade latencies or central negativity 
during the Antisaccade task. (4) Participants in the training condition had reduced 
self-reported trait anxiety in relation to improvements in the training task. These 
results lend support to the notion of training-related gains in attentional control and 
WM in emotionally-natural tasks and also self-reported anxious symptomatology. 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Our results have important theoretical and practical implications with regard 
to anxiety-related information processing biases and impairments in WM and 
attentional control. These implications are presented considering the effects of 
anxiety on top-down influences (attentional control, WM), interaction between top-
down and bottom-up (attentional bias to threat) influences, causal influences, and 
context (cognitive load). 
Anxiety-related Effects on Top-down Influences: Attentional Control and 
Working Memory 
As emphasized throughout this thesis, anxiety has been closely associated 
with impairments in attentional control and WM (Eysenck et al., 2007; Bishop, 2007; 
Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Moran, 2016). Accordingly, as described in the previous 
sections, studies reported in this thesis extensively focused on this relationship. 
Specifically, in chapters 3 and 4, we focused on the influence of state anxiety and 
worry, respectively, on WM. 
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In chapter 3, we observed that elevated state anxiety was related to better 
WM performance in the presence of threat-related stimuli supporting hypervigilance 
(i.e. increased vigilance can lead to increased monitoring and broader attention; 
Eysenck, 1992), and mood congruency accounts (i.e. anxious mood can improve 
performance in the presence of anxiety-provoking stimuli; Bower, 1981). However, in 
chapter 4, we observed that worry was related to reductions in WM capacity. 
Collectively, these findings suggest that different forms of anxiety might have 
differential effects on top-down attentional control and WM. However, it should also 
be noted that performance benefits in chapter 3 were observed in relation to threat-
related stimuli and we could not observe an overall improvements in WM regardless 
of threat. Hence, the apparent discrepancy in our findings with regard to effects of 
worry and state anxiety might be due to the presence vs. absence of (task-irrelevant) 
threat-related stimuli. In line with this view, several studies previously reported state-
anxiety-related impairments in WM when using emotionally neutral tasks to assess 
WM (Lavric et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 2006; Vytal et al., 2012; 2013). Relatedly, in 
chapter 5 of this thesis, we examined the influence of worry on selective attention to 
threat; yet we failed to observe worry-related effects on threat-related information 
processing. Furthermore, in chapter 5, we also focused on top-down influences such 
as WM capacity on the relationship between worry and selective attention to threat. 
Previous research already suggested that better attentional control and WM capacity 
can help to resist distractor interference (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Barrett et al., 
2004), and also potentially reduce the deleterious effect of worry-related 
impairments on performance. However, the results of chapter 5 did not corroborate 
a possible modulatory effect of WMC on the relationship between worry and 
processing of threat-related information either. 
To sum up, our findings show state anxiety-related improvements and worry-
related impairments in WM. However, more research is needed considering the role 
of threat-related processes to get a clearer perspective on the modulatory (and 
sometimes opposite depending on the actual context) effects of different forms of 
anxiety on top-down influences. Furthermore, although state anxiety was related to 
performance benefits in the presence of threat-related stimuli (chapter 3), such 
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relationship could not be observed in relation to worry (chapter 5). However, 
discrepancies in these findings might also be due to different methodological 
approaches we adopted in two studies; such as relevance of threat-related stimuli to 
the task. Our results in chapter 5 also failed to show that top-down factors such as 
WM capacity could possibly reduce the adverse effects of worry on selective 
attention to threat. Non-significant results of this chapter will be discussed further in 
the limitations section here below. 
Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences 
Chapter 2 addressed the effects of early attentional bias to threat-related 
stimuli on subsequent information processing stages. In this study, we observed a 
trend indicating that increased attentional bias to threat-related stimuli was related 
to decreased processing efficiency of performance in the subsequent processes at 
high level of trait anxiety. This finding is compatible with previous theoretical 
accounts proposing increased attentional bias towards threat in high-anxious 
population (Williams et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, this finding is of particular importance since several theoretical models 
in anxiety emphasized that early-information processing biases can influence 
subsequent stages of information processes, however with scant empirical evidence 
gathered so far in the literature confirming this conjecture (Beck & Clark, 1997; Hirsch 
& Mathews, 2012). According to these models, biased information processing may 
lead to dysfunctional cognitive strategies such as worry; and as such it may have a 
crucial role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders.  
The new findings of chapter 2 were different from those reported in chapter 3 
where we mainly focused on state anxiety, and observed there state anxiety-related 
improvements in WM in the presence of threat-related stimuli. Together these 
findings suggest that while trait anxiety has detrimental effects on WM, state anxiety 
can possibly have adaptive consequences, being associated with improvements in 
WM performance in the presence of threat-related stimuli. However, this 
interpretation should be taken cautiously due to different methodological approaches 
we had in these two studies (different tasks, different assessment techniques). 
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Furthermore, in chapter 2, more efficient encoding of faces in relation to high trait 
anxiety might also be considered as an anxiety-related benefit. Although, high trait 
anxiety was related to reduced processing efficiency in subsequent stages of 
information processing in the presence of threat-related faces, behavioral 
performance did not differ as a function of anxiety. Interestingly, these results raise 
the question of whether trait anxiety is actually related to performance benefits or 
costs. To clarify this issue, future research is needed focusing on better characterizing 
the boundaries for processing gains or costs during information processing (in the 
presence vs. absence of threat-related in formation in the environment) related to 
either state or trait anxiety (at the sub clinical level). 
Causal Influences 
Several chapters in this dissertation also focused on causal status of anxiety 
and cognitive processes. Specifically, chapter 4 focused on the influence of worry 
component of anxiety on WM capacity. The findings of this investigation were in line 
with previous theoretical accounts proposing that worry consumes limited, albeit 
important cognitive resources leading thereby to impairments in WM capacity (Hirsch 
& Mathews, 2012; Eysenck et al., 2007; see also Moran, 2016 for a review); and 
suggest the existence of a causal link between worry and reduced WM capacity. 
However and as a caveat, we note that this causal influence is not fully established, 
since the effects were not directly found in association to the manipulation, but in 
response to individual variations as a function of the worry manipulation. Results of 
chapter 4 are also consistent with previous findings demonstrating a direct influence 
of worry in impaired attentional control (Hayes et al., 2008; Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, 
Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014). Given these findings, new intervention techniques to 
improve WM capacity (such as WM training) might be beneficial (to apply in 
individuals with high vulnerability to worry) in order to decrease the deleterious 
influence of worry-related impairments on WM functioning. Accordingly, in chapter 
6, such training was applied in high-trait-anxious sample and promising findings were 
obtained. 
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The findings reported in chapter 6 indicated beneficial effects of WM training 
in attentional control and they also suggest some reduction in anxious symptomology 
resulting from this specific training. Furthermore, the results obtained with regard to 
the Flanker task with stress vs. safe condition showed that training-related gains were 
observed specifically under stressful conditions where anxiety-related effects in WM 
are typically more evident (i.e. Sorg & Whitney, 1992; Edwards, Edwards, & Lyvers, 
2015; also see Eysenck, 1992). However, the findings with regard to the antisaccade 
task with emotional content were less conclusive. It has been suggested that an 
emotional WM training might be more useful to observe training-related gains on 
tasks with emotional content (Schweizer, Hampshire, & Dalgleish, 2011). The findings 
of chapter 6 open new research avenues to explore such as; (1) the effects of 
emotional WM training on attentional control and anxious symptomatology; (2) the 
long-term effects of WM training on attentional control and anxiety; and (3) the 
underlying (neurocognitive) mechanisms that WM training is possibly targeting. 
Eventually, such training may also be applied in clinically-anxious sample which may 
potentially benefit from improvements in attentional control and WM. 
Context: Cognitive Load 
Some of the new experimental results reported in this thesis also concerned 
cognitive (WM) load effect in relation to anxiety (chapter 2, and 3; also see chapter 4 
for exploratory analyses). In chapter 2, anxiety-related effects were observed in high 
compared to low cognitive load. Furthermore, in chapters 3 and 4, state 
anxiety/worry-related effects were observed particularly under high cognitive load 
condition. As such, our findings are in line with previous studies where anxiety-
related effects were detected only under high cognitive load (MacLeod & Donnellan, 
1993; Berggren, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Qi et al., 2014a; Qi et al, 2014c); but also 
the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) which proposes that anxiety-
related effects are most evident when the task is cognitively demanding (also see 
Berggren & Derakshan, 2013). Our findings with regard to load effect also suggest 
that in everyday life, high-anxious individuals may not experience much problems 
while performing simple, routine tasks; however, anxiety-related effects may possibly 
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interfere with task-related behavior when anxious individuals need to perform more 
challenging or demanding (cognitive) tasks, tapping into WM and attention control. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 The different studies reported in this dissertation also had several limitations. 
In this section, these limitations are addressed and also recommendations for future 
research are provided.  
A first limitation is related to the characteristics of the subjects recruited. 
Although the main focus of this thesis was on cognitive risk factors of anxiety and 
anxiety disorders, studies were conducted either in healthy (see chapters 2, 3, 4 and 
5) or subclinical-anxious (see chapter 6) individuals. However, influence of anxiety on 
cognitive performance can differ in healthy and patient populations. For instance, 
state anxiety (Vytal, Arkin, Overstreet, Lieberman, & Grillon, 2016), and worry 
(Stefanopoulou et al., 2014) might impair WM even more in patient population 
(where clinical levels of negative affect are evidenced). Nevertheless, our 
investigations might still be helpful to understand cognitive vulnerability to anxiety 
which is an important risk factor for clinical anxiety (Eysenck, 1992). However, in 
order to gain more insight into the clinical implications of the current findings, future 
research is recommended in clinically-anxious samples. 
Secondly, we primarily focused on the role of either trait anxiety (see chapters 
2 and 6) or state anxiety/worry (see chapters 3, 4 and 5) in our studies. However, 
although trait and state anxiety are highly correlated (Eysenck, 1992), the interaction 
between trait and state anxiety can also influence information processing in several 
and (often) non-transparent ways: for example several studies already demonstrated 
that individuals high in state anxiety have greater attentional bias towards threat 
(MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992); and impaired WM (Egloff 
& Hock, 2001) if they are also high in trait anxiety concurrently. Hence, future studies 
are recommended to pre-select participants in high and low trait anxiety while 
investigating the role of state worry/anxiety on performance in order to explore the 
full scope of interactions effects between state and trait anxiety. 
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Thirdly, in the studies where we investigated anxiety-related processes 
considering task difficulty (specifically, chapters 2 and 3), we focused on only the 
effects of cognitive (WM) load in relation to anxiety, yet influences of perceptual load 
was not investigated in any of these chapters. However, cognitive and perceptual 
load can have different effects on task performance. For instance, as opposed to high 
cognitive load, high perceptual load can be related to reduced interference by 
distractor (see Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Lavie, 2005). Accordingly, 
studies focusing on perceptual load observed anxiety-related impairments in 
performance only under low perceptual load (Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007; 
Bishop, 2009). Hence, in order to fully understand how task demands influence 
performance in relation to anxiety, future studies are recommended considering the 
role of both cognitive and perceptual load. 
Although in several chapters of this dissertation, we focused on both 
processing efficiency (neurophysiological measures; ERPs) and performance 
effectiveness, in some of them, we only relied on behavioral measures which might 
be reflecting only the performance effectiveness. For example, in chapter 5, in order 
to observe threat-related processes, we focused on behavioral measures (reaction 
times); whereas worry-related effects might have emerged in processing efficiency 
(such as cognitive effort invested to perform the task) which was not examined in this 
chapter however. In a similar vein, in chapter 2, we did not observe anxiety-related 
effects on WM performance at the behavioral level either; but modulatory effects of 
anxiety on WM performance with regard to load and emotion only emerged at the 
ERP level. It is also noteworthy to mention that, in chapters 3 and 4, anxiety-related 
effects were observed at the behavioral level; yet only under high cognitive load 
condition when anxious individuals might not be able to utilize compensatory 
strategies to maintain performance effectiveness (see Berggren & Derakshan, 2013). 
However, in chapter 2, even under high cognitive load condition, anxiety-related 
effects were not observed in behavioral outcome measures. One possible explanation 
for that observation could be due to differences in task demands between these two 
studies; such as set size. For instance, while participants were asked to attend to 4 
items in chapter 4; participants encoded only 2 items in chapter 2 during the high 
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cognitive load condition. However, in order to have a better understanding of 
mechanisms underlying anxiety-related effects on performance under various task 
demands, future studies are warranted, preferably focusing on both effectiveness and 
efficiency of performance. 
Lastly, throughout this dissertation, we mainly focused on attentional bias 
towards threat. However, anxiety might also be related to biases in interpretation of 
ambiguous information; long-term memory or future expectations (Beck, Emery, & 
Greenberg, 1985; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 
1997; Bishop, 2007; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). These factors have not been considered 
within the scope of this dissertation. It might be valuable to focus on each of these 
biased processes in order to have a full perspective on cognitive vulnerability to 
anxiety. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 In this thesis, cognitive vulnerability factors to anxiety were investigated by 
means of experimental research carried out using a modern cognitive 
psychopathology framework. In accordance with the dominant cognitive theories in 
anxiety available in the literature (i.e. Eysenck, 1992; Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck et 
al., 2007), our findings demonstrated a close link between anxiety, attentional control 
and WM, although the direction and strength of this complex relationship appear to 
vary depending on specific task demands and contextual factors. As such, we hope 
that the studies reported in this thesis could contribute to gain a better 
understanding of the relationship between attentional bias towards threat-related 
information considering several forms of anxiety and subsequent stages in 
information processing; the causal status of worry and reductions in WM capacity; 
and also the causal status of attentional control and anxiety. Because some of these 
studies yielded inconclusive results and await replication, we believe that future 
research in experimental psychopathology is recommended at this stage, considering 
the above-mentioned limitations, with the aim to eventually gain a better 
understanding of the nature and extent of vulnerability factors for anxiety. This 
research line may eventually be valuable to prevent the development and 
maintenance of anxiety at a clinical level, which is associated with debilitating 
consequences for the health and well-being. 
  
CHAPTER 7 
 
182 
REFERENCES 
Baddeley, A. (1992). Working memory. Science, 255(5044), 556-559. 
Baddeley, A. (2003). Working memory: looking back and looking forward.Nature 
reviews neuroscience, 4(10), 829-839. 
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & Van 
Ijzendoorn, M. H. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and 
nonanxious individuals: a meta-analytic study. Psychological bulletin, 133(1), 
1. 
Barrett, L. F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. W. (2004). Individual differences in working 
memory capacity and dual-process theories of the mind.Psychological 
bulletin, 130(4), 553. 
Baxter, A. J., Scott, K. M., Vos, T., & Whiteford, H. A. (2013). Global prevalence of 
anxiety disorders: a systematic review and meta-regression.Psychological 
Medicine, 43(05), 897-910. 
Beck, A. T., & Clark, D. A. (1997). An information processing model of anxiety: 
Automatic and strategic processes. Behaviour research and therapy,35(1), 
49-58. 
Beck, A. T., Emery, G., & Greenberg, R. L. (1985). Anxiety disorders and phobias: A 
cognitive approach. Basic, New York, b58. 
Berggren, N., & Derakshan, N. (2013). Attentional control deficits in trait anxiety: 
why you see them and why you don’t. Biological Psychology, 92(3), 440-446. 
Berggren, N., Koster, E. H., & Derakshan, N. (2012). The effect of cognitive load in 
emotional attention and trait anxiety: An eye movement study. Journal of 
cognitive psychology, 24(1), 79-91. 
Birk, J. L., Dennis, T. A., Shin, L. M., & Urry, H. L. (2011). Threat facilitates subsequent 
executive control during anxious mood. Emotion, 11(6), 1291. 
Bishop, S. J. (2007). Neurocognitive mechanisms of anxiety: an integrative 
account. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(7), 307-316. 
Bishop, S. J. (2009). Trait anxiety and impoverished prefrontal control of 
attention. Nature neuroscience, 12(1), 92-98. 
 
   GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
183 
Bishop, S. J., Jenkins, R., & Lawrence, A. D. (2007). Neural processing of fearful faces: 
effects of anxiety are gated by perceptual capacity limitations.Cerebral 
cortex, 17(7), 1595-1603. 
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American psychologist, 36(2), 129. 
Clark, D. A., & Beck, A. T. (2011). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders: Science and 
practice. Guilford Press. 
Corbetta, M., & Shulman, G. L. (2002). Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven 
attention in the brain. Nature reviews neuroscience, 3(3), 201-215. 
Derryberry, D., & Reed, M. A. (2002). Anxiety-related attentional biases and their 
regulation by attentional control. Journal of abnormal psychology, 111(2), 
225. 
Edwards, E. J., Edwards, M. S., & Lyvers, M. (2015). Cognitive trait anxiety, 
situational stress, and mental effort predict shifting efficiency: Implications 
for attentional control theory. Emotio 
Egloff, B., & Hock, M. (2001). Interactive effects of state anxiety and trait anxiety on 
emotional Stroop interference. Personality and Individual Differences, 31(6), 
875-882. 
Eriksen, B. A., & Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the identification 
of a target letter in a nonsearch task. Perception & psychophysics, 16(1), 
143-149. 
Eysenck, M. W. (1992). Anxiety: The cognitive perspective. Psychology Press. 
Eysenck, M. W., & Calvo, M. G. (1992). Anxiety and performance: The processing 
efficiency theory. Cognition & Emotion, 6(6), 409-434. 
Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R., & Calvo, M. G. (2007). Anxiety and 
cognitive performance: attentional control theory. Emotion, 7(2), 336. 
Gazzaley, A., & Nobre, A. C. (2012). Top-down modulation: bridging selective 
attention and working memory. Trends in cognitive sciences, 16(2), 129-135. 
Gray, J. A., & McNaughton, N. (2003). The neuropsychology of anxiety: An enquiry 
into the function of the septo-hippocampal system (No. 33). Oxford 
university press. 
Grupe, D. W., & Nitschke, J. B. (2013). Uncertainty and anticipation in anxiety: an 
integrated neurobiological and psychological perspective. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 14(7), 488-501. 
CHAPTER 7 
 
184 
Hallett, P. E. (1978). Primary and secondary saccades to goals defined by 
instructions. Vision research, 18(10), 1279-1296. 
Hayes, S., Hirsch, C., & Mathews, A. (2008). Restriction of working memory capacity 
during worry. Journal of abnormal psychology, 117(3), 712. 
Hirsch, C. R., & Mathews, A. (2012). A cognitive model of pathological worry. 
Behaviour research and therapy, 50(10), 636-646. 
Jaeggi, S. M., Seewer, R., Nirkko, A. C., Eckstein, D., Schroth, G., Groner, R., & 
Gutbrod, K. (2003). Does excessive memory load attenuate activation in the 
prefrontal cortex? Load-dependent processing in single and dual tasks: 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study. NeuroImage, 19(2), 210-225. 
Kessler, R. C., Chiu, W. T., Demler, O., & Walters, E. E. (2005). Prevalence, severity, 
and comorbidity of 12-month DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity 
Survey Replication. Archives of general psychiatry, 62(6), 617-627. 
Lavie, N. (2005). Distracted and confused?: Selective attention under load.Trends in 
cognitive sciences, 9(2), 75-82. 
Lavie, N., Hirst, A., De Fockert, J. W., & Viding, E. (2004). Load theory of selective 
attention and cognitive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 133(3), 339. 
Lavric, A., Rippon, G., & Gray, J. R. (2003). Threat-evoked anxiety disrupts spatial 
working memory performance: an attentional account. Cognitive therapy 
and research, 27(5), 489-504. 
Lystad, C. M., Rokke, P. D., & Stout, D. M. (2009). Emotion congruent facilitation of 
attention when processing anxious stimuli. Cognitive therapy and 
research, 33(5), 499-510. 
MacLeod, C., & Donnellan, A. M. (1993). Individual differences in anxiety and the 
restriction of working memory capacity. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 15(2), 163-173. 
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1988). Anxiety and the allocation of attention to 
threat. The Quarterly journal of experimental psychology, 40(4), 653-670. 
MacLeod, C., & Rutherford, E. M. (1992). Anxiety and the selective processing of 
emotional information: Mediating roles of awareness, trait and state 
variables, and personal relevance of stimu. Behaviour research and 
therapy, 30(5), 479-491. 
   GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
185 
Mathews, A. (1990). Why worry? The cognitive function of anxiety. Behaviour 
research and therapy, 28(6), 455-468. 
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1994). Cognitive approaches to emotion and 
emotional disorders. Annual review of psychology, 45, 25. 
Mathews, A., Mackintosh, B., & Fulcher, E. P. (1997). Cognitive biases in anxiety and 
attention to threat. Trends in cognitive sciences, 1(9), 340-345. 
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (1998). A cognitive-motivational analysis of 
anxiety. Behaviour research and therapy, 36(9), 809-848. 
Moran, T. P. (2016). Anxiety and Working Memory Capacity: A Meta-Analysis and 
Narrative Review. 
Öhman, A., Flykt, A., & Esteves, F. (2001). Emotion drives attention: detecting the 
snake in the grass. Journal of experimental psychology: general, 130(3), 466. 
Posner, M. I. & Petersen, S. E. The attention system of the human brain. Annual 
review of neuroscience. 13, 25–42 (1990). 
Putman, P., Verkuil, B., Arias-Garcia, E., Pantazi, I., & van Schie, C. (2014). EEG 
theta/beta ratio as a potential biomarker for attentional control and 
resilience against deleterious effects of stress on attention. Cognitive, 
Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(2), 782-791. 
Qi, S., Chen, J., Hitchman, G., Zeng, Q., Ding, C., Li, H., & Hu, W. (2014). Reduced 
representations capacity in visual working memory in trait anxiety.Biological 
psychology, 103, 92-99. 
Qi, S., Zeng, Q., Luo, Y., Duan, H., Ding, C., Hu, W., & Li, H. (2014). Impact of working 
memory load on cognitive control in trait anxiety: an ERP study.PloS 
one, 9(11), e111791. 
Rachman, S. (1998). Anxiety, Hove, East Sussex. 
Schweizer, S., Hampshire, A., & Dalgleish, T. (2011). Extending brain-training to the 
affective domain: increasing cognitive and affective executive control 
through emotional working memory training. PLoS One, 6(9), e24372. 
Shackman, A. J., Sarinopoulos, I., Maxwell, J. S., Pizzagalli, D. A., Lavric, A., & 
Davidson, R. J. (2006). Anxiety selectively disrupts visuospatial working 
memory. Emotion, 6(1), 40. 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
186 
Shipstead, Z., Harrison, T. L., & Engle, R. W. (2012). Working memory capacity and 
visual attention: Top-down and bottom-up guidance. The Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 65(3), 401-407. 
Shipstead, Z., Lindsey, D. R., Marshall, R. L., & Engle, R. W. (2014). The mechanisms 
of working memory capacity: Primary memory, secondary memory, and 
attention control. Journal of Memory and Language, 72, 116-141. 
Sorg, B. A., & Whitney, P. (1992). The effect of trait anxiety and situational stress on 
working memory capacity. Journal of Research in Personality,26(3), 235-241. 
Stefanopoulou, E., Hirsch, C. R., Hayes, S., Adlam, A., & Coker, S. (2014). Are 
attentional control resources reduced by worry in generalized anxiety 
disorder?. Journal of abnormal psychology, 123(2), 330. 
Theeuwes, J. (2010). Top–down and bottom–up control of visual selection.Acta 
psychologica, 135(2), 77-99. 
 
Vogel, E. K., McCollough, A. W., & Machizawa, M. G. (2005). Neural measures reveal 
individual differences in controlling access to working 
memory. Nature, 438(7067), 500-503. 
Vytal, K. E., Arkin, N. E., Overstreet, C., Lieberman, L., & Grillon, C. (2016). Induced-
anxiety differentially disrupts working memory in generalized anxiety 
disorder. BMC psychiatry, 16(1), 1. 
Vytal, K. E., Cornwell, B. R., Letkiewicz, A. M., Arkin, N. E., & Grillon, C. (2013). The 
complex interaction between anxiety and cognition: insight from spatial and 
verbal working memory. 
Vytal, K., Cornwell, B., Arkin, N., & Grillon, C. (2012). Describing the interplay 
between anxiety and cognition: from impaired performance under low 
cognitive load to reduced anxiety under high load. Psychophysiology, 49(6), 
842-852. 
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1988).Cognitive 
psychology and emotional disorders. John Wiley & Sons 
 
 NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
ONDERZOEKSDOELEN 
Angst wordt omschreven als een aversieve, negatieve emotionele toestand, 
die optreedt bij het waarnemen van bedreiging (Rachman, 1998). Vanuit een 
evolutionair gezichtspunt, kan angst beschouwd worden als een adaptieve 
emotionele toestand die nuttig kan zijn bij het opmerken van de eerste tekenen van 
gevaar (Eysenck, 1992; Clark & Beck, 2011). Echter, bij afwezigheid van onmiddellijke 
dreiging, kan angst maladaptief zijn, wat vaak het geval is bij angststoornissen 
(Barlow, 2002; Gray & McNaughton, 2003; Clark & Beck, 2011).  
Angststoornissen behoren tot de meest voorkomende psychische stoornissen 
in de samenleving (Baxter, Scott, Vos, & Whiteford, 2013). Inzicht in de risicofactoren 
waardoor deze stoornissen ontstaan en voortbestaan, is dan ook van groot belang. 
Onder de vele mogelijke risicofactoren - waaronder genetica, vroege 
levenservaringen, trauma, en persoonlijkheidsfactoren (Barlow, 2000), worden 
cognitieve risicofactoren benadrukt. Cognitieve factoren blijken een centrale rol te 
spelen bij angst, en dit bij verschillende angststoornissen (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992; Beck & Clark, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Matthews, 1988; Mogg 
& Bradley, 1998; Eysenck, Santos, Derakshan, & Calvo, 2007; Grupe & Nitschke, 
2013). Cognitieve modellen benadrukten vaak dat angst gerelateerd is aan 
vertekeningen in de informatieverwerking bij confrontatie met bedreigende stimuli 
(Beck & Clark, 1997; Williams et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007); maar ook algemene 
beperkingen in cognitieve mechanismen, zoals het werkgeheugen (WG) en 
aandachtscontrole (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Berggren & Derakshan, 
2013). 
Het WG is een geheugensysteem met beperkte capaciteit, en wordt gebruikt 
om complexe problemen op te lossen (Baddeley, 1992). WG capaciteit wordt 
uitgedrukt in termen van iemands vermogen om relevante informatie te verwerken, 
terwijl afleidende informatie genegeerd wordt. WG processen hangen nauw samen 
met aandachtscontrole (Baddeley, 2003; Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012; Shipstead, Lindsey, 
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Marshall, & Engle, 2014). Bijgevolg kan gebrekkige aandachtscontrole een efficiënte 
werking van het WG verhinderen. Aandachtscontrole is gebaseerd op de interactie 
tussen twee subsystemen: een bottom-up en top-down systeem (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Theeuwes, 2010; Posner & Petersen, 1990). Terwijl het bottom-up 
systeem stimulus-gedreven en reflexief is; is het top-down systeem doelgericht en 
vrijwillig. De interactie tussen deze subsystemen is belangrijk, omdat deze bepaalt in 
welke mate individuen in staat zijn om irrelevante informatie te inhiberen, en 
gefocust te blijven op hun huidige doelstellingen (Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001; 
Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). 
Op basis van cognitieve standpunten en theoretische benaderingen van angst, 
hebben we ons in het huidige proefschrift gericht op angst-gerelateerde 
vertekeningen en beperkingen in belangrijke cognitieve factoren die de 
kwetsbaarheid voor angst verhogen. Meer bepaald, hebben we bottom-up invloeden 
onderzocht, zoals aandachtbias voor bedreiging (neiging om bedreigende informatie 
op te merken in de omgeving op te merken en hierop gefocust te blijven; Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007; hoofdstuk 2, 3, en 5), alsook algemene beperkingen in top-down 
aandachtscontrole en WG (hoofdstuk 4 en 6). Tevens werden verschillende vormen 
van angst onderzocht, waaronder toestandsangst (tijdelijke emotionele toestand in 
reactie op situaties die als bedreigend worden ervaren; Spielberger, 1972, hoofdstuk 
3), trekangst (een stabiele individuele eigenschap om de neiging te hebben angst te 
ervaren, Spielberger, 1972, hoofdstuk 2 en 6), en piekeren (toestand waarbij 
oncontroleerbare, opdringerige, negatieve gedachten over de toekomst optreden; 
Borkivec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & DePree, 1983, hoofdstuk 4 en 5). Tenslotte, werden 
ook de invloed van de context (taakvereisten zoals cognitieve belasting, hoofdstuk 2 
en 3) en de causale relatie tussen angst en WG (hoofdstuk 4 en 6) onderzocht. In de 
volgende paragraaf, worden deze onderzoeksdoelen en de belangrijkste resultaten 
kort samengevat. 
OVERZICHT VAN HOOFDSTUKKEN EN HOOFDBEVINDINGEN 
Hoofdstuk 2 focuste op hoe vroege aandachtsbias voor bedreiging invloed 
heeft op de volgende stappen van informatieverwerking. Gezien de adverse effecten 
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van dispositie voor angst op performantie evidenter kunnen zijn onder een hoge 
cognitieve (zie Berggren & Derakshan, 2013), werd ook de invloed van cognitieve 
(werkgeheugen; WG) lading bekeken in dit onderzoek. In deze studie hebben we een 
taak afgenomen waar emotie (neutrale vs. angstige gezichten) en WG lading (lage vs. 
hoge lading) gemanipuleerd werden en opgeslagen diende te worden in et 
werkgeheugen. We maten zowel gedragsindices als event related potentials (ERPs). 
Op ERP-niveau focusten we op de N170 (voor het encoderen van gezichtsstimuli, 
vroege verwerking), en de CNV (contingente negatieve variatie; voor het 
onderhouden van informatie, anticiperende cognitieve inspanning, late verwerking). 
Onze resultaten waren de volgende: (1) enkel het effect van WG lading verscheen op 
gedragsniveau; (2) N170 activiteit was gemoduleerd door WG lading en angst, wat 
aantoont dat hoog-angstige individuen een grotere N170 hadden onder een hoge WG 
lading vergeleken met onder een lage lading; (3) CNV activiteit was gemoduleerd 
door WG lading, emotie en angst, wat aantoont dat hoge angst gerelateerd was aan 
lagere CNV activiteit in de hoge WG lading conditie vergeleken met die met een lage 
lading, in de aanwezigheid van angstige gezichten; (4) Ten slotte was er een trend die 
een omgekeerde relatie aantoonde tussen N170 en CNV activiteit in de aanwezigheid 
van angstige gezichten, als een functie van WG lading en dit was evidenter bij hoog-
angstige individuen. Deze resultaten zijn de eerste om een mogelijke connectie aan te 
tonen tussen een verbeterde verwerking van angstige gezichten (geïndexeerd door 
N170 activiteit) en een gereduceerde verwerkingsefficiëntie van het WG (geïndexeerd 
door CNV activiteit) als reactie op taakvereisten in individuen met een verhoogde 
dispositie voor angst. 
Hoofdstuk 3 focuste op de rol van situationele angst op het WG, rekening 
houdend met cruciale factoren die mogelijk bijdragen aan deze relatie: emotie 
(bedreigingsgerelateerde vs. neutrale stimuli) en cognitieve lading (hoge vs. lage 
lading). Om het effect van situationele angst op WG te onderzoeken, rekening 
houdend met taakvereisten (lage vs. hoge cognitieve lading) en emotionaliteit 
(bedreigingsgerelateerde vs. neutrale stimuli), werd een emotionele variant van de 
WG taak gebruikt door de Fockert, Rees, Frith en Lavie (2001) afgenomen. Vooraleer 
deze taak van start ging, werd situationele angst gemanipuleerd door dreiging met 
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shock. Resultaten toonden dat situationele angst (zelfgerapporteerde angstscores na 
de manipulatie; alsook veranderingen in deze scores van pre- naar post-manipulatie) 
een omgekeerde relatie had met interferentie door bedreigingsgerelateerde stimuli in 
de conditie met een hoge cognitieve lading. Gelijkaardige bevindingen werden niet 
gevonden in de conditie met een lage cognitieve lading. Dit onderzoek kan nuttig zijn 
om een beter begrip te bekomen van de effecten van situationele angst op WG 
performantie, rekening houdend met emotionaliteit en taakvereisten in gezonde 
volwassen subjecten. 
In hoofdstuk 4 werd de causale status van piekeren en WG capaciteit 
onderzocht. In dit onderzoek werden participanten toegewezen ofwel aan een 
“pieker conditie” waar ze gevraagd werden te focussen op een zorgwekkende 
gedachte; ofwel aan een controleconditie waar ze gevraagd werden te focussen op 
een positief onderwerp (cf. Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008). Om WG capaciteit te 
kunnen beoordelen, voerden participanten een veranderingsdetectietaak uit (Vogel, 
McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005) voor (pre-manipulatie) en na (post-manipulatie) 
een pieker inductie of een controleprocedure. Resultaten toonden aan dat 
participanten in de pieker conditie een verminderde WG capaciteit hadden tijdens de 
post- in vergelijking met de pre-manipulatie, gerelateerd aan verhoogde zorgen. 
Bevindingen van dit onderzoek zijn belangrijk aangezien ze een directe relatie 
suggereren tussen piekeren en WG capaciteit. 
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzochten we de relatie tussen piekeren en aandachtsbias 
naar bedreiging, rekening houdend met de modulaire rol van de WG capaciteit. Om 
de WG capaciteit te beoordelen, voerden participanten eerst een 
veranderingsdetectietaak uit (Vogel et al., 2005). Daarna werden ze toegewezen aan 
ofwel een pieker ofwel een controleconditie, waar een pieker manipulatie of een 
controleprocedure werd gevolgd. (cf. Hayes et al., 2008). Nadien voerden 
participanten een visuele zoektaak uit met boze, blije of neutrale gezichten (cf. 
Derakshan & Koster, 2010) om de bedreigingsgerelateerde aandachtsbias na te gaan. 
Op basis van de visuele zoektaakperformantie werden verscheidene 
aandachtsbiasindices berekend, gecontroleerd voor engagement voor 
bedreigingsgerelateerde stimuli (boze gezichten) en disengagement voor zulke 
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stimuli. Resultaten toonden dat conditie (piekeren vs. controle) geen effect had, op 
geen enkele van de aandachtsbiasindices. Bovendien werd de relatie tussen conditie 
en de aandachtsbiasindices ook niet gemodereerd door WG capaciteit. De 
bevindingen van hoofdstuk 5 zijn dus niet overtuigend met betrekking tot de invloed 
van piekeren op aandachtsbias naar bedreiging en de rol van WG capaciteit op deze 
relatie. 
In hoofdstuk 6 werd de causale status van de relatie tussen angst en 
problemen in aandachtscontrole en WG verkend door WG training. In dit onderzoek 
bekeken we de effecten van WG training op aandachtscontrole, alsook de 
zelfgerapporteerde angstige symptomatologie in voorgeselecteerde (subklinische) 
individuen met predispositie om hoog-angstig te zijn. Participanten werden 
toegewezen aan ofwel een trainingsconditie waar ze een dual N-back taak uitvoerden 
(Jaeggi et al., 2003) ofwel een actieve controleconditie waar ze een niet-adaptieve 
versie van de taak uitvoerden. De training/controle interventie duurde drie weken (15 
sessies). Voor en na deze interventie werden participanten uitgenodigd naar het lab 
om computertaken uit te voeren die aandachtscontrole en WG beoordelen (Resting 
State EEG, Flankertaak – met veilige en stresserende condities, antisaccadetaak – met 
boze of neutrale gezichten); en ook vragenlijsten invulden met betrekking tot angst, 
zorgen en aandachtscontrole. In deze studie observeerden we trainingsgerelateerde 
verbeteringen in aandachtscontrole (gezien in resting state EEG); verbeteringen in 
flankertaakperformantie in de stresserende conditie; en ook verminderde 
zelfgerapporteerde angst gerelateerd aan verbeteringen in de trainingstaak. 
Trainingsgerelateerde verbeteringen konden echter niet geobserveerd worden in de 
antisaccadetaak met emotionele gezichten. In het algemeen suggereren onze 
resultaten dat WG training in angstige individuen gunstige effecten kan hebben. 
THEORETISCH EEN PRAKTISCHE IMPLICATIES 
De focus van hoofdstuk 4 had betrekking tot de invloed van piekeren (de 
cognitieve component van angst) op werkgeheugencapaciteit. Resultaten gevonden 
in deze studie suggereerden een causale link tussen piekeren en verminderde 
werkgeheugencapaciteit. Deze bevindingen zijn in lijn met voorgaande theoretische 
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kaders die voorstellen dat piekeren cognitieve bronnen (die beperkt zijn) consumeert 
en dit leidt tot tekortkomingen in werkgeheugencapaciteit (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; 
Eysenck et al., 2007; zie eveneens Moran, 2016 voor een review). Gebaseerd op de 
bevindingen van hoofdstuk 4, zouden interventietechnieken die gericht zijn op het 
verbeteren van werkgeheugencapaciteit (zoals werkgeheugentraining) voordelig 
kunnen zijn voor individuen die veelvuldig piekeren, om zo de invloed van piekeren 
op werkgeheugen capaciteit te beperken. Dit soort training werd vervolgens in 
hoofdstuk 6 toegepast in hoog angstige subjecten (bij angst kan gezien worden als 
trek); hierbij observeerden we training gerelateerde verbeteringen in werkgeheugen, 
aandachtscontrole alsook in zelfgerapporteerde symptomatologie van angst. 
Desondanks werden geen trainingsgerelateerde verbeteringen geobserveerd in de 
antisaccade taak met emotionele inhoud. De bevindingen van hoofdstuk 6 zijn 
suggestief/aanmoedigend voor toekomstig onderzoek omtrent emotionele 
werkgeheugentraining; lange termijn effecten van werkgeheugentraining; en 
onderliggende mechanismen waarop werkgeheugentraining mogelijks richt. 
Hoofdstuk 2, 3, en 5 van deze uiteenzetting focuste op een aandachtsbias 
voor bedreiging waarbij meerdere vormen van angst in rekening werden gebracht. De 
resultaten van hoofdstuk 2 suggereerden een mogelijke link tussen vroege 
aandachtsbias voor bedreiging  en een vermindering in de daaropvolgende 
verwerking van informatie geassocieerd met hogere niveaus van trekangst. Deze 
bevinding ondersteunt verschillende theoretische kaders omtrent angst die 
voorstellen dat vertekeningen/biases tijdens vroege verwerking van informatie een 
grote impact kunnen hebben op verdere verwerking van informatie en kan leiden tot 
dysfunctionele cognitieve strategieën zoals bezorgdheid (Beck & Clark, 1997; Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012). Hoofdstuk 5 focuste dan weer op de relatie tussen bezorgdheid en 
aandachtsbias. In deze studie vonden we echter geen relatie tussen bezorgdheid en 
aandachtsbias voor bedreiging. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor kan liggen bij de 
‘processing efficiency account’ van angst (Processing efficiency theory; Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992; Attentional control theory, Eysenck et al., 2007). Volgens deze theorieën 
zou angst voornamelijk de efficiëntie van verwerking verminderen (de relatie tussen 
de uitkomst van een prestatie en het gebruik van cognitieve bronnen; vaak gemeten 
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via neurofysiologische maten)  in plaats van de effectiviteit  van prestaties (de 
uitkomst van prestaties; vaak gemeten via gedragsmaten). In hoofdstuk 5 baseerden 
we ons enkel op gedragsmaten (reactietijden; die kunnen gezien worden als een maat 
van effectiviteit van prestaties) om aandachtsbias voor bedreiging te onderzoeken 
(Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Basten, Stelzel, & Fiebach, 2012); terwijl bezorgdheid-
gerelateerde effecten mogelijks tot uiting kwamen in de efficiëntie van verwerking, 
werden deze niet onderzocht in hoofdstuk 5. Bijkomend werden er in hoofdstuk 2 
ook geen angst-gerelateerde effecten (op gedragsniveau) op werkgeheugenprestaties 
gevonden, maar deze effecten manifesteerden zich wel op ERP niveau. Ten laatste 
onderzochten we de rol van situationele angst op aandachtsbias voor bedreiging in 
hoofdstuk 3. In tegenstelling tot de bevindingen in hoofdstuk 2, waar we 
vermindering in prestatie terugvonden in relatie met trekangst en aandachtbias voor 
bedreiging, observeerden we in hoofdstuk 3 situationele angst-gerelateerde 
voordelen voor prestaties wanneer zij in de aanwezigheid waren van 
bedreigingsgerelateerde stimuli.  
Verschillende onderzoeken in deze thesis focusten ook (hoofdstuk 2 en 3; 
alsook hoofdstuk 4 ter exploratie) op het effect van cognitieve belasting. In deze 
hoofdstukken observeerden we dat angst-gerelateerde effecten meer uitgesproken 
waren tijdens een conditie van hoge cognitieve belasting. Deze bevindingen zijn in lijn 
met vorige studies waarbij angst-gerelateerde effecten enkel voorkwamen bij hoge 
cognitieve belasting, wanneer de taak meer vereiste (MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; 
Berggren, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Qi, Chen, Hitchman, Zeng, Ding, Li, & Hu, 
2014a; Qi, Zeng, Luo, Duan, Ding, Hu & Li, 2014c). Onze bevindingen met betrekking 
tot het effect van belasting suggereert ook dat in het dagelijkse leven, hoog angstige 
individuen deze problemen niet ervaren bij simpele geroutineerde taken; angst-
gerelateerde effecten kunnen echt wel interfereren met het dagelijkse leven wanneer 
men moet presteren op uitdagende taken.  
BEPERKINGEN EN TOEKOMSTIG ONDERZOEK 
De studies gerapporteerd in deze thesis hebben ook enkele beperkingen. 
Alhoewel het algemene doel van deze thesis bestond uit het beter begrijpen van 
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cognitieve kwetsbaarheidsfactoren bij angst en angststoornissen, werden de studies 
uitgevoerd met enkel een steekproef van gezonde volwassenen. Ten tweede focusten 
we ofwel op de rol van trekangst (hoofdstuk 2 en 6) ofwel op de rol van situationele 
angst/bezorgdheid (hoofdstuk 3, 4 en 5). Hierbij werd de interactie tussen 
situationele angst en trekangst niet in rekening gebracht. Ten derde focusten we in 
onze studies enkel op de rol van cognitieve belasting; terwijl perceptuele belasting 
ook een behoorlijke invloed kan hebben op prestaties (zie Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & 
Viding, 2004; Lavie, 2005), werd dit niet bestudeerd. Ten laatste focusten we ons in 
deze thesis vooral op een aandachtsbias voor bedreiging. Angst kan echter ook 
gerelateerd zijn aan vertekeningen die betrekking hebben op interpretatie of 
geheugen (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mathews, 
Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). 
Samengevat toonden de gerapporteerde studies in deze thesis aan dat er een 
nauwe link bestaat tussen angst, aandachtscontrole en werkgeheugen. Om een nog 
duidelijker perspectief te krijgen op angst en factoren die cognitieve kwetsbaarheid 
inhouden,  wordt bij het voeren van toekomstig onderzoek aangeraden om de 
hierboven vermelde beperkingen te overwegen of in rekening te brengen.  
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   - e-mail:  
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% The effects of state anxiety on working memory in relation to emotion and cognitive load 
% Author: Berna Sari 
% Date: 25.5.2016 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Berna Sari 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
 
- e-mail: ayseberna.sari@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Ernst Koster 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
 
- e-mail: ernst.koster@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
Doctoral thesis - Berna Sari 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Only to the data described in the thesis. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify):external hard drive 
 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
 
202 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: see 
methodology in Chapter 3 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: StateAnxiety.sav, quest.emrg2, task.emrg2 
  - [ ] file(s) containing analyses. Specify:stateanxiety.spv 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: external hard drive 
    
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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% The effects of active worrying on working memory capacity 
% Author: Berna Sari 
% Date: 16.3.2016 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Berna Sari 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
 
- e-mail: ayseberna.sari@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Ernst Koster 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
 
- e-mail: ernst.koster@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
Sari, B. A., Koster, E. H., & Derakshan, N. (2016). The effects of active worrying on working 
memory capacity. Cognition and Emotion, 1-9. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Only to the data described in the article. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify):external hard drive 
 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
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  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: A detailed 
description can be found in the article. 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: Worry1.xlsx; Worry1.sav 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: Worry.spv 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: external hard drive 
    
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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% The effects of active worrying on threat-related information processing considering the 
modulatory role of working memory capacity 
% Author: Berna Sari 
% Date: 16.3.2016 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Berna Sari 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
 
- e-mail: ayseberna.sari@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Ernst Koster 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
 
- e-mail: ernst.koster@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
doctoral thesis - Berna Sari 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Only to the data described in the thesis. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify):external hard drive 
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* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: see 
methodology in Chapter 5 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: Worry2.xlsx; Worry2.sav 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: worry2.spv 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: external hard drive 
    
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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% Training working memory to improve attentional control in anxiety: a proof-of-principle 
study using behavioral and electrophysiological measures  
% Author: Berna Sari 
% Date: 22.9.2015 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Berna Sari 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
 
- e-mail: ayseberna.sari@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Ernst Koster 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
 
- e-mail: ernst.koster@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
Sari, B. A., Koster, E. H., Pourtois, G., & Derakshan, N. (2015). Training working memory to 
improve attentional control in anxiety: A proof-of-principle study using behavioral and 
electrophysiological measures. Biological Psychology. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
Only to the data described in the article. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify):external hard drive 
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* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: A detailed 
description can be found in the article. 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: Questionnaires.xlsm, Theta.xlsx, Training 
improvement.xlsx, Antisaccade Latency Post.xlsm, Antisaccade Latency Pre.xlsm, Beta.xlsx, 
Central Negativity.xlsx, Flanker.xlsx, Training.sav 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: training.spv 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: external hard drive 
    
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
 
 
